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Abstract 
 
Understanding how beliefs form and change is important because people act upon 
their beliefs in the world around them, which has implications for everyone.  The 
present research programme therefore aimed to explore mechanisms in the belief 
process.  This was approached from the dual-process perspective that there are two 
kinds of thinking: intuitive and rational.  It was predicted that belief formation and 
change would be path-dependent, with rational disconfirmation influencing 
rationally-based beliefs more and intuitive disconfirmation influencing intuitively-
based beliefs more.  The research programme used a mixture of lab-based studies 
and naturalistic intervention studies, drawing upon a range of population samples.  
Belief in Extrasensory Perception (ESP) was the focus for belief change, due to its 
association with intuitive belief-basis and broad distribution within the general 
population.  The proposed model of path-dependent belief change was not 
supported, however.  Ultimately, it was found that beliefs vary in being held for 
rational or intuitive reasons, and that this difference emerges at the belief formation 
stage due to the nature of the material encountered and the person’s cognitive 
processing style.  However, neither the nature of the material nor the person’s 
cognitive processing style influences belief change.  Therefore, while the findings 
did not support the specific model being tested, they did successfully demonstrate a 
connection between belief formation and change.  It is argued that the observed 
asymmetry is only explainable by a difference in encoding at belief formation and 




Abstract      4 
Contents 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................... 3 
INTRODUCTION & AIMS.................................................................................................................... 7 
GENERAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 11 
What is a Belief? .............................................................................................................................................. 11 
The Rational Actor .......................................................................................................................................... 16 
The Non-Rational Actor .................................................................................................................................. 24 
Dual-Process Accounts of Cognition ............................................................................................................... 34 
Path-Dependent Belief Change: A Dual-Process Model of Belief .................................................................... 43 
Paranormal Beliefs as a Research Tool ............................................................................................................. 47 
General Hypotheses ......................................................................................................................................... 55 
STUDY 1 – BELIEF-BASIS CORRELATES WITH SELF-PREDICTED BELIEF CHANGE: A 
REPLICATION STUDY ........................................................................................................................ 56 
Background ...................................................................................................................................................... 56 
Method ............................................................................................................................................................. 60 
Results ............................................................................................................................................................. 68 
Discussion ....................................................................................................................................................... 75 
STUDY 2 – DOES BELIEF-BASIS INFLUENCE REAL WORLD BELIEF CHANGE? .............. 79 
Background ...................................................................................................................................................... 79 
Method ............................................................................................................................................................. 84 
Results ............................................................................................................................................................. 87 
Discussion ....................................................................................................................................................... 94 
REFINING THE BELIEF-BASIS MEASURE..................................................................................... 98 
Background ...................................................................................................................................................... 98 
Materials .......................................................................................................................................................... 99 
Analysis ......................................................................................................................................................... 100 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................................... 103 
STUDY 3 – DOES INHIBITION OF INTUITION CONTRIBUTE TO BELIEF CHANGE? .. 105 
Background .................................................................................................................................................... 105 
Method ........................................................................................................................................................... 112 
Abstract      5 
Results ........................................................................................................................................................... 116 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................................... 129 
STUDY 4 – THE CRT5: EXTENDING THE 3-ITEM COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST ....... 135 
Background .................................................................................................................................................... 135 
Method ........................................................................................................................................................... 139 
Results ........................................................................................................................................................... 147 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................................... 155 
STUDY 5 – AN EXTENDED INTERVENTION ON PATH-DEPENDENT BELIEF CHANGE
.................................................................................................................................................................. 164 
Background .................................................................................................................................................... 164 
Method ........................................................................................................................................................... 169 
Results ........................................................................................................................................................... 172 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................................... 183 
STUDY 6 – BELIEF FORMATION AND CHANGE IN THE LAB ............................................. 190 
Background .................................................................................................................................................... 190 
Method ........................................................................................................................................................... 196 
Results ........................................................................................................................................................... 202 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................................... 206 
GENERAL DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................... 212 
Path-Dependency and Dual-Process Theories ............................................................................................... 212 
Considering Other Accounts of Belief Formation and Change ..................................................................... 222 
Thinking Style & Belief-Basis ........................................................................................................................ 228 
Believing and Unbelieving in the Paranormal .............................................................................................. 235 
Concluding Summary & Reflections ............................................................................................................. 244 
Abstract      6 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 251 
APPENDIX 1 – STUDY 1: QUESTIONNAIRE ............................................................................... 264 
APPENDIX 2 – STUDY 2: BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING ......................................................... 283 
APPENDIX 3 – STUDY 1: FREE-TEXT RESPONSES .................................................................... 286 
APPENDIX 4 – STUDY 3: QUESTIONNAIRE ............................................................................... 315 
APPENDIX 5 – STUDY 5: BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING ......................................................... 331 
APPENDIX 6 – STUDY 6: EXPERIMENTAL MATERIAL ........................................................... 334 
 
  
Introduction & Aims      7 
Introduction & Aims 
 
Beliefs power the world – people act upon the world based upon how they believe it to 
be.  Beliefs pervade each person’s every waking, and even non-waking, moment – a 
top-down influence on everything people do and even what they think.  Beliefs range 
from the mundane, such as how much milk is in the fridge at home right now, to the 
incredibly important and even metaphysical, such as whether the soul survives bodily 
death or whether people can communicate telepathically.  If one believes there is 
insufficient milk in the fridge then one might go to the supermarket to pick up some 
more.  If one believes that people have special powers, such as communicating directly 
from mind to mind (telepathy) or being able to see things on the other side of the world 
using just their mind (remote viewing), then millions of dollars might be spent on 
trying to weaponise these abilities (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Marks, 2000).  This 
would all be of little consequence if people’s beliefs were normative – that is to say, 
formed rationally, based on the best available information.  However, this is not 
always the case and people often hold beliefs that are non-normative.   Unfortunately, 
the consequences of such beliefs can be somewhat greater than running out of milk for 
one’s morning coffee. 
For example, acupuncture is an ancient Chinese medical procedure involving the 
insertion of extremely fine needles into the skin.  The theory behind this is that it 
balances energy channels in the body. However, a meta-analysis of studies on the 
effectiveness of acupuncture demonstrated that it does not provide better results than a 
placebo (Madsen, Gotzsche, & Hrobjartsson, 2009), the implication being that the 
proposed energy channels may not exist as claimed.  Nevertheless, the procedure has a 
long cultural history and consequently it remains a fairly common treatment, even in 
Western countries.  However, it is not without risks.  For example, a study conducted 
in China by Liu et al. (2014) documented a high number of cases (30 patients from a 
single clinician over a 6-month period) of primary inoculation tuberculosis (PIT), 
which is a form of tuberculosis caused by bacteria entering into the skin.  This can lead 
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to disfiguring ulcerative lesions and even high temperature and fever.  In other, 
apparently rarer, cases the direct physical nature of acupuncture can even lead to 
punctured lungs (Stenger, Bauer, & Licht, 2013).  Clearly, better medical hygiene and 
procedure would prevent these sorts of issues, but it is arguably an unnecessary risk 
for something that is no more effective than a placebo that has no risks attached to it.  
However, people’s beliefs that acupuncture may be effective lead them to use that 
traditional treatment. 
Magical beliefs are a common form of non-normative belief.  One commonly heard 
argument is that such beliefs are of little concern.  However, this is not always the case 
and this is illustrated vividly by the 5-year-old girl in Chicago who was burned during 
a Voodoo ritual.  The ritual was to cleanse her of a demon that was making her 
misbehave and involved fire being blown over her (Associated Press, 2018).  The 
current state-of-the-art knowledge from developmental psychology, however, is that 
children are not possessed by devils, no matter what the outward appearances may be.  
However, the people involved genuinely believed that a spirit was possessing the girl 
and, in fact, were only acting in her best interests, based upon how they believed the 
world to be (that devils can possess people and fire can cleanse this). 
As social beings, people act collectively in the world as well.   This can have a much 
bigger impact than the individual cases just illustrated.  For example, one major 
challenge for humankind at present is climate change, but while the scientific data are 
unequivocal, there is a sizeable minority who take issue with the claim that the climate 
of the planet is warming.  This particular case of acting in the world, based upon one’s 
beliefs about it, has the effect of delaying steps to tackle the issue, with enormous 
consequences for the world as a whole (Snow & Snow, 2015).  One of the challenges 
with respect to climate change is therefore changing people’s beliefs about it.  In order 
to do this, however, there needs to be an understanding of how beliefs change. 
The present research programme was therefore motivated to investigate mechanisms 
involved in the belief process.  As will be seen, there has been a tendency in the 
literature to focus on normative beliefs changing in response to rational information, 
but as illustrated above, people’s beliefs are not always normative.  Furthermore, they 
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may not always be based on rational reasons.  For example, someone who lives in an 
area where it snowed a lot more last winter might think that the planet is cooling, not 
getting warmer.  However, they would be basing their claim on personal experience 
rather than scientific evidence.  And, while personal experience is often a useful form 
of evidence, it is insufficient to negate an entire area of scientific knowledge.  
Therefore, in order to address this gap in understanding belief, the present programme 
focused upon paranormal belief, which is less commonly held for rational, normative 
reasons (personal experience and normative thinking will be discussed in greater 
depth later). 
The key aim of the programme was to make progress in understanding the 
mechanisms behind the belief process and to this end the programme tested a model of 
belief change that proposes a connection between how beliefs are formed and how they 
change.  This path-dependent model is described in detail later, but in brief the 
prediction is that rational beliefs are more influenced by rational information and 
intuitive beliefs are more influenced by intuitive information.  In addition to this, if any 
knowledge gained about the belief process is to be useful it should generalise to the 
wider population, so this was another major aim of the programme. 
The programme therefore approached the study of belief formation and change using 
mainly naturalistic studies, as well as samples from multiple populations, rather than 
being limited to the typical student samples used in much of psychology research 
(McNemar, 1946; Smart, 1966).  The aim was to test the path-dependent model in order 
to progress understanding of the mechanisms underlying belief change.  To this end 
the study focused upon belief in Extrasensory Perception (ESP), which is a paranormal 
belief that people can communicate with each other or sense things directly with their 
minds, such as knowing what card is next in a deck of randomised cards with no 
normal way to know.  Paranormal beliefs are both widespread (Castro, Burrows, & 
Wooffitt, 2014; Goritz & Schumacher, 2000; Rice, 2003) and of the kind that people 
often believe for reasons that are not rational in nature, such as personal experience or 
gut feeling (Clarke, 1995; however see Cardena, 2018, for a review of meta-analyses of 
research that some people may base their ESP belief on).  This is also a kind of non-
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normative belief where there are potentially serious ramifications, such as those 
illustrated in the Voodoo ritual. 
In summary, the belief process is an important one to understand due to the potential 
for negative impacts that can come from people acting upon their beliefs.  This is the 
case both at the level of individuals and at the level of the global population. In order 
to add to existing understanding of this important process the present research 
programme aimed to investigate the connection between belief formation and change, 
based upon the hypothesis that the belief change mechanism is path-dependent.  This 
was to be conducted via a series of studies, focusing largely on naturalistic designs 
investigating belief in ESP.  In order to enhance generalisation to the wider population 
the aim was also to use largely non-student sample groups where possible. 
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General Background 
What is a Belief? 
The importance that beliefs have in the real world has been made abundantly clear, but 
to study beliefs requires knowing, or at least operationalising, what beliefs actually are.  
Merriam-Webster (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/belief, 2018) defines belief 
thus: “something that is accepted, considered to be true, or held as an opinion”.  
Dictionaries reflect common usage rather than scientific operationalisations, but it 
certainly seems obvious to most people what a belief is.  Definitions of belief in the 
research literature are, however, much harder to come by; perhaps for the very reason 
that what belief means does seem so intuitively obvious.  For example, in Lindeman’s 
(2011) paper on belief in complementary and alternative medicine, there is no attempt 
to define or operationalise ‘belief’, despite it being the key focus of the research study.  
Instead the meaning of the term is left for the reader to supply.  Similarly, Paik, 
MacDougall, Fabrigar, Peach, and Jellous (2009) did not include any discussion of what 
is meant by the term ‘belief’, even though belief was the core focus of their research.  
They were testing whether belief change was dependent upon reasons for belief. 
In contrast, Hample (1979) does touch on some of the properties of belief, when 
explicitly stating that belief and belief change are a matter of degree; belief is not 
simply a black and white thing.  Hample expressed this in terms of mathematical 
equations and tested the idea empirically.  Yet, beyond the nuance that belief is a 
matter of degree, Hample follows Lindeman, and Paik et al., in omitting to discuss 
what belief actually is.  This is just a very small selection of the literature on belief, 
intended simply to illustrate the general trend of avoiding or neglecting definition of 
the key term that the literature is focused on investigating.  While intuitively it does 
seem obvious what belief is, for academic study, it seems to be an oversight not to 
discuss any issues of definition and to pin down the meaning more rigorously.  Indeed, 
as will be seen, what belief is, is what makes it important to study in the first place.  
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Even if, after review, the intuitive definition is the one settled upon, it will have been 
settled upon knowing the issues involved. 
Once researchers and other thinkers do try to operationalise the concept of belief, 
however, it quickly becomes apparent that it is a complex and nuanced concept – yet, 
as already noted, simultaneously ‘obvious’ to people colloquially.  This obviousness is 
much easier to draw upon than attempting to define belief and it perhaps explains the 
general tendency of the research literature to avoid or neglect defining the term.  For 
example, in relation to this complexity, Gilbert (1991) begins by raising the question of 
the distinction between understanding and believing.  Specifically, he states that 
believing means attaching a positive assessment to the thing understood, and thus 
belief and understanding are two separate things: “Beliefs in the broad and colloquial 
sense, involve both the mental representation and positive assessment of meaningful 
information” (p.107).  However, he does not stop there and further argues that 
understanding actually involves at least a fleeting belief that the understood thing is 
true, thus adding a coupling between the two concepts.  In this he takes the Spinozan 
view that people necessarily initially accept something as true before then unbelieving 
it (Spinoza, 1677/1996).  This is in direct opposition to Descartes (1637/1984) view that a 
thing can be understood entirely separately from believing in the truth of it or not.  
However, although Gilbert discusses belief at length, his focus is mainly on the 
mechanics and less on properties, such as degree or type. 
For example, it is quite common for people to be asked simply if they believe in X or 
not.  However, this is a very black and white view of belief and a more granular 
approach may be needed when actually studying the topic.  Politzer and Carles (2001) 
echo this refrain in their Artificial Intelligence approach to studying belief change.  
They conclude that belief, and hence belief change, is a matter of degree, rather than an 
all-or-nothing process.  Indeed, this is something that is often implicit in research on 
belief, usually only made explicit via the use of scale-based belief measures, such as the 
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004) used by Lindeman (2011).  At other 
times the idea of degrees of belief is made more explicitly, such as in the very direct 
position on this taken by Hample (1979).  On the other hand, the black and white idea 
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of believing or not believing still pertains in colloquial usage.  For example, the 
definition of belief presented in the Collins dictionary 
(https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/belief, 2018) is: “Belief is a feeling of 
certainty that something exists, is true, or is good.”  Here the term ‘certainty’ is used, 
which is completely contrary to the notion of degrees of belief. Dictionaries, in 
reflecting usage, do not always completely agree on definitions of terms, and it is also 
common for a dictionary to provide more than one usage, due to the nature of actual 
language use.  This clearly underlines the need to pin down the concept more 
rigorously for academic study, rather than relying entirely upon readers’ 
understandings of the term, as much of the literature does. 
Something that is perhaps rather less obvious than degrees of belief, however, is kinds 
of belief.  Indeed, the existence of different kinds of belief has been debated, as will be 
seen, but overall the argument will be that there are different types.  In particular two 
types are of interest: rational and intuitive.  Those terms will be discussed in greater 
depth later, but for now a brief overview will suffice to raise the point that beliefs 
might vary in kind.  It is relatively obvious, of course, that beliefs can be held regarding 
many different things (although it is worth reiterating that beliefs can indeed be about 
any state in the world and not just limited to religious beliefs, or similar topics of belief, 
such as the paranormal phenomena referred to earlier).  Again, this is something  
typically left as implicit in the literature, such as in the study by Paik et al. (2009), in 
which participants expressed beliefs about topics as diverse as people’s personalities, 
animals, and the quality of news articles. 
What is perhaps less obvious is that beliefs themselves might vary in kind; not only 
with respect to what the beliefs are about.  Paik et al. (2009) focus on this in relation to 
category and individual information being the basis for differentially influencing belief 
change.  However, a more fundamental difference in belief is their rational versus 
intuitive nature.  In this vein, Sperber (1997) argued that people hold two main kinds of 
beliefs: intuitive and reflective, the latter mapping to the ‘rational’ type mentioned 
above.  Sperber took the view that people tend to react to new information initially at 
an intuitive level; a very rapid and unconsidered response to the information.  This 
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means that all beliefs would initially be based upon intuition on the topic at hand.  
Only later can reflection (i.e. deliberative rational thinking) on the topic lead to holding 
a rationally-based belief.  Thus Sperber presents the possibility that beliefs may be held 
for different reasons.  In the terminology of the present thesis, this will be referred to as 
‘belief-basis’. 
Meanwhile, Alcock (2018) very explicitly distinguishes between rational beliefs and 
what he calls irrational beliefs, the latter being akin to the intuitive belief-basis referred 
to above.  Alcock adds some complexity to this distinction, however, when he opines 
that beliefs are all the same kind of thing regardless of how they are acquired, thus 
taking the contrasting view that beliefs can be of different types yet underneath it is the 
same process involved.  Finally, unlike much of the main body of psychological 
literature on the topic, Alcock does actually discuss what belief is, and the difficulties 
in defining the term.  The opposite case tends to be more common, however, with 
different papers touching upon different aspects of belief, while leaving the core 
definition for the reader to provide (e.g. Hample, 1979).  There is an interesting irony in 
this approach, where the research or theory is raising a differential factor within belief, 
yet at the same time the rest of the concept of belief is left undiscussed. 
The present thesis will be focusing on mechanisms rather than just kinds of beliefs, 
however, and will be arguing, in contrast to Alcock, that the two kinds are not the 
same thing underneath.  The beliefs used in the present research are therefore merely a 
tool to examine the underlying mechanisms.  Specifically, the main belief topic used in 
the present research programme was a paranormal phenomenon (see the section on 
paranormal beliefs as a research tool), as similarly seen in the research by Lindeman 
(2011). 
With respect to the various issues raised above, the thesis takes a relatively broad view 
on what a belief is: belief is a person’s assertion about the state of the world or some 
part of it and this assertion may vary in the degree of confidence with which it is held.  
This includes beliefs about the states of other minds, future states of the world, past 
states, and so on.  One might even hold beliefs about the truth of abstract propositions, 
such as in formal mathematics; beliefs need not be about concrete things.  Broadly 
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speaking, to say that someone believes something is to say that they think the state of 
the world is X, to some degree of likelihood – i.e. the strength of the belief in question.  
Naturally, and logically, it is true that people act in the world based upon how they 
think the world is, social and other constraints notwithstanding.  This may even extend 
to abstract concepts or ideologies.  That is to say, because beliefs are embodied within 
people, who exist in the world, people act in the world based upon their beliefs.  And 
this is what makes beliefs inherently important to study. 
As will be seen, however, all too often studies on belief treat beliefs as abstract forms 
disconnected from the real world, only having influence inside a person’s head.  
However, this neglects the fact that beliefs exist in people’s brains, which are 
inherently embodied and empowered to act in the world (constraints on the individual 
notwithstanding).  Moreover, people’s beliefs are threaded throughout their 
interactions with the world, be they big or small.  As the introduction rather 
dramatically put it, “beliefs power the world”.  However, by now it should be clear 
that this is not actually such an extravagant claim to make.  Indeed, as Alcock (2018) 
notes, beliefs are pervasive in every moment of people’s lives and even in their deaths. 
Finally, a word on the usage of terminology relating to belief is required.  Terms such 
as, belief, view, conceptual change, and so on, abound in the literature.  However, the 
exact word used matters less than the definition.  Indeed, in the present study 
programme there was a change in terminology from ‘belief’ to ‘view’ in the third 
research study, for better clarity in the materials given to participants.  This was due to 
the cultural connotations that can surround the word ‘belief’, while ‘view’ is a more 
neutral, broader term, that is also closer to how academics operationalise (explicitly or 
implicitly) the concept of belief.  Indeed, turning to the Oxford English Dictionary 
definition of belief, we can see the additional connotations that belief may have for 
people outside of academia (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/belief, 2018).  Here 
belief is defined as: “An acceptance that something exists or is true, especially one 
without proof.”  This places the emphasis on lack of evidence, which implies that an 
evidence-based view on something is not a belief about it.  Instead, belief is conflated 
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with faith, which is a conflation that is generally avoided in the psychological literature 
on belief formation and change. 
Now that the argument for operationalising the term has been presented and a suitable 
operationalisation provided for ‘belief’, it is time to address the factors relevant to the 
present research programme.  In doing so, the remainder of this chapter and the 
studies that follow will be reviewing literature on cognition in general as well as belief 
more specifically, starting with rationality, then moving on to non-rational cognition, 
and dual-process accounts that bring these two disparate concepts together.  Finally, it 
presents a dual-process model of belief change for testing and then discusses the use of 
paranormal belief as a research tool. 
The Rational Actor 
In the literature on belief, phrases such as ‘conceptual change’ tend to reflect the idea 
that beliefs and belief change are ultimately the result of a rational thought process.  In 
other words, people are often thought of as ‘rational actors’ in the world.  People are 
seen as taking the facts into account in an unbiased way and evaluating them in so far 
as their intellectual abilities allow.  This is not to say that people will never make errors 
due to inaccurate inputs or differences in intellectual ability.  Such errors are inevitable, 
but the key point of the rational actor view is that ultimately it is a rational process that 
lies underneath all higher order human thinking, such as judgments and decision 
making. 
Ritter (1930) perhaps put it most directly in the 1930’s in his paper entitled “Is Man a 
Rational Animal?”, to which the answer given is an emphatic ‘yes’.  But, the approach 
continues through to today, with recent studies still taking a rational actor approach.  
For example, Bucher, Roser, Nejasmic, and Hamburger (2014) investigated belief 
revision during way-finding, an activity where people navigate across the countryside 
between way-points.  In this activity, there is a common need to update one’s direction 
of travel since, as is so often the case, the map is not exactly the same as the territory.  
The activity had a fairly good ecological validity (although they did use Virtual Reality 
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(VR) for the study) and arguably it is relevant to the real world.  However, the focus of 
the research was on rational factors; specifically, the structure of the initial instructions 
to the participants – i.e. the structure of information presented, which would then be 
processed by the rational actors in order to find their way through the VR exercise. 
At a low level, the Rational Actor approach makes superficial sense.  People’s brains 
are in essence highly complex neural networks and neural networks are essentially 
complex mathematical engines in organic form.  In this light, everything in the brain is 
ultimately mathematical, and thus rational.  This might be seen as taking a view that is 
too low-level, however, since research taking the rational actor approach typically 
focuses on higher level cognition, well above the neuronal level.  Nevertheless, it does 
serve to demonstrate that there is sense in the mathematical approach that is often 
found in the rational actor literature, even though the present chapter will be taking a 
broader view of behaviour and cognition in later sections. 
A downside to this computational and highly rational approach to cognition is that it 
can tend to lead to investigating similarly computational and highly rational 
judgments and decision-making scenarios.  The research by Bucher et al. (2014), 
referred to above, is in fact marked out as distinct from other rational actor research by 
its use of a realistic scenario and presentation mode.  In contrast, Elio and Pelletier 
(1997) provide a more classic example of the rational actor approach.  In their study 
they asked people to make judgments about sentences that were either problems of 
modus ponens or modus tollens inference.  Modus ponens is defined as: P implies Q, 
and P is true, therefore Q is true.  For example, if Jane gets another sale then she will 
get a bonus this month (P implies Q).  Jane got another sale (P) therefore she will get a 
bonus this month (Q).  Whereas modus tollens is: P implies Q, but Q is not true, 
therefore P is not true.  Since we can infer that if P always causes Q, then if Q is not 
true then P is not true either.  For example, on Fridays Jane buys donuts (P then Q).  
Jane has not bought donuts (not-Q) therefore it is not Friday (not-P).  As should be 
clear, people in such studies are often being asked to make judgments on which clear 
logical evaluation can be made; the participants are either right or they are wrong 
when making their judgment. 
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This also provides a good example of the dangers of leaving belief undefined in 
literature on belief formation and change.  The paper refers to beliefs and the title is 
“Belief change as a propositional update”.   However, many lay people would see it as 
making judgments not forming beliefs.  As mentioned earlier in the chapter, however, 
lay understanding of the term does not always equate with academic usage and the 
present thesis would consider such judgments to be acceptable under the umbrella of 
‘belief’, although beliefs with greater real-world relevance are to be preferred (see the 
section on Paranormal Beliefs as a Research Tool later in this chapter). 
Another classic example is provided by McFarland and Thistlethwaite (1970).  In this 
instance they used syllogistic reasoning tasks, although they were presented in a 
longer format than is typically the case, in order to make them appear less like pure 
logic questions.  For example: “An increase in American foreign aid to African 
countries would retard the growth of communism in those countries.  American 
foreign aid to Africa will be increased.  The growth of communism in African countries 
will be retarded.” (p.135).  Boiled down to its essence, however, a syllogism is similar 
to modus ponens, but specialised into having a major premise, a minor premise, and a 
conclusion.  A typical presentation is with a category as the major premise and an 
individual item as the minor premise.  For example: all flowers require water (major 
premise).  A rose is a flower (minor premise) therefore a rose requires water 
(conclusion).  Rewritten as modus ponens gives: If it is a flower it requires water (P 
implies Q).  A rose is a flower (P) therefore it requires water (Q). 
The paper also illustrates another feature often found in rational actor literature.  
Beyond the tendency to focus on rational topics and judgments, there is naturally a 
tendency to describe belief using rational systems, such as formal logic.  This makes 
sense if human cognition is indeed thought to be rational.  McFarland and 
Thistlethwaite (1970) illustrate this via their use of formal logic notation to model the 
effect of ‘persuasive statements’ on participants (said statements were actually 
syllogisms as illustrated above).  So the rationality of the rational actor approach is 
seen right through from how the research is approached to how the results are 
expressed and theories built. 
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Finally, as with Elio and Pelletier (1997), the paper refers to the research as being about 
belief revision. However, a lay person may interpret it as simply evaluation of a logical 
statement; a judgment upon which belief is not required, since the evaluation itself 
suffices.  For an academic, in contrast, when a person makes a judgement about 
something they thus hold a belief about it – the person believes or does not believe that 
X is the case and how they got to that belief state does not invalidate the fact that it is a 
belief state.  Once again, this sort of belief is within the broad remit set by the present 
thesis. 
In contrast, some of the papers taking a classical approach do try to use more realistic 
material, applying more to the real world.  For example, Hample (1979) asked for 
opinions on questions relating to student cycle paths, the job market, and tenants’ 
rights.   To an extent, McFarland and Thistlethwaite (1970) also attempted to do this, 
but Hample did not use pure logic in the guise of relevant topics.  Instead Hample 
used fake radio and news excerpt transcripts alongside the questions being asked.  
Nevertheless, the point was merely to introduce the presence of such messages rather 
than investigating anything to do with the nature of the messages themselves, the latter 
being something that the present thesis will become very much concerned with.  Like 
McFarland and Thistlethwaite, Hample also concludes with the presentation of a 
mathematical model of belief and belief change. 
The classical approach to humans as rational actors in general is illustrated particularly 
well by reviews and theoretical papers, such as the one by Schulte (2002).  The paper 
provides a review of logic and mathematical models on the topic of belief change, and 
from the very start it epitomises the classical approach, with its title “Minimal belief 
change, Pareto-optimality and logical consequence”.  Should the reader still be in any 
doubt then the first line of the abstract clears this up for them: “A rational agent 
changes her beliefs in response to new information…”  Note the terms ‘Rational’, 
‘agent’, and ‘information’ – like ants and weather systems, the assumption is that 
people are mathematically predictable, at least in theory if not in practice, and that this 
is thanks to the fact that human beings are rational actors.  Should the reader continue 
to read the rest of the paper they will find it much as they would expect it to be.  This 
General Background      20 
in itself is a compliment on the focused writing of the paper, but at the same time it is 
also indicative of the limited focus of the field as a whole. 
Indeed, this is not just the view of one pair of authors, nor is it an anachronism from 
1970s research, prior to the ‘emotions revolution’ (Weber & Johnson, 2009).  A good 
summary of the position is provided by Hansson (2017): 
“In the logic of belief revision (belief change), a belief state (or database) is 
represented by a set of sentences. The major operations of change are those 
consisting in the introduction or removal of a belief-representing sentence. In both 
cases, changes affecting other sentences may be needed (for instance in order to 
retain consistency). Rationality postulates for such operations have been proposed, 
and representation theorems have been obtained that characterize specific types of 
operations in terms of these postulates.” (p.1) 
While this is only a summary, not a specific theory, the focus on the rational actor is 
clear: a lack of non-rational factors, and maintenance of internal consistency, for 
example.  With densely packed prose heavily weighted with rational terminology such 
as “database” and “representation theorems”, it perfectly encapsulates the rational 
actor approach and literature style.  It will be seen later in this chapter that the internal 
consistency element has not been supported in research on belief outside of the rational 
actor sphere.  However, for now it is worthwhile as an illustration of the view, that 
people are inherently rational even when it comes to something like ‘belief’, which 
some, such as Alcock (2018), might label as being irrational at times. 
However, not all literature on the rational actor hypothesis is as extreme as that 
presented so far.  Clearly research into human beings as rational actors need not be 
constrained to problem solving in classic logic or making judgments about sentences, 
even though much of the literature may conspire to give this impression.  As has 
already been seen, for example, Bucher et al. (2014) used VR to look at belief revision 
during wayfinding, while retaining a rational actor focus.  Another example that has 
already been touched upon is category congruence.  Paik et al. (2009) found that beliefs 
formed based upon category information rather than individual information were 
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more likely to change in response to disconfirming information that was also category-
based.  This paper provides a good example of one that is not directly referring to the 
rational actor model, but is still taking that approach.  By focusing on rational factors, 
such as category/individual level, the implication is that people’s cognition is 
processing rational information rationally.  Similarly, Lange and Fishbein (1983) 
critique other rationality based judgment and decision making (JDM) literature for not 
taking categories into account, although their rational actor approach is slightly more 
direct in that they focus on putting factors into an equation to model belief formation 
and change.  And, of course, these factors exclude non-rational ones.  This is assuming 
that one accepts that the act of categorising is a rational cognitive process, albeit that 
the categories themselves could be categories of things that are non-rational, such as 
fantasy creatures. 
Other twists on the classical rational actor approach include an interesting one from 
Mandel (2014).  In this paper, Mandel argues for the value of external visualisations to 
aid reasoning.  The theory is that the visualisations externalise some of the demands of 
a problem, thereby freeing up additional working capacity for manipulating and 
processing the problem at hand.  This, of course, still follows the idea, and in fact 
emphasizes the idea, that the people are processing the information rationally – hence 
the reason why freeing up processing resources should improve performance.  Indeed, 
it was already noted at the start of this section that the rational actor approach does not 
actually assume people will perform flawlessly all of the time, if ever.  It is more akin 
to assuming that once the experimental ‘noise’ has been removed, people are 
ultimately rational thinkers beneath it all. 
This leniency from the rational actor approach is illustrated by a proposal from Bleile 
(2014), which has similarities to the ‘frame problem’ in Artificial Intelligence (AI).  The 
frame problem in AI proposes that a major issue for robots operating in the real world 
is the sheer amount of information that needs to be processed (Brown, 1987).  Using 
first order logic this would simply be overwhelming.  Bleile’s proposal can be seen in a 
similar light, but applied to human beings instead of robots.  The premise is that, even 
though people have a much more powerful way of processing the information than 
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resorting to first order logic, the amount of information is still overwhelming and it 
cannot all be taken account of.  Bleile proposes that a chief determinant of what 
information is taken into account is past experiences.  This goes some way to 
explaining why different people faced with the same problems may make different 
choices even if processing the information completely rationally.  Their paths leading 
up to the decision will have been different and therefore if the amount of information 
that needs taking into account is large enough, their past experiences will direct their 
focus, influencing the final outcome.  Ultimately then, from this more lenient 
perspective, people are seen as resource-limited rational actors making the best 
decisions they can, based upon the information brought into focus via the influence of 
past experiences.  Seen in this light, belief change might be path-dependent – 
likelihood of belief change may be due to how a belief was arrived at in the first place. 
Anderson and Rausch (2009) take this further by actually including non-rational 
factors, such as desire, in their proposal.  However, they include such factors in their 
model only as inputs to an ultimately rational process of cognition – what they refer to 
as a ‘rational model of common sense choice’. The proposal therefore demonstrates 
how non-rational factors can be integrated into an underlying rational model of 
cognition, without sacrificing the rational actor.  By placing such non-rational 
influences as ‘desire’ outside of the model, the proposal gains the ability to explain 
apparently non-rational behaviours, while retaining a rational core of human 
cognition.  Once again, people are seen as rational albeit that they are rational actors 
subject to imperfect inputs for processing. 
McFadden (1999) adds another dimension to this view in his paper on rationality for 
economists.  In it he argues that so-called non-normative behaviour by people in 
various situations is caused by misperceptions, which in turn leads to misframing of 
the situation – that is to say that people are thinking rationally, but they have 
accidentally gotten the problem situation represented incorrectly in their head or they 
are making errors in retrieving details relating to the problem solution.  So in this case 
it is not simply that the inputs are of poor quality or incorrect, but that the person is 
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liable to the error of framing the problem situation incorrectly which, regardless of the 
quality of the inputs, leads to an incorrect (i.e. non-normative) outcome. 
One thing often missing from the literature reviewed so far, however, are the 
mechanisms that would underlie these rational thinking processes.  How, for example, 
is it decided that something is true or false, or that a certain input should be weighted 
in a certain way?  A common approach to this problem is the application of probability 
theories.  As in the paper by Morris (1996), people are deemed to have various 
probabilistic beliefs modelled in their minds.  This aligns with the present thesis’ 
assertion that beliefs are a matter of degree, but takes it a step further in trying to 
include this in the model of belief formation and change very directly.  It is also 
compatible with Bleile’s (2014) idea that prior experiences shape future decisions.  In 
Morris’ terms, these prior experiences are manifested as a set of beliefs each with a 
probability attached.  These probabilities will be included in any current processing 
and evaluation of new information, including the selection of what information is most 
relevant to focus on – it is cognitively easier to build upon existing information (even if 
it is incorrect) than to start from scratch.  Here, of course, Morris is still omitting non-
rational factors from the probability modelling. 
However, this is not always the case.  For example, Stelios (2016) presents a classically 
dense rational actor paper on JDM, with a heavy emphasis on mathematical modelling, 
including a comparison of the model with the Bayesian framework.  The Bayesian 
approach uses prior probabilities to influence assignment of new probabilities or 
revision of existing ones, and in this sense links with the ideas of Morris (1996) and 
Bleile (2014).  However, despite its mathematical focus the author does attempt to 
explicitly bring in non-rational factors.  This is achieved via a factor referred to as 
‘credibility of the speaker’.  While this includes evaluative data, such as the speaker’s 
authority on the topic, it is explicitly included as something that the hearer (the 
participant) may make an intuitive, instant judgment about. 
In summary, the rational actor approach posits people as being rational actors in so far 
as their intellectual resources and the available information allow.  This rationality is 
echoed in the way that the study of the topic tends to be approached and the ways in 
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which theories are expressed.  Theories are often expressed as mathematical models 
and the materials used tend towards the abstract or rational, such as judging the truth 
of syllogisms or the movements of shapes.  Exceptions to this are also present in the 
literature, but they retain the rationality focus.  Typically, this consists of eschewing 
non-rational factors even while they critique other researchers for ignoring various 
rational ones, such as categories.  However, taking the rational actor approach does not 
mean that people are viewed as flawless reasoners, only that they are ultimately 
following rational processes albeit not always perfectly, due to reasons such as 
intellectual ability, inaccurate informational input, or incorrect framing of the problem 
situation.  Indeed, there are even some models of belief in the rational actor literature 
that allow for path-dependency in belief formation and change.  This is interesting 
because in general if all thinking is rational then the same cognitive processing is in 
play at belief formation as it is at belief change.  However, models that incorporate 
prior beliefs – i.e. the path to belief formation – allow for path-dependency of belief 
change, while also retaining the rational actor at the core of the approach. 
Finally, despite various criticisms levelled in this section, such as omission of non-
rational factors, it must be acknowledged that the rational actor view has endured for a 
long time.  Indeed, it certainly has plausibility, as arguably people can act rationally, 
and as has been seen there is a large amount of literature demonstrating how people 
conform to rational models of thinking and belief.  What is missing, however, is a 
better understanding of the contribution of non-rational factors to thinking and belief, 
and whether these factors contribute merely as inputs or as part of the cognitive 
process itself. 
The Non-Rational Actor 
In contrast to the literature on rational actors, the literature in the vein of the ‘emotions 
revolution’ (Weber & Johnson, 2009) is peppered with terminology such as ‘valence’ 
and ‘affect’.  However, emotion is a limited term in this context and more broadly it 
can be better to speak of non-rational as the simple opposite of rational (later in the 
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chapter the term ‘intuitive’ will be favoured, but for now, non-rational is most 
appropriate). This allows for the discussion of factors in cognition outside of just 
emotional responses or influences.  Nevertheless, much of the material does focus on 
the feelings involved – typically positive or negative, or simply level of arousal – and 
this is included in ‘non-rational’ as well.  Briefly, non-rational cognition does not 
follow rules of pure logic or mathematics, and in doing so may go against the 
normative (logically correct) responding that rational actor theories presume to be the 
goal of people’s cognitive processes.  There is a trade-off here, however, and it is 
typically one of speed and resources – non-rational thinking tends to take less time and 
by that token also consumes less energy.  However, as will be seen, it is not inherently 
necessary that non-rational thinking will produce errors or even depart from 
normative responses (e.g. Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011), although inevitably it does 
allow more room for this sort of thinking error to occur. 
However, before continuing, it is important not to confuse non-rational and irrational 
thinking, although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, such as in Alcock’s 
(2018) use of the term ‘irrational belief’.  For the purposes of maintaining clarity in the 
present thesis it is important to be clear on the difference between normal cognitive 
processes and unhealthy ones.  In this light, non-rational will refer to a myriad of 
behaviours by perfectly healthy normal individuals.  These are behaviours and 
thinking that people do all the time, day to day; indeed, it will be shown that it is far 
from being the exception that people behave in these ways (contrary to how the 
rational actor model paints people as being).  In contrast, people described as behaving 
irrationally are generally demonstrating a less than healthy mental state, which may be 
temporary or longer-term.  As noted the term is used sometimes to mean non-rational 
but for the purposes of this thesis irrational will be taken to be a particular subset of 
non-rational thinking.  Specifically, the present thesis will be excluding irrational 
thinking or behaviour and focusing upon normal cognition. 
As noted at the start of this section, research on non-rational cognition and behaviours 
– the non-rational actor hypothesis, so to speak – often focuses upon affect.  Indeed, 
one of the classic findings is that affect provides information (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 
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2003).  This appears remarkably close to some of the rational actor theories that treat 
non-rational factors as merely inputs to the underlying rational processing: affect is 
literally information to be processed rationally.  The difference here, therefore, is 
largely one of the perspective being taken and the primacy given to the non-rational 
factors ahead of rational ones.  The classic study in this area was conducted by 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  They had people rate how happy they were with their life 
and found that this correlated with whether people were in a good mood or not.  This, 
in turn, was influenced by the weather being good or not.  This simple meteorological 
difference made a significant difference to the way people evaluated their life in 
general, not just their life at that point in time.  This is a striking conclusion in 
comparison to that predicted by rational actor theories.  It implies that non-rational 
influences shape the whole thinking process and are not merely information to be 
crunched.  In theory, a rational actor should be discounting the affective information as 
relevant only to the present and thus irrelevant to the general case that they are being 
asked to evaluate.  Yet the influence of the affect extends beyond the current moment, 
implying that such factors may be more closely intertwined with thinking processes 
than previously supposed.  This is taking the results of the study slightly further than 
Schwarz and Clore did at the time.  However, in a later paper they argue that affect 
and cognition are interrelated, not independent (Storbeck & Clore, 2007).  By this they 
do not mean, as Sperber (1997) did, that the one follows the other, but that they are 
truly interrelated. 
Such research as this might suffer the accusation of not including enough rational 
factors, the reverse of the critique of much rational actor research.  However, generally 
the focus is to control for other factors and demonstrate that non-rational elements are 
present rather than to present an overarching model of an area of cognition, as is often 
the case in rational actor theories, which have a strong tendency to present models.  
Indeed, noting this shift in focus towards research into non-rational thinking, Weber 
and Johnson (2009) coined the term the ‘emotions revolution’ as counterpoint to the 
earlier cognitive revolution. 
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However, just because people act non-rationally at times does not mean that their 
behaviours cannot be explained mathematically and perhaps this element of the 
rational actor approach might survive even in the realm of research into non-rational 
thinking.  Charpentier, De Neve, Li, Roiser, and Sharot (2016) presented a paper taking 
just this approach.  Using models to predict choices, they concluded that models that 
include feelings about things are better predictors of choice than purely value-based 
models.  However, an alternative is that it is simply not always possible to describe or 
explain behaviour using mathematics or modelling and this is the view taken by Baker 
(2008).  Baker does not directly argue for non-rationality, yet also does not take a 
rational actor stance.  Instead, Baker argues for what could be termed a ‘practical 
rationality’.  That is, things can be argued to be rational in pragmatic terms, such as a 
person’s propensity towards a particular type of action (in which case it is perfectly 
rational for them to behave thusly).  Rather than requiring reasons to be expressible in 
logical form, Baker argues that attempting to express reasons for actions in such a 
formal way would actually distort them. 
Indeed, the tendency in the literature on non-rational cognition is not to attempt to 
present mathematical models.  However, this may be more due to the nature of the 
topics and their influence on the approaches used than it actually being impossible to 
model such behaviour mathematically or not.  Indeed, whether this is the case remains 
an open question. What does not remain an open question, however, is that people do 
think non-rationally and, as will be seen, it is arguably the norm rather than the 
exception.  Indeed, there are known to be a number of heuristics and biases present in 
normal cognitive processing, due simply to how the brain works (Kahneman, 2003; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1974), heuristics being mental short cuts that people use 
unwittingly in their day-to-day cognition. 
As will be, seen, this sort of speedy, rule-of-thumb thinking has evolutionary 
advantages and does not always produce errors.  However, it can do so, and one 
classic example is the conjunction fallacy, which is a thinking bias that occurs due to 
applying the representativeness heuristic inappropriately (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994).  
For example, in the classic Linda Problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 2002), the Linda of 
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the title is described in a way that is more representative of a feminist than a bank teller 
– participants have no problem using the representativeness heuristic to make the not 
unreasonable judgement that Linda is more likely to be a feminist than a bank teller.  
However, in this case 85% of participants rated it more likely that Linda was a 'feminist 
bank teller' than a 'bank teller', whereas in fact there is more chance of Linda being a 
bank teller in general than specifically a feminist bank teller.  As it stands, this might be 
explained by rational actor models as participants framing the problem incorrectly, as a 
representativeness problem rather than a conjunction problem – either problem being 
relatively easy to solve on its own.  However, the effect persisted for 57% of 
participants even when it was made explicit that 'bank teller' includes both non-
feminist and feminist bank tellers. 
This result is hard to explain in terms of inaccurate problem framing, since participants 
had access to both frames.  Yet the representativeness heuristic, a non-rational rule of 
thumb, won out over the normative rational response.  Indeed, Kaiser, Field, Jonides, 
and Alexander (1986) showed that even when people perform well on solving one 
problem, it does not predict their performance on another closely related problem.  For 
example, when asked to predict the path of a ball from when it exits a curved tube, it 
was surprisingly common for people to predict a curved path instead of the straight 
path that the ball would actually travel.  This occurred even after people had correctly 
solved the problem of the path that water would travel when exiting a curved tube.  
Despite the problems being physically and structurally identical, the ball problem was 
harder to solve.  Indeed, the only difference between the two problems is that the water 
one is more familiar to most people.  It therefore seems that they are solving it by 
referring to experience, but that this experience is not generalising to a related problem.  
This is hard for most rational actor theories to explain, since the relevant information is 
present and ought to be tagged with a high relevance, since the problem is structurally 
the same - in fact, the only difference is a ball instead of water so there is plenty to cue 
the use of past experience in a similar situation (cf. Bleile, 2014).  
However, as well as making poor predictions about the behaviour of objects in the 
physical world, it turns out that people are just as bad at making predictions about 
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their own behaviours.  For example, Nisbett and Borgida (1975) found that people 
disregarded base-rate information when predicting what their own actions would be 
likely to be.  That is to say, even when participants knew the likelihood (base-rate 
information) of someone doing something in a given situation, it did not influence 
what they predicted they would do in that situation.  There were two such situations in 
Nisbett and Borgida’s study: the first was about a study where people administered 
dangerously strong electric shocks in a learning study, and the second was about 
people failing to help someone in serious distress in another room, who they could 
hear over an intercom calling out for help.  In the first case, participants rated 
themselves less likely than the average to give strong shocks and in the second case 
more likely than average to help.  This in itself is not particularly surprising as people 
naturally prefer to think of themselves as good people.  What was surprising is that 
compared to not knowing the base-rates, knowing the base-rates made no difference to 
people’s self-predictions; the rational information was completely disregarded in 
favour of the bias towards maintaining self-image.  Contrary to rational actor models, 
the non-rational ‘information’ was not simply modifying the weight given to the 
rational information, it was overriding it completely. 
It is worth noting that most psychology research is done with university students 
(McNemar, 1946; Smart, 1966) and therefore it seems unlikely that such thinking is 
down to lack of intelligence.  However, it might be argued that, even within such an 
elite population, intellect does vary.  In answer to this, Stanovich and West (2007, 
2008b) present studies demonstrating that falling foul of cognitive biases does not 
occur because the participants were less capable.  Measures of intellect and cognitive 
abilities, such as SAT scores, did not correlate with the likelihood of making thinking 
errors.  Research such as this suggests that non-rational cognition is fundamental to the 
human condition, in direct contradiction to the rational actor view.  Of course, if such 
thinking is inherent to the human condition then it should also influence belief 
formation and change. 
However, when giving examples like the ones given so far there is a risk that the 
reader comes away with the impression that non-rational thinking, such as the use of 
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mental heuristics, always leads to thinking errors.  This is not at all the case, however, 
and, in fact, such heuristics exist because normally they produce accurate, or good 
enough, results (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011).  Indeed, it is only by studying when 
they produce incorrect results that it is possible to know they exist and that not all 
thinking is rational.  Clearly, there is good evidence for non-normative thinking in 
normal everyday cognition.  And this conclusion is also supported by Shafir and 
LeBoeuf’s (2002) review of literature arguing that research demonstrating non-
normative behaviours is flawed, for various reasons, including theoretical assumptions 
and the materials used (e.g. causing participants to frame a problem incorrectly).  They 
conclude that the critique of the rational actor view, similar to the critique given in this 
chapter so far, is a ‘compelling’ one. 
Unlike this chapter’s earlier review of the rational actor literature, where the term 
‘belief’ was widely found, the non-rational actor literature that has been reviewed has 
focused largely on behaviours.  Nevertheless, if people’s thinking processes can be 
non-rational then it follows that beliefs would also be influenced by non-rational 
factors, such as affect or heuristics.  Indeed, this was a motivating premise for the 
current research programme and a model relating to this will be tested.  However, first 
the review will cover some specific examples of non-rational belief, followed by some 
examples of the new wave of research into belief that takes non-rational cognition as a 
primary focus. 
Perhaps the most striking example of non-rational belief is when it co-exists with 
rational belief.  For example, Legare, Evans, Rosengren, and Harris (2012) found that 
people in the Zande tribe could hold both rational and non-rational (magical) beliefs 
about the exact same phenomenon.  In this case, the belief related to the tall grain 
stores that were used both to store grain and to shelter under.  Inevitably sometimes a 
grain store will collapse, perhaps because of termite damage, and people might be 
killed.  The Zande understood perfectly the physical reasons for the collapses: the 
structural weakness accruing over time.  However, they also held the belief that 
witchcraft was responsible for specific people being there at that specific time. So, on 
the one hand they believe the granary collapses due to structural weakness and that 
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this could happen suddenly at any time, causing loss of life.  While on the other hand, 
they attribute particular deaths to magic.  It is more than just ‘how’ something happens 
that is important; ‘why’ it happens is just as important, if not more important.  The 
physical reasons explain ‘how’ the granary comes to collapse.  But, this leaves the 
question of ‘why’ at that particular moment?  This void is filled with a paranormal 
explanation. 
In rational terms, there is no need to ask the second question, but people do not always 
believe in things for rational reasons.  Indeed, even strong rational counterevidence, 
such as the world not ending when it is prophesized to, may fail to change belief 
(Sauvayre, 2017).  While the exact mechanisms behind such failures of belief change are 
still under debate, the fact that beliefs continue to be held for non-rational reasons is 
not.  Such failures of belief change are taken to demonstrate that people are holding 
non-rational beliefs, because those beliefs are held in contrast to overwhelming rational 
evidence against the belief. 
As noted by Weber and Johnson (2009), there has been something of an ‘emotions 
revolution’, a term that they use as akin to the cognitive revolution that followed on 
from behaviourism.  This is reflected in the research on belief, which has seen a greater 
acceptance of non-rational factors and processes within the research literature.  For 
example, Sharot et al. (2012) looked at the good news/bad news effect, where people 
tend to update their internal beliefs more when encountering favourable information.  
In their study, they disrupted the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and found that this 
helped to reduce the good/bad news effect.  The importance of this latter detail is not in 
where the disruption occurred, but rather the implication regarding non-rational 
thinking being manifest in the brain processes and not merely a type of ‘input’ into an 
underlying rational processing core.  Additional neuroscientific support for the 
influence of valence comes from Moutsiana, Charpentier, Garrett, Cohen, and Sharot 
(2015), whose study revealed differences in the processing of favourable and 
unfavourable information in relation to belief updating.  Again, the specific circuitry 
that they propose is less important than the implication that comes with it about the 
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nature of non-rational thinking processes being part of normal thinking rather than just 
an input to it. 
However, valence is perhaps a relatively easy feeling for people to access and a 
stronger test could use something more subtle so that people are not aware of its 
influence or even its presence.  To this end, Reber and Greifeneder (2016) review the 
literature on metacognitive effects and affect on belief formation.  They argue that 
fluency, in particular, influences belief formation - if it is easy to process (high fluency), 
then it must be true.  Fluency might be manipulated by making something easier or 
harder to read by manipulating the font, for example.  Or, in the case of a study by 
Danziger, Moran, and Rafaely (2006), ease of retrieval was manipulated by requiring 
retrieval of more or fewer items (see also: Simmons & Nelson, 2006).  Participants were 
asked to come up with positive things to say about something and then asked to make 
an overall evaluation.  Retrieving more items is mentally harder than retrieving fewer 
items, but overall produces a greater number of positive reasons to like the thing in 
question.  One can imagine this applied in the context of being asked to state reasons to 
like a newly released soft drink or home appliance, for example, and it would be 
expected that a greater number of positives retrieved would lead to the formation of a 
more positive view about the product.  However, the opposite was actually true.  It 
was the amount of mental effort (the fluency) that actually influenced participants’ 
final evaluations.  Those who had come up with a greater number of positives actually 
gave the least positive final ratings.  Whereas those who experienced greater fluency 
(less cognitive demand) were more positive in their final ratings.  These findings 
strongly suggest that belief formation involves a non-rational component and, in 
combination with the neuroscientific evidence, that this component is part of the 
thinking process capable of overriding other parts of the process, rather than being a 
mere contributory to it. 
Another way of manipulating beliefs is by manipulating how something is framed.  
The key difference from the previous examples is that this does not involve valence or 
affect; emotions need not play any part.  For example, a common belief in basketball 
and volley ball is the hot-hand belief (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985).  This is the 
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belief that if someone has been shooting well then they have the ‘hot-hand’ and will 
continue to shoot well on their next shots.  In actual fact, this is down to clusters in 
random series rather than any actual hot-hand effect, but it remains a prevailing belief 
due to the compelling nature of the brain to detect patterns even where none exist 
(Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, 2007; van Elk, 2015).  However, Raab and MacMahon 
(2015) demonstrated that this belief can be manipulated by framing effects.  The study 
used videos of basketball play that differed in terms of the perspective the video was 
taken from (an observer in the stands or a non-active player at the end of the court).  
They found lower rates of hot-hand belief (and related allocation behaviour) in the 
observer perspective condition. 
These sorts of findings, where only a video angle is manipulated or fluency is 
manipulated, are not easily explained as due to individual differences in cognitive 
ability – i.e. being less capable of using the rational information appropriately.  Indeed, 
Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2015) demonstrated that even experts make the same 
mistakes as lay people.  Their research looked at ethical problems, such as the classic 
trolley problem and Asian disease problem. This is effectively like asking people about 
their moral beliefs.  In the trolley problem, the decision must be made whether to 
divert a train trolley down one track or leave it on its current path.  If it is diverted, it 
will kill a person who is stuck on that branch of the track.  If it is not diverted, 
however, it will kill 5 people on the other branch of the track.  This pits people’s sense 
of the prerogative to protect life against the blame associated with action or inaction.  It 
is a classic ethical dilemma, the normative answer to which is to kill as few people as 
possible – not an ethical dilemma that specialist ethics philosophers should have a 
problem with.  This can be framed in different ways, however, indicating greater 
physical closeness or distance and greater differences in terms of actively putting 
someone in harm’s way rather than diverting something towards them.  They therefore 
presented three trolley scenarios: switch, push, and drop.  Switch is the traditional 
option described above.  Push is to push a heavily laden hiker into the path of the 
trolley to stop it (the person themselves is not heavy enough to stop the trolley; they 
must sacrifice the hiker not themselves to save the five people).  And finally, the drop 
option is similar to switch, but drops someone onto the track to stop the trolley from 
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killing five people.  Structurally, these are all the same problem and rationally the 
actions should all be rated as equally morally bad.  Nor should it matter what order the 
scenarios are presented in.  What Raab and MacMahon (2015), in fact, found was that 
the experts were no more immune to framing or order effects than non-experts.  It was 
not the case that experts gave equal ratings to all of the scenarios, nor was it the case 
that the experts were consistent in their ratings irrespective of the order of 
presentation.  In reality, the experts did not differ in their responses from the lay 
people in the study.  This was the case even though participants were not rushed to 
make a response so that there was no limitation of cognitive resources (as there is in 
some other examples that will be given later). 
In summary, this section has presented strong evidence that people are not rational 
actors all of the time.  Rather, people’s thinking, behaviours, and even their beliefs can 
be influenced by non-rational factors, such as affect, valence, and framing.  These 
results pertain despite level of expertise or general intellectual capability, and there is 
also evidence to suggest physical locations of related processing in the brain (further 
examples in this vein will be give later in the chapter as well).  These results cannot be 
explained by rational actor models of belief and in combination they present a case for 
non-rational thinking being an inherent part of people’s normal thinking processes, 
rather than an adjunct to an underlying rational thinking process as proposed by many 
rational actor theories.  Such factors therefore need taking into account when 
developing theories of belief formation and change, such as the one tested in the 
current research programme. 
Dual-Process Accounts of Cognition 
The evidence for people’s non-rational thinking and behaviours is strong, but so is the 
evidence for their rational thinking and behaviours.  More recently researchers and 
theorists have, therefore, been taking a dual-process approach to explaining cognition.  
Dual-process theories essentially agree on a split between intuitive cognitive 
processing and rational cognitive processing (Epstein, 1994; Lieberman, 2007; Sloman, 
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2002; Sperber, 1997; Stanovich & West, 2008b; Tversky & Kahneman, 2002; Wegener & 
Chien, 2013; Zajonc, 1980).  While the terminology varies (e.g. associative vs rule-based 
and reflexive vs reflective), the basic distinction between the types of thinking are the 
same.  Intuitive thinking is rooted in feelings and experience, while rational thinking is 
deliberative thinking that is largely affect-free.  The present thesis will be using the 
intuitive/rational terminology and a little clarification is required regarding this. 
The term ‘rational’ has already been sufficiently covered in this chapter and no more 
time will be spent on discussing it here.  However, some clarification of what is meant 
by ‘intuitive’ cognition is perhaps required.  So far in the review the reader has 
encountered terms such as ‘affect’ and ‘non-rational’, but very rarely the term 
‘intuitive’.  As well as not being present very often in the literature reviewed so far, this 
term was, in fact, deliberately avoided so that its operationalisation could be dealt with 
properly.  In short, the thesis uses the term intuitive because the other two terms (non-
rational and affect) are not quite sufficient to address the needs at hand.  The term 
‘non-rational’ is too broad and ‘affect’ is too narrow.  Non-rational is a very broad 
term, which at times makes it very suitable.  However, being the negation of rational, 
means that it encompasses randomness and irrational thinking, which are not things 
that dual-process theories or the present thesis are trying to explain.  The thinking of 
healthy people when making any meaningful judgment is rarely random and nor do 
they tend to think in irrational ways (a term which this thesis uses to refer to mentally 
disturbed thinking).  Meanwhile affect is a term limited to feelings, which does not 
include heuristics or cognitive biases, such as those reviewed in the previous section.  
A different term is needed and the most appropriate one used in dual-process 
literature is ‘intuitive’ cognition.  This encompasses affect, valence, heuristics and 
biases, and so on, occurring in normal healthy individuals, but excludes irrationality or 
sheer randomness. 
It also includes personal experience.  Personal experience is included under intuitive 
cognition because the reality judgement about personal experience arrives immediately 
and fully formed without any need to process it further, although such processing can 
be applied afterwards.   As was discussed earlier, heuristics, such as trusting personal 
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experience, make sense since otherwise people’s navigation through the world would 
be tortuously slow and dangerous (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011).  Necessarily, 
personal experience is also highly compelling, since continuously stopping to ponder 
one’s perceptions would not only slow one down, but would also prove evolutionarily 
disadvantageous.  Pausing to ponder the existence of the tiger crouching to pounce is a 
sure way to have one’s genes removed from the pool.  People therefore tend to think of 
personal experience as good quality ‘evidence’.  Indeed, the legal system places a great 
deal of weight on eyewitness testimony.  This is despite its known fallibility, with 80% 
of cases that were overturned due to DNA analysis, originally being convicted on 
faulty eyewitness testimony (Wells et al., 2000).  Personal experience is therefore 
included under the umbrella of intuitive thinking, as reliance upon it is akin to the 
reliance placed upon other heuristic thinking processes.  Perception of the world is 
necessarily indirect and inaccurate, but trusting this personal experience comes easily 
without rational reflection and for the most part trusting the accuracy of personal 
experience is a good rule of thumb to follow.  However, as with other heuristics, it may 
also lead people astray, since although people are not enslaved to believing that all 
personal experiences are accurate reflections of the state of the world, the tendency is 
to go with this fast and energy efficient heuristic judgement. 
Finally, a word on affect is needed before continuing.  While affect comes under the 
umbrella of intuitive cognition, the current thesis will not be requiring affect to be 
present in order for thinking to be counted as intuitive.  However, according to a 
review on research into intuitive thinking, this is not always the case in the research 
literature on intuition (Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 2008).  In fact, affect 
is quite commonly cited as a necessary component of intuitive thinking.  Hodgkinson 
et al. cite Dane and Pratt (2007) as defining intuitions as “…‘affectively-charged 
judgments that arise through rapid, non-conscious, and holistic associations’” (p.4 in 
Hodgkinson et al., 2008).  Furthermore, they state that they feel this statement captures 
the nature of the reviewed research well.  However, as has been seen earlier in the 
chapter, intuitive thinking includes heuristics and biases, which do not require affect to 
be present (at least, not any more than affect can be said to be present at any time in 
decision making or belief, since it is hard to imagine its complete and total absence.  
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Even personal experience need not involve substantial amounts of affect).  One can be 
‘cold and calculating’, for example, instead of ‘passionate and emotional’.  The term 
‘affectively charged’, used by Dane and Pratt, therefore seems to limit the study of 
intuitive thinking to the study of emotion or other feelings rather than cognitive 
processing more broadly.  In contrast, dual-process theories of cognition include 
intuitive processing, such as the application of heuristics, in addition to affect-laden 
thinking, and personal experience. 
A number of dual-process theories have been put forward, some more detailed than 
others.  One of the suggestions already encountered on more than one occasion in this 
chapter comes from Sperber (1997).  Sperber’s idea of dual-processing was a sequential 
one, however, with rational processing following only after intuitive processing has 
had its effect.  This perhaps is useful in explaining very low-level processes, such as 
perceptual illusions.  For example, whilst it is extremely hard (if not impossible) to 
avoid being fooled by a visual illusion such as the Müller-Lyer, one can nevertheless 
disregard it as an illusion, either by knowledge of the illusion or by measuring the lines 
and discovering its illusory nature directly.  However, the general trend in dual-
process theories is to focus on higher level cognitive processes and for the two types of 
processing to be independent rather than sequential, although, as will be seen, there is 
also a general tendency to regard intuitive thinking as having primacy and rational 
thinking to be harder to activate.  
Kahneman, for example, proposes a two-system approach to explaining cognition, 
with System-1 being intuitive and System-2 being rational (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1971, 1974, 2002).  The theory is largely based upon the results of 
research using exclusion problems, such as the Linda problem, where people have to 
exclude one piece of information (in this case representativeness) in order to get the 
correct answer.  Typically, this means people are presented with rational and intuitive 
information and have to exclude the latter in order to provide the normative response.  
For example, in framing problems people are required to exclude surface features, such 
as pulling a lever or pushing a hiker into the path of a railroad trolley, and focus on the 
underlying problem structure.  In other words, the theory is largely built upon 
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observations gained from pitting people’s two processing systems against each other, 
often by requiring people to exclude information that is appealing to System-1.  The 
conclusion is that System-1 has primacy and is also much faster than the slower 
System-2, which patiently waits for when System-1 hands over control due to 
encountering something outside of its heuristic abilities to handle.  The main argument 
for the primacy of System-1 is that it is evolutionarily advantageous to use rapid, 
generally accurate, heuristics, which use minimal energy resources (see also: 
Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011).  Time and energy are both critical commodities for 
survival and passing on of genes.  Too much energy spent on rational thinking means 
energy that cannot be used on other vital survival demands, such as running away 
from the crouching tiger.  Similarly, taking one’s time is a luxury when food is scarce 
and predators are quick.  Decisions often need to be made in real-time, often in an 
instant; as epitomised most famously in the fight or flight response.   Based upon these 
advantages, intuitive thinking would be expected to evolve first. 
There is some neuroscientific evidence for this type of systems view from research by 
Satpute and Lieberman (2006).  They found that intuitive and rational thinking 
activated different areas of the brain and thus different ‘systems’.  Furthermore, 
rational thinking was largely constrained to the cortex and hippocampus whereas 
intuitive thinking included evolutionarily older areas, such as the amygdala and basal 
ganglia.  They ultimately proposed a dual-process theory that they call the X/C system, 
where the X-system is reflexive and the C-system is reflective – i.e. intuitive and 
rational (Lieberman, 2007; Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute, 2004). 
In contrast, Stanovich (Stanovich & West, 2008b) argues that taking a systems view is 
not justified at this point in time.  Indeed, while the neuroscientific findings discussed 
above are impressive, it must be noted that they come from the same set of researchers 
and that neuroscience of brain region activations is fraught with technical difficulties 
(Lyon, 2017).  Stanovich argues that the brain is highly interconnected and it is better, 
at this point, to think of types of processing instead of systems, to which end Stanovich 
proposes type-1 and type-2 processing, mapping to intuitive and rational thinking 
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respectively.  Beyond this difference, however, Stanovich’s conception of dual-
processing is very similar to that of others. 
Finally, Epstein presents a dual-process theory called Cognitive-Experiential Self 
Theory (Epstein, 1994; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996).  The theory is less 
wedded to the idea of systems vs types of processing and more generally refers to 
cognitive style.  A key difference is, however, in the development of a measure in 
relation to the theory.  The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) is used to measure 
preference for rational and intuitive thinking styles.  Encouragingly, as predicted by 
CEST, the intuitive and rational subscales were found to be independent rather than 
poles at either end of a continuum.  If the dual-process account, in general, is correct 
then this obviously has implications for belief formation and change, such as beliefs 
being formed via different types of processing: intuitive vs rational. 
Some of the strongest direct support for this comes from studies that demonstrate 
dissociation of intuitive and rational thinking.  For example, Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, 
Sherman, and Sherman (2006) used the process dissociation procedure to look at 
intuitive and rational processing and found that the two types of thinking did indeed 
dissociate.  The process dissociation procedure involves presenting inclusion and 
exclusion versions of problems, such as the Linda problem encountered earlier in this 
chapter.  The classic Linda problem is an exclusion problem: participants have to 
exclude one piece of information to get the correct answer, in this case taking the base-
rate information into account and excluding representativeness.  But, if the base-rate 
information is changed to match representativeness then participants could use either 
piece of information, and thus either type of thinking, to arrive at the correct answer – 
this would be an inclusion problem.  In exclusion problems rational and intuitive 
processes therefore arrive at different results, whereas in an inclusion problem they 
both arrive at the same result.  In theory then, if intuitive and rational thinking are 
completely independent and parallel then people would score perfectly on the 
inclusion problems while revealing their use of rational or intuitive thinking on the 
exclusion problem, thus allowing calculation of the independence of the two processes.  
Overall, Ferreira et al. (2006) found that the two types of thinking process dissociated, 
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as predicted, suggesting that the dual-process view of cognition is correct.  This was 
also the case when they added conditions where participants were under increased 
cognitive load, designed to tie up resources and thus lead to greater reliance upon the 
less resource-intensive intuitive thinking processes. 
Stupple, Ball, and Ellis (2013) used a similar approach in terms of inclusion and 
exclusion principles, but using surface features versus logical conclusions of syllogistic 
reasoning tasks.  In this case the syllogism can be made to intuitively suggest one 
answer, perhaps based upon experience of how the world is, but actually the logic 
gives another answer (e.g. contrary to how the world actually is, but logically correct 
within the context of the syllogism being presented), thus giving an exclusion problem.  
Alternatively, the surface and logic features can match, giving an inclusion problem.   
As general support for a dual-processing account of cognition, they found that 
processing times were longer for the exclusion problems, suggesting that the rational 
thinking required for a correct solution was taking longer, as predicted by dual-process 
theories. 
So far it has been seen that intuitive processing seems to take precedence, or at least is 
the default mode of cognition.  In exclusion tasks, such as the one conducted by 
Ferreira et al. (2006), it is the intuitive thinking that is the default; intuitive thinking is 
required to fail or be skipped in order for rational thinking to occur.  This supports the 
idea of the evolved primacy of intuitive thinking. But it does not address why or how 
this primacy might be overridden.  One suggestion in answer to this question is cueing, 
where features of the situation cue the brain to apply the more expensive rational 
thinking processes.  This might be due to rather direct factors, such as the instructions 
used when asking people to do a task in a lab study (Inbar, Cone, & Gilovich, 2010).  Or 
it might be due to incidental factors, such as a harder to read font, resulting in greater 
engagement of analytical thinking (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007).  Either 
way, the implication is that unless external factors of the situation cue the application 
of rational thinking, intuitive thinking is the default. 
However, positive affect (PA) has also been proposed as promoting intuitive thinking, 
as in the study by King, Burton, Hicks, and Drigotas (2007), which found that positive 
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affect was associated with greater formation of paranormal beliefs.  Since this type of 
belief is known to be associated with intuitive thinking style, they proposed that PA 
promotes intuitive thinking.  This certainly makes sense from an evolutionary 
perspective since PA is a signal that ‘all is okay’ and thus there is no need to spend 
extra effort thinking more deeply (Fredrickson, 2001).  This might explain how 
incidental factors such as disfluent fonts would cue rational thinking; via reducing 
positive affect and the feeling that ‘all is okay’. 
Another piece of evidence supporting the evolved primacy comes from studies of the 
inhibition of intuitive thinking.  This sort of evidence uses various measures of 
inhibition, such as time delays, to infer that intuitive thinking has to be inhibited in 
order for rational thinking to come online and have an effect – so in exclusion 
problems, correct answers that require rational thinking should take longer (Stupple et 
al., 2013).  Travers, Rolison, and Feeney (2016) took this further in their mouse-tracking 
study, adding spatial information to the timing information.  They not only compared 
how long it took people to get right or wrong answers on exclusion problems, but they 
also tracked participants’ movements of the mouse during the time they were selecting 
their answer on a computer screen.  This showed participants had a tendency to move 
towards the intuitive answer initially even if they then went on to give the correct 
answer that required rational thinking.  While this is not a direct view into the minds 
of the participants, it does support the idea that intuitive thinking has primacy and 
requires inhibiting.  The tests used in Travers et al.’s study were from the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005), which will be covered in detail later in the thesis.   
The idea of evolved primacy of intuitive thinking also aligns well with studies 
demonstrating the dissociation of thinking skills and susceptibility to heuristics and 
biases (e.g. Blackmore, 1997; Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008b).  The evolved primacy of 
intuitive thinking predicts that it is one thing to have the ability to think critically or 
intelligently, but it is another thing to actually apply it.  And this is exactly what this 
type of research finds: no association between thinking skills and application of those 
skills.  Kelemen, Rottman, and Seston (2013) also demonstrated the same thing, but in a 
slightly different way.  When placed in conditions where cognitive capacity was 
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reduced, even trained scientists made judgments counter to their scientific training and 
knowledge.  In this case, they made teleological errors under conditions of a speeded 
response paradigm.  Under unspeeded circumstances, the nature of the problem would 
cue application of their specialist knowledge. 
Finally, the compelling nature of intuitive thinking has already been raised, but it has 
also been demonstrated in experiments.  One example already encountered was the 
Linda problem where, even when all of the information was present, people still went 
with their intuitive response (57% of people made this error; Tversky & Kahneman, 
2002).  However, a more striking example was presented by Denes-Raj and Epstein 
(1994). Investigating the ratio-bias phenomenon, they presented participants with two 
bowls of jelly beans each containing a specified proportion of red beans, but different 
absolute amounts of beans (see also: Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992).  Participants were 
asked to choose which bowl they would prefer to draw a bean from at random, with 
the aim of drawing a red bean.  Surprisingly, 82% of participants made one or more 
non-optimal choices (i.e. choosing the larger bowl despite it having lower odds).  The 
reason participants gave for this was that it felt like they had more chance with the 
bigger bowl.  This basic demonstration of the ratio-bias phenomenon is instructive, but 
what was more surprising was that many participants went ahead and picked the 
incorrect bowl even when they explicitly stated that they knew the odds were against 
them. It was not a matter of having insufficient mathematical skills or, as Anderson 
and Rausch (2009) argue in their rational actor proposal, that non-rational factors, such 
as desire, are merely inputs into an underlying rational process of cognition.  The 
compelling nature of intuitive thinking was enough to completely overrule rational 
thinking even after it had been activated and applied.  This suggests that the primacy 
of intuitive thinking is powerful enough to extend beyond the initial judgment process. 
Overall in this section, clear evidence has been presented of the need to take a dual-
process approach to understanding cognition, rather than relying entirely on one or 
other of the rational actor or non-rational actor accounts.  Although details of the 
theories, their assumptions, and their terminology vary, the core idea of a dual-process 
account of cognition is well supported.  The research discussed in this section has been 
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focused on cognition generally, however, while the thesis’ main focus is ultimately on 
belief.  Now that the case has been made for the dual-process account it is therefore 
time to turn to the application of this account to belief formation and change.  The next 
section will review dual-process literature relating to belief and present the model of 
belief formation and change that the research programme set out to test. 
Path-Dependent Belief Change: A Dual-Process Model of Belief 
It has been argued in this chapter that a dual-process account has strong support.  One 
of the things implied by this account is that beliefs may be formed in varying degrees 
by intuitive and cognitive processing.  This in turn has implications for belief change as 
well:  it will be argued in this section that the implication is that belief change is path-
dependant.  In particular, that beliefs formed via one mode of thinking will be most 
susceptible to change when encountering disconfirming ‘information’ that appeals to 
the same type of cognitive processing.  That is to say, belief change is dependent upon 
the path taken at belief formation.  Therefore, intuitively-based beliefs will be more 
influenced by disconfirmation that appeals more to intuitive thinking than rational 
thinking, and vice versa.  It will be argued that this idea has surface plausibility and 
some degree of emerging support, but that a research programme is needed to evaluate 
it properly. 
One of the key implications of a dual-process approach to belief formation and change 
is that beliefs can be formed via either of the two processes: intuitive or rational.  It can 
be difficult to know exactly how existing beliefs were formed, however, so generally 
speaking research tends to rely upon belief-basis as a proxy measure for inferring belief 
formation mechanisms.  That is to say, beliefs formed intuitively will have an intuitive 
belief-basis: generally, people will state they believe for intuitive reasons, such as 
personal experience.  Whereas beliefs formed via rational cognitive processing will 
have a rational belief-basis: people will claim belief based on rational reasons, such as 
the weight of the scientific evidence.  This sort of variation in belief-basis is illustrated 
in research by Griffin (2008), where participants rated their reasons for belief in a 
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number of topics, including parenting, racial IQs, and evolution, against a number of 
statements, such as: “I trust my heart not my head on this topic” and “My opinion is 
supported by science.”  They found that belief-basis did indeed vary and that different 
topics tended to have a different belief profile, such as evolutionary theory being 
associated with a more rational belief-basis, whereas creationism was associated with a 
more intuitive belief-basis.  Arguably a belief in evolutionary theory is more likely to 
have come about via the route of rational processing applied to rational information 
sources on the topic, rather than, for example, personal experience and thus it would 
be expected that belief-basis would have a greater rational component.  This particular 
research study and others by the same author will be covered in far greater detail in the 
rest of the thesis. 
In contrast to rationally-based belief in evolutionary theory, Irwin and Young (2002) 
applied Sperber’s (1997) distinction of intuitive and reflective beliefs, and found that 
paranormal beliefs associated more with intuitive thinking than reflective thinking.  
This mirrors what Griffin found in relation to Extrasensory Perception (ESP) having a 
more intuitive belief-basis and is a well demonstrated association within research on 
paranormal beliefs, as will be seen in the next section of the chapter.  In combination 
with Griffin’s research, such findings suggest that belief-basis does act as a valid proxy 
for the belief formation path.  
However, if beliefs are forming for different reasons then it seems plausible that this 
may influence how they change.  Bleile (2014) made this kind of prediction in their 
rational actor model of belief formation and change, which saw the influence of past 
experience as vital to the ability of people to focus their attention on a limited amount 
of information from the vast sea engulfing them.  The implication for beliefs was that 
the way people arrive at a belief will influence what information they are likely to then 
process and thus how likely that information is to change the belief.  The proposal of 
the current thesis differs from Bleile, however, in taking intuitive thinking into account, 
rather than taking a rational actor approach and, furthermore, making an explicit 
demarcation between two types of processing: intuitive and rational. 
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There is some support for the idea of path-dependent belief change in the literature, 
some of it indirect and some of it more direct.  Indeed, some support actually comes 
from the rational actor perspective.  For example, a number of studies have found that 
category congruence is a factor in belief change (Lange & Fishbein, 1983; Paik et al., 
2009).  When participants formed beliefs based upon category-level information it was 
category-level disconfirmation that had the most influence on belief change.  In a 
similar vein, but looking at congruency of intuitive factors, Edwards (1990) found that 
induced emotionally-based beliefs were altered by increasing emotional arousal, but 
intellectually based beliefs were not.  Edwards induced affective associations to a 
stimulus item (a Chinese ideograph) subliminally.  He found that affect-based beliefs 
were more influenced by affect-based disconfirmation, although he did not find a 
congruence effect for cognitively (i.e. non-affect) based beliefs, which were 
manipulated via vignette statements.  This study therefore provides only partial 
support for the path-dependent theory of belief change, although the study is not 
necessarily comparing like with like, since subliminal association is known to be more 
likely to create effects (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) and they were also 
not specifically looking at rational processing, only non-affect-based processing. 
Some interesting, non-academic field-based evidence comes via Oxenham (2016).  
Citing the Emergent project (http://www.emergent.info/), which tracks the truth or 
falsity of viral social media posts, Oxenham notes that when countermeasures were 
deployed in the form of competing posts, it was not the factual, rational 
disconfirmations that had the greatest effect.  It was disconfirmations that were 
presented in the same sort of way as the originals; spoofs of the original viral posts.  
Thus posting a Snopes (https://www.snopes.com/) article debunking a false viral post 
had only a small effect on the propagation of the viral message.  Whereas posting a 
viral style spoof debunking the false viral message had a much greater effect.  This 
like-cures-like approach is very similar to the path-dependency being tested in the 
current research programme. 
There are, of course, alternative theories on belief change and these will be covered in 
more depth when discussing results of the studies in the programme.  However, one 
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theme that is worth noting ahead of time is the notion of ‘defence’ of beliefs, which 
may be a factor in resistance to belief change regardless of the initial path, or may 
actually depend upon the initial path.  This latter scenario was found in a study by 
Russell and Jones (1980) in which believers and sceptics both reacted emotionally to 
material that disconfirmed their views, but only believers were selective in their 
interpretation of the material.  In contrast, others argue that beliefs are defended 
regardless of the initial path.  In fact, presenting disconfirming material to someone 
with a strong belief may result in a ‘backfire effect’ (e.g. Betsch & Sachse, 2013).  The 
idea is that people defend against threatening facts just as they do against physical 
threats and the stronger the threat, the stronger the defence that is mounted, hence the 
backfire effects.  This, of course, has serious implications for any dual-process theory of 
belief change, since it implies that defences are primary and rational processing does 
not even have time to come into play regardless of the belief-basis. 
Nevertheless, general support for the idea of path-dependent belief change is good, 
and there is also emerging direct support for the idea.  In particular, a study by Griffin 
and Ohlsson (2001) found that greater rational belief-basis in a topic predicted higher 
ratings of belief change likelihood in response to rational counter-evidence.   They did 
not test the effect of intuitive information on intuitively-based beliefs and their 
rationale for their predictions was based upon a slightly different underlying model, 
but the results do offer support for the model proposed in the present thesis, that belief 
change is path-dependent.  Indeed, this particular study provided a blueprint for some 
of the studies in the present programme and will therefore be discussed in greater 
detail as it becomes relevant to do so.  For now, it is enough to note that the study 
provides initial support for the proposed model. 
In summary then, the model being proposed is that belief change is path-dependent.  It 
has been argued that information may be processed in different ways 
(intuitive/rational) and that this will lead to different bases for belief.  Given a dual-
process account of cognition it also makes sense that beliefs linked to one system, or 
type of thinking, will respond differentially to material of a different type and some 
evidence of this occurring has also been presented.  Specifically, the path-dependent 
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model makes the prediction that like-cures-like in terms of belief change.  So, an 
intuitively held belief will be more likely to change in response to disconfirmation that 
is appealing to intuitive processing by the brain whereas a rationally held belief will be 
more likely to change in response to disconfirmation that appeals to rational 
processing in the brain (perhaps with cueing involved – Inbar et al., 2010).  In physical 
system terms (e.g. Lieberman, 2007; Lieberman et al., 2004; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006), 
it could be framed as beliefs rooted in one system being less likely to be influenced by 
disconfirmation that is targeted at the other system. 
Paranormal Beliefs as a Research Tool 
As already noted at the start of this thesis beliefs are wide ranging and pervasive.  This 
means that a full representative sample of beliefs in research on belief is not practical, 
and this is indeed what has been seen when reviewing the literature.  It therefore 
makes sense to focus upon beliefs that vary in ways relevant to the predictions of the 
model being proposed.  Therefore in this case the beliefs should be believable for 
intuitive reasons, but have clear rational counterarguments as well.  They should also 
be relatively common, but not ubiquitous, for the purposes of data gathering and for 
generalising to the wider population in relation to beliefs more generally.  For example, 
most people agree the earth is not flat.  Although some people disagree with this, the 
general proportion is too skewed for a reasonable mix of responses in a general 
sample.  It will be argued that paranormal beliefs fulfil the needs of the present 
research programme, by being both relatively common and subject to clear rational 
disconfirmations in contrast to the known tendency for intuitive reasons for belief in 
these phenomena. 
For the purposes of the present thesis, it can be stated that paranormal phenomena are 
phenomena that go substantially beyond or are contrary to known natural forces.  For 
investigating belief change it is not actually critical whether the beliefs in question are 
of real phenomena or not; the main thing is that paranormal belief provides the right 
kind of material to work with.  In this case, due to the nature of the paranormal 
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phenomena, there are a wide range of good counter arguments and counter evidence 
relating to them.  
The first important requirement that paranormal belief needs to satisfy is variation in 
reasons for belief.  There will, of course, always be variation in belief-basis, and 
paranormal belief tends to be associated more with intuitive reasons for belief, such as 
personal experience (Clarke, 1995).  For the purposes of the present programme, it is 
acceptable and even desirable that the bias is skewed towards intuitive belief-basis, 
largely because of the easy access to naturalistic rational disconfirmation (as will be 
seen later when the intervention study approach is covered).  The intuitive belief-basis 
of paranormal beliefs is generally well replicated in the literature, although Schouten 
(2010) finds, contrary to Clarke (1995), that paranormal belief did not correlate with 
personal experience.  This remains the exception, however, in a broad literature that 
finds in agreement with Clarke.  This body of research covers both belief-basis and 
thinking style, the former being treated as a proxy for the latter in the present thesis.  
This is achieved by either self-report of belief-basis (as in Clarke or Schouten) or via 
measures of thinking style, such as the REI, which was previously discussed in relation 
to the CEST dual-process account (Epstein et al., 1996).  Measures of paranormal belief 
commonly include, but are not limited to, the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale 
(Thalbourne, 1995) and the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004; Tobacyk & Milford, 
1983).  Using these and other measures, paranormal belief has consistently associated 
more with intuitive than rational thinking style or belief-basis (Aarnio & Lindeman, 
2005; Boden, Berenbaum, & Topper, 2012; Clarke, 1995; Irwin & Young, 2002; Wolfradt, 
Oubaida, Straubeb, Bischo, & Mischo, 1999).  Experimental research by King et al. 
(2007) can also be added to the correlational findings.  In three studies looking at 
induced or naturally occurring positive effect (PA) in relation to formation of beliefs 
about phenomena, such as ghosts or UFOs, they found that PA was associated with 
greater belief formation.   In other words, when an intuitive aspect of people’s thinking 
was manipulated, it increased belief in paranormal or similarly anomalous 
phenomena. 
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Overall therefore, there is good evidence that paranormal beliefs often have an 
intuitive component.  However, it is not the case that paranormal belief is entirely 
intuitively-based (Cardena, 2018).  For example, in Aarnio and Lindeman’s (2005) 
study involving 3141 participants the correlation between paranormal belief and 
intuitive thinking style explained less than 12% of the variance – a non-trivial, 
significant association, but one that leaves plenty of variation for statistical analysis in 
studies such as the ones in the present programme, and plenty of variance still to be 
explained, perhaps by a model such as the one proposed here. 
It is also very important that when the population is sampled believers in the 
paranormal will be found.  Gallup polls and reviews of polls in the literature 
demonstrated that this would not be a problem for paranormal belief.  While 
paranormal beliefs do not saturate the population, they are most certainly very 
common.  Haraldsson (1985), for example, reported that 73% of British adults surveyed 
believed that telepathy exists and 44% believed in hauntings. Moreover, 64% claimed 
some kind of psychic experience and 14% had experienced being haunted.  The exact 
pattern of beliefs in specific phenomena varies over time, but paranormal belief in 
general tends to remain relatively stable (Castro et al., 2014; Goritz & Schumacher, 
2000; Rice, 2003).   
It is common in the literature on paranormal belief to use omnibus measures of belief 
that ask people about multiple phenomena, aggregating the result into a single overall 
belief score.  However, such scales have proved unreliable in terms of the factors they 
produce (Hartman, 1999; Lange, Irwin, & Houran, 2000; Lawrence, 1997; Tobacyk, 
2004; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983).  For example, Reincarnation and Astral Projection both 
appear under the Spiritualism subscale of the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & 
Milford, 1983), but there is nothing inherent in believing in Reincarnation that suggests 
belief that the mind or soul can leave the body whilst still alive, as is the case in Astral 
Projection. Indeed, Reincarnation could be seen as similar to the belief that “the soul 
continues to exist though the body may die”, which the Paranormal Belief Scale places 
in a different category: Traditional Religious Belief. 
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The other problem is a purely practical one.  If disconfirmation is to be presented then 
it will need to be specific to particular phenomena.  Given the logistical constraints on 
the programme, it was simply not practical to do this for more than a few phenomena.  
The present research program therefore focused mainly on the single phenomenon of 
Extrasensory Perception (ESP), which is a relatively commonly held belief (e.g. 
Haraldsson, 1985), and was also the phenomenon included in Griffin and Ohlsson’s 
(2001) study that much of the present programme extends from.  The fact that 
paranormal beliefs are common implies that they are a normal part of the human 
condition rather than related to clinical issues or extreme circumstances. 
Indeed, by example, Lindeman’s (2011) definition of paranormal belief includes the 
notion of core ontological confusions (e.g. Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Lindeman & 
Svedholm, 2012).  These are confusions about the nature of how the world works, such 
as agreeing with the statement “Moss forms around rocks in order to stop soil erosion” 
(Kelemen et al., 2013), which is untrue because moss does not care about soil erosion; it 
just grows where it can.  As Kelemen et al. demonstrated, this sort of thinking error can 
beset even highly trained scientific minds.  Such basic ontological knowledge is picked 
up early in development, whereas scientific knowledge about the world is learnt later 
in life.  Lindeman’s argument is that paranormal beliefs are largely the result of 
misapplying such ‘intuitive knowledge’.  That is to say, to make such errors is not a 
mental health issue, it is a perfectly normal thinking error that people make.  For 
practical reasons, the present research program focuses mainly on belief change, 
however, with belief-basis being used as a proxy for the mechanism of belief 
formation. 
There are, however, other ideas relating to belief change, especially in relation to the 
reduction of paranormal beliefs.  These are covered briefly below and then touched 
upon again where they are pertinent to the study programme findings and 
developments.  Broadly speaking, the majority of theories on belief change, especially 
in the area of the paranormal, tend to fall under the general heading of ‘deficits 
hypotheses’ of varying colours and stripes.  In general, deficits models of belief change 
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take the view that something is missing from believers’ understanding or abilities.  
Addressing this deficit is often seen as the way in which belief change can be achieved. 
One of the two main types of deficit model is sometimes known as the knowledge deficit 
view and refers to the existence of a knowledge gap between believers and non-
believers.  The present thesis will refer to this simply as ‘exceptionalism’ – i.e. experts 
have exceptional status with respect to knowledge and thus related truth judgements.  
This view is common in science and government and is demonstrated particularly 
clearly in a recent statement by Professor Leakey, the famous palaeontologist 
(Associated Press, 2012): 
“If you get to the stage where you can persuade people on the evidence, that it's 
solid, that we are all African, that color is superficial, that stages of development of 
culture are all interactive… then I think we have a chance of a world that will 
respond better to global challenges." (p.1) 
This statement illustrates the enduring optimism that many academics have: if it were 
just possible to provide the solid evidence and get it across to people, then they will 
change their minds.  This optimism, of course, ignores Kuhn’s (1996) infamous 
observation that even in science ideas are resistant to change, which usually comes as a 
result of the old-guard dying off rather than real changes of views.  More recently 
Simis, Madden, Cacciatore, and Yeo (2016) investigated the persistence of the deficit 
model in science.  They conclude that scientists suffer from the belief that people 
generally process the scientific information rationally like they do.  In this light, if only 
the knowledge gap can be closed then beliefs will change in line with the knowledge.  
As has been seen, and as argued by Simis et al. (2016), this is not the case, however, 
since people are not necessarily processing the knowledge in the same way that the 
scientists are.  Indeed, the general view is that the deficits model is suboptimal for 
changing people’s beliefs and that it should be modified or even discarded completely 
(Ahteensuu, 2011; Ko, 2016; Sturgis & Allum, 2004; Wright & Nerlich, 2016).  However, 
despite this pessimism, it will be seen below that knowledge deficit interventions have 
actually demonstrated belief change with respect to the paranormal, so it is not an 
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approach to belief change to be entirely written off, even if it might be considered a 
suboptimal approach. 
The other main type of deficits model is what will be referred to in this thesis as 
inoculationism.  This idea is that the formation of non-normative beliefs, such as 
paranormal beliefs, can be ‘inoculated’ against by having knowledge and/or thinking 
skills to combat the beliefs before they can even be formed.  In contrast to the 
knowledge deficits view, which focuses on belief change, inoculationism focuses on 
belief formation.  One of the key proponents of this view within sceptics of the 
paranormal is Lilienfeld (Lilienfeld, Ammirati, & David, 2012; Lilienfeld, Ammirati, & 
Landfield, 2009).  Riffing off Miller’s (1969) classic call to ‘give psychology away’ to the 
public at large, Lilienfeld’s argument ultimately concludes by stating that there should 
be more research on the effectiveness of debiasing people’s thinking – what Alcock 
(2018) refers to as a ‘firewall to folly’.  This aligns with Stanovich’s (e.g. Stanovich & 
West, 2008b) idea that new ‘mindware’ can be acquired; that one can learn to avoid 
thinking errors. 
However, inoculationism faces challenges from the existing literature regarding its 
plausibility as a successful approach.  The main problem is that critical thinking skills 
dissociate from their application.  Even if new mindware is acquired there is the issue 
of triggering it.  Indeed, even Stanovich himself demonstrated such dissociation 
(Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008a, 2008b).  But, the dissociation between thinking skills 
and the application of them is in general a robust finding within the literature 
(Blackmore, 1997; Dagnall et al., 2007; Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005; Royalty, 1995).  At 
this point therefore, inoculationism would seem less likely to obtain support from the 
present research programme, if the premise of the programme is indeed correct.  
Nevertheless, while the present programme did not directly test the inoculationist 
theory, its prominence amongst sceptics of the paranormal makes it important to keep 
in mind when evaluating the findings in relation to ESP. 
Most relevant to the present research programme, however, is empirical research 
demonstrating actual belief change in the real world, rather than merely theorizing 
about it.  And as noted previously this research tends to offer some support for 
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exceptionalism.  Such research typically follows an intervention paradigm and teaches 
knowledge, and possibly also skills in a relevant area, generally finding that skills are 
less capable of changing beliefs than specific knowledge – contrary to the mindware 
gap hypothesis.  For example, Jones and Zusne (1981) demonstrated that increasing 
knowledge via a course on specific paranormal topics (including ESP) led to reduction 
in belief in those topics.  Similarly, McLean and Miller (2010) presented a course 
covering anomalistic psychology topics and compared it to the effects of a standard 
research methods course.  Both samples started at similar belief levels, and both 
courses led to improvements in critical thinking skills, but only the topic-specific 
course reduced paranormal beliefs: reducing from 83.57 to 56.50 on a percentage scale 
(see also: Morier & Keeports, 1994).  Banziger and College (1983) also demonstrated the 
same with an older, non-student sample (mean age 67) and found long-term belief 
reduction at 6 months follow up.  Finally, while all of the above were course-length 
interventions, Happs (1991) demonstrated belief reduction with a one-time 
intervention that presented participants with videos of water diviners repeatedly 
failing to find water under test conditions.  Once again, this demonstrated long-term 
belief reduction in a non-student population (trainee primary school teachers). 
These studies lay down a good precedent for the use of interventions, which is the 
main approach the present study programme took.  However, they generally focus 
only upon whether or not belief change will take place, with little investigation of why 
belief change is taking place and this is where the present programme diverges from 
those discussed above – i.e. in testing a model of belief change.  The present research 
programme therefore made extensive use of the type of intervention approach just 
discussed, both in course-length and single-lecture-length interventions.  This was 
deemed to be a good methodology to use because it has been demonstrated to induce 
belief change in the expected direction (i.e. belief reduction) and it is more ecologically 
valid than most lab-based studies. 
The studies in the programme would be able to look at changes in real beliefs acquired 
by people naturally.  As Mitchell (2012) notes, lab studies vary in how much they 
replicate in the real world, with the average correlation between lab and real world 
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being around r=.55, once the highly successful organisational psychology studies are 
factored out.  What is lost in a naturalistic setting, in this present instance, is the ability 
to control belief formation conditions.  As already discussed the programme therefore 
relied upon belief-basis as a proxy for inferring the mechanism of belief formation.  
Specifically, it will be assumed, as was argued earlier in the chapter, that intuitive 
belief-basis correlates positively with intuitive mechanism of belief formation and that 
the same applies for rational belief-basis and rational mechanism of belief formation. 
Furthermore, in the belief research discussed so far it is generally assumed that self-
reports of belief are a suitable proxy for people’s real beliefs (e.g. Griffin & Ohlsson, 
2001; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983).  This is based upon the assumption that belief is 
something that people can accurately access and that their self-reports of belief are 
unbiased.  The present study programme follows suit in simply asking people to rate 
their belief in each topic of interest.  Throughout the present thesis changes in self-
reported levels of belief are referred to as ‘actual’ or ‘real-world’ belief change, to 
distinguish this from self-predictions of future belief change, such as that seen in Study 
1.  However, it must be acknowledged that such ‘actual belief change’ is change in self-
reported belief levels and that such a measure may be subject to inaccuracy caused by 
demand effects or imperfect self-access to one’s true beliefs.  One way to mitigate 
against such issues is to use measures that ask indirect questions, which are then 
combined to come to a conclusion about the level of belief a person has in a topic.  
However, where such measures do not already exist they require substantial time to 
develop.  This made the approach impractical for the current research programme, 
which would have required new measures to be developed for a number of topics. 
Finally, as already discussed, it was not practical to cover all paranormal beliefs in the 
research programme.  The focus was therefore on the phenomenon of ESP 
(extrasensory perception).  This is a relatively broad category of paranormal 
phenomenon, relating to the communication of information without any known 
physical means – e.g. direct mind to mind communication. Therefore, the research 
programme used paranormal belief in testing a dual-process model that addresses a 
gap in the literature on what is known about the connection between belief formation 
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and change.  This was carried out using questionnaires, real-life intervention studies, 
and laboratory studies. 
General Hypotheses 
Specific hypotheses are made for the empirical studies discussed in each chapter, but 
the core set of hypotheses revolve around the idea that belief change is path-
dependent: rational information will influence rationally held beliefs more than 
intuitively held beliefs and intuitive information will influence intuitively held beliefs 
more than rationally held beliefs.  More specifically, moving towards a position of 
greater scepticism regarding paranormal phenomena will be more likely when a 
person’s existing view is held for rational reasons rather than intuitive reasons.  The 
following general hypotheses can therefore be formed: 
H1 – Belief in the paranormal will be reduced after exposure to non-paranormal 
explanations. 
H2 – Greater belief in the paranormal will correlate with a more intuitive belief-basis. 
H3 – A more rational belief-basis will correlate with greater belief change (both self-
predicted and real-world). 
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Study 1 – Belief-Basis Correlates with Self-
Predicted Belief Change: A Replication Study 
Background 
As already noted in the general discussion, some direct support for the proposed 
model comes from a study by Griffin and Ohlsson (2001).  The model they test is a little 
different from the path-dependency one.  They arrived at their model by modifying a 
three-stage model of conceptual change proposed by Chi and Thagard (Chi, 1992; 
Thagard, 1992; both cited in Griffin & Ohlsson, 2001).  This original model proposes 
that new knowledge firstly has to be recognised as conflicting, then secondly, a 
conceptual framework has to be constructed within which to understand the new 
knowledge and, thirdly, that if the new knowledge provides a more coherent 
conceptual framework, it should replace the old knowledge (i.e. it should be accepted 
as true and the old knowledge judged as untrue, or less true).  This model adheres to 
Descartes’ view that it is possible for people to hold an idea in mind neutrally, without 
committing to any kind of belief about it (Descartes, 1637/1984).  In contrast, Spinoza 
argued that to understand an idea one must at least momentarily hold it in mind as 
being true, before then unbelieving it (Spinoza, 1677/1996).  This will be something that 
is reflected upon later in the thesis.  However, for now it is enough to note that the 
three-stage model is generally in line with many existing rational actor models of 
conceptual change, of the kind discussed in the General Background chapter of this 
thesis.  Such models tend to suggest that if people are aware of non-paranormal 
explanations and have the ability to process this (rational) knowledge appropriately 
then they should alter their beliefs accordingly.  Failure to change one’s beliefs is 
therefore due to factors such as cognitive dissonance or failing to properly understand 
the non-paranormal explanations presented. 
However, Griffin and Ohlsson (2001) modified this three-stage theory of conceptual 
change by adding the explicit acknowledgement that beliefs may be held for both 
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rational and intuitive reasons.  They predicted that rationally held beliefs would be 
more likely to change in the face of strong contradictory evidence (i.e. rational 
disconfirmation) due to the belief-basis being of like kind and thus directly evaluable 
against such evidence, whereas an intuitive belief-basis would not be. 
Participants in Griffin and Ohlsson’s study were 120 undergraduates at the University 
of Illinois at Chicago.  Belief in five topics was investigated: creationism, afterlife, 
opposites attract, ESP, and evolution.  For each topic participants were presented with 
a description of the topic and then asked to rate their belief in the topic on a scale of 1-9 
(complete disbelief to complete belief).  They were then asked to provide up to three 
self-generated reasons for their belief/disbelief in the topic.  Finally, they were also 
asked to rate reasons for belief/disbelief in the topic using five pre-prepared statements 
provided by Griffin and Ohlsson, which were based upon previous pilot research.  
Each statement was rated on a scale of 1-9 (not at all their reason for belief to 
completely their reason for belief).  These pre-prepared reasons for belief divided into 
statements reflecting rational reasons for belief and statements reflecting intuitive 
reasons for belief (see Table 1 in the methods section of the present chapter for a 
complete list of statements).  The intuitive or rational nature of the statements was not 
labelled as such for participants, however.  The responses to the five statements were 
combined to give an overall belief-basis score for participants’ level of belief in each 
topic.  This score ranged from 1-9, where 1 represents intuitive belief-basis and 9 
represents rational belief-basis (see the Scoring section in this chapter for further 
detail). 
Griffin and Ohlsson found that beliefs tended to have greater correlation with one or 
other type of belief-basis.  Notably they found that belief in ESP correlated more with 
an intuitive belief-basis, which is as would be expected based upon this robust 
association in the literature on paranormal belief.  Furthermore, they found that belief 
in afterlife, opposites attract, and creationism also correlated with an intuitive belief-
basis (i.e. a lower belief-basis score).  Whereas belief in evolution correlated with a 
rational belief-basis (i.e. a higher belief-basis score).  Most importantly for the model 
tested in the present research programme, however, they found that a greater rational 
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belief-basis correlated with greater self-predicted likelihood of future belief change, if 
confronted by strong contradictory evidence (which is assumed by Griffin and Ohlsson 
to be rational in nature).  This is exactly what the path-dependency model would also 
predict. 
However, while the path-dependency model therefore makes the same prediction for 
the outcome of Griffin and Ohlsson’s study, the underlying reasoning is different.  This 
is due to the proposed mechanism of belief formation. The intuitive pathways in the 
brain are being used and intuitive associations being made and thus rational counter-
evidence that activates rational pathways and associations will have a difficult time 
modifying the existing belief.  Griffin and Ohlsson take a similar approach, arguing 
that intuitive reasons for belief are not of the same kind as contradictory new 
knowledge (the former is intuitive and the latter is rational) and therefore the two 
pieces of information cannot be easily compared, leading to a low likelihood of belief 
revision. However, their rationale was based upon the type of knowledge rather than 
the mechanism underlying the processing of the knowledge.  The difference is subtle 
and ultimately the same prediction is made regarding the present replication study, 
however.  What Griffin and Ohlsson do omit, however, is any prediction about what 
would happen regarding intuitive disconfirmation.  Although their study could not 
test that prediction it would be interesting to have seen how this factor would fit into 
their model overall; whether it would be as simple as stating like-influences-like. 
Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) study provided a useful methodological template, but it 
required replication.  It would have been easy to go ahead and run an intervention 
study with belief recorded before and after the intervention.  However, the study by 
Griffin and Ohlsson had not yet been replicated, so if null results were obtained in a 
real-world intervention study it would not be clear if it was due to a methodological 
failure of replication or simply because belief formation and change in the real world 
differs from self-predictions of belief change in the lab.  It may even be the case that 
their findings do not replicate.  As Ioannidis (2005) observes, there is a general 
tendency to only publish positive findings.  The findings of Griffin and Ohlsson might 
not actually be real effects, just papers that made it out of the file drawer because they 
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were positive.  Before embarking on a research programme it was therefore necessary 
to replicate the original self-prediction study prior to a real world test. 
Brandt et al. (2014) present a recipe for convincing replications.  They list the following 
rules: 
1. Carefully defining the effects and methods that the researcher intends to 
replicate; 
2. Following as exactly as possible the methods of the original study (including 
participant recruitment, instructions, stimuli, measures, procedures, and 
analyses); 
3. Having high statistical power; 
4. Making complete details about the replication available, so that interested 
experts can fully evaluate the replication attempt (or attempt another 
replication themselves);  
5. Evaluating replication results, and comparing them critically to the results of 
the original study. 
The present replication departs from this list on some points.  For merely practical 
reasons the study was not pre-registered, although the ability to do this is now 
becoming much easier, and preregistration is therefore more common (Nosek, 
Ebersole, DeHaven, & Mellor, 2018).  More notably, however, the present study used a 
different sample group: a special interest group rather than a student sample.  And it 
was conducted in a different mode: online instead of paper and pencil.  Considering 
that a full research programme might be based upon the replication and considering 
the issues with the overrepresentation of psychology students in psychology research 
(McNemar, 1946; Smart,1966), it was felt that a different type of sample group would 
be appropriate so long as the material remained the same (Griffin and Ohlsson used a 
student sample in the USA).  Since the ultimate aim was to generalise to the wider 
population from the programme findings, this divergent replication would provide a 
more robust replication of the effect, without detrimental impact to the replication 
itself.  The use of online as the mode of presentation was not expected to influence the 
results and was simply the best way to recruit a non-student sample.  Empirical 
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support for the equivalence of the online mode of research is presented in the method 
section of this chapter.  Finally, for details on statistical power see the Statistical Power, 
Method subsection. 
In summary then, the present study replicated Griffin and Ohlsson’s original study, 
with a different sample group and material was presented online, but otherwise with 
identical material and identical hypotheses. 
Hypotheses 
H1 – belief-basis would correlate with belief in the topics in the same pattern as Griffin 
and Ohlsson’s study. 
H2 – For each topic, a greater rational belief-basis would correlate with greater self-
ratings of belief change likelihood. 
Method 
The study measured three variables.  The first two were belief-basis and belief-level in 
each of five topics: creationism, afterlife, opposites attract, ESP, and evolution.  These 
two factors were measured using a belief-basis measure and a direct self-report of 
belief level.  Both of these used 9-point response scales and are described in detail 
below.  The third variable was the self-predicted likelihood of belief change after 
encountering strong contradictory evidence in the future, simply referred to as self-
predicted belief change in the rest of this chapter.  This was also measured for each 
topic and was measured via a direct question asking for a rating of likelihood on a 
scale of 1 to 9, described in more detail below.  On each of the five topics, participants 
were also given the option to provide up to three free-text responses, stating their top 3 
reasons for belief in each topic. 
Participants 
A volunteer sample of subscribers to the Anomalistic Psychology Research Unit 
(APRU) mailing list was recruited for the study.  This was a largely non-student 
sample with a special interest in the paranormal.  The group consists of both believers 
and sceptics.  The final sample size was 72 after 12 were removed due to missing data.  
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This sample consisted of 30 men and 42 women, ranging in age from 20 to 70 (mean 
36.16, SD = 14.873). 
Statistical Power 
As noted by Brandt et al. (2014), it is important that replications have sufficient power 
to detect the effects they are attempting to replicate.  For the present study G*Power 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2014) was used to calculate power related 
requirements based upon the information provided in Griffin and Ohlsson (2001).  
There were 120 participants in Griffin and Ohlsson’s study, and 72 in the present 
study. 
For the correlations between belief-basis and belief Griffin and Ohlsson report all 
correlations individually, and these ranged from -.35 to .73, with the ESP correlation 
being -.42.  However, for statistical significance they only report p < .05 for all 
correlations, without going into further detail.  Based upon this information it was 
calculated that the present study would need between 15 and 83 participants to detect 
effects of the same size as those found in Griffin and Ohlsson.  For the ESP topic 
specifically, it was calculated that 56 participants would be needed.  Bearing in mind 
that p < .05 is a maximum p-value for these correlations this means that the above 
requirements are on the conservative side, since lower p-values for the effects would 
lead to lower numbers of participants being required to detect the effects. 
For correlations between belief and self-predicted belief change Griffin and Ohlsson 
only give the lowest and highest correlations (from .3 to .4).  They report that all 
correlations were significant p < .05, but do not provide detail on individual p-values.    
Based upon this information it was calculated that the study would need between 63 
and 115 participants.  Again, for the reasons given previously, these requirements are 
on the conservative side. 
For the present study, which had 72 participants, it was calculated that the power to 
detect the correlations between belief-basis and belief was between 92% and 100% (the 
latter was rounded up to 100% by G*Power).  For the ESP topic specifically, 
prospective power was calculated as 98.2%.  Power to detect the correlations between 
belief and self-predicted belief change was calculated as being between 82.83% and 
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97.12%.  Again, it is worth noting that these power calculations are on the conservative 
side due to Griffin and Ohlsson only stating that p < .05 for all correlations. 
Equivalence of Online Mode of Presentation 
The general consensus on online psychology research is that it is equivalent to pencil 
and paper presentation.  Even as far back as 2008, Andersson, Ritterband, and 
Carlbring (2008) were recommending that simple questionnaire assessments were 
equivalent.  Furthermore, Aluja, Rossier, and Zuckerman (2007) showed equivalence 
using multiple samples of direct paper and pencil vs online presentation (see also: 
Chuah, Drasgow, & Roberts, 2006; Denscombe, 2016).  Indeed, even where differences 
have been found, such as in the prospective memory questionnaire (PMQ), it is unclear 
that the online mode is actually different in an inferior way to the offline mode, or 
whether the online mode is different in a superior way (see: Booth-Kewley, Larson, & 
Miyoshi, 2007, discussed below). 
The online mode was deliberately chosen as a way to recruit a largely non-student 
sample.  Use of the online mode is generally supported in the literature (Birnbaum, 
2004; Reips, 2016), including cross-cultural support for equivalence (Ekman, Dickman, 
Klint, Weiderpass, & Litton, 2006; Yu & Yu, 2007). Whitaker (2007) also observed 
gender was also not a factor in equivalence of the online and offline modes.  Finally, 
Booth-Kewley et al. (2007) provided evidence that online questionnaires may actually 
garner a more honest response from participants, due to greater perceived anonymity 
online, which may make the online mode superior to the offline mode in some cases, 
such as revealing details about personal beliefs. 
Materials 
The questionnaire was presented via Lime Survey version 1.92 
(http://www.limesurvey.org/) hosted on computer servers at Goldsmiths College, 
University of London.  The belief-basis measure of the questionnaire is outlined below 
(see Appendix 1 for full details of the questionnaire).  Briefing and consent were 
presented on the first page of the questionnaire, followed by demographic questions 
on age and gender.  These included the option of no response.  Age was also banded to 
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make this less of an issue for participants to provide this detail.  Each belief topic was 
described as is given in Table 1 (see next page). 
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Table 1 - Descriptions of Belief Topics 
Topic Description 
Creationism 
For the purpose of this study Creationism 
is defined as the belief that the Bible gives 
a literally true account of the creation of 
the Earth and all life upon it. 
Evolution 
For the purpose of this study Evolution is 
defined as the development of all the 
species of animals on earth from earlier 
forms (for example, land animals evolved 
from early forms of fish). 
ESP 
For the purpose of this study Extrasensory 
Perception (ESP) is defined as the direct 
perception of information by the mind 
without using any normal way to find the 
information out. 
Opposites attract 
For the purpose of this study the idea that 
Opposites Attract is defined as people 
being attracted to partners who are the 
opposite of themselves in significant ways 
(such as in their personality or in the 
hobbies that they like, and so on). 
Afterlife 
 
For the purpose of this study Afterlife is 
defined as a place, or state, in which 
people continue to exist after their mortal 
bodies have died. 
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All of the questions for a single topic were presented before any questions were 
answered on the next topic.  The order of presentation of the topics was as in Table 1.  
Participants were asked to rate their reason for belief on a 9-point scale ranging from 
“completely disbelieve” to “completely believe”.  They were then asked “What are the 
top 3 reasons for your belief in [Topic]?” and given the option to enter free-text 
responses.  Following this they were asked to rate each of five provided reasons for 
belief (see Table 2), rating these on a 9-point scale, ranging from “not at all my reason” 
to “completely my reason”.  Finally, for a given topic, they were asked to predict 
likelihood of future belief change: “Now imagine that you were presented with strong 
evidence that contradicted your belief.  How likely would you be to change your 
belief?”  They were asked to rate likelihood on a 9-point scale ranging from “not at all” 
to “completely”. 
Table 2 - Predefined reasons for belief and disbelief 
Intuitive Rational 
 
My belief about [topic] makes me feel 
good or is comforting. 
 
When it comes to issues like [topic], I trust 
my 'heart', not my 'head' to tell me the 
truth. 
 
I don't need proof, I have faith that my 




My belief about [topic] is a result of 
examining all of the evidence I'm aware of 
and choosing the most convincing 
explanation. 
 
My belief about [topic] is supported by 
current scientific knowledge. 
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Scoring 
 
Belief in each topic was taken as the raw value reported by participants in response to 
the single belief rating question asked on each topic.  The scale ranged from 1 to 9, 
where 1 is complete disbelief and 9 is complete belief. 
Belief-basis for each of the five topics was scored as per Griffin and Ohlsson (2001).  
The mean rating for the three intuitive items was subtracted from the mean rating for 
the two rational items, to give what Griffin and Ohlsson refer to as the knowledge-
effect difference score, but is referred to in this thesis as belief-basis score.  The belief-
basis score ranges from 1 to 9, with 1 indicating highly intuitive reasons for belief in a 
topic and 9 indicating highly rational reasons for belief. 
Self-predicted belief change on each topic was taken as the raw value reported by 
participants in response to the single belief change prediction question on each topic.  
The score ranged from 1 to 9, where 1 is the least likelihood of belief change and 9 is 
the highest likelihood.  
Procedure 
The time sequence of the study is illustrated in Figure 1.  Participants were invited to 
take part via an email directing them to the questionnaire online.  Upon visiting the 
questionnaire webpage, they read a briefing form and gave initial consent to take part 
in the study (Appendix 1).  Participants were assured of their anonymity in the study 
and that they had a right to leave the study at any point.  Participants completed the 
questionnaire page by page, as detailed in the materials section above and in Appendix 
1 (see also Figure 1).  Participants did not have to complete the questionnaire at one 
sitting and could return to it and continue at any time.  Consent to use the data was 
confirmed again at the end of the study, since in an online study people can leave even 
right at the end without any indication that they wish their data to be withdrawn – 
final reconfirmation is therefore necessary to ensure consent is adequately obtained.  
Participants were then offered the option to be notified of the results and debriefed.  
This preference was handled via an email submission script independent of the survey 
software, so that anonymity was retained.  Notification and an explanation of the study 
were emailed to those requested it.  The delayed debriefing was necessary to prevent 
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people talking to other people taking part in the study.  The study adhered to the 
ethical guidelines laid out in British Psychological Society guidance (BPS, 2018) and 
BPS ethics for Internet Mediated Research (BPS, 2017).  This study was approved by 
the ethics committee at Goldsmiths College, University of London. 
Figure 1 - Time sequence and measures for Study 1 
Topic statement








a Belief in topic rated from 1-9 (none to completely)
b In their own words, participants provided up to 3 reasons for belief in the topic.
c Belief-basis – calculated from 5 ratings of reasons for belief (1-9, from not at all to 
completely). Mean rating for the three intuitive items is subtracted from the mean 
rating for the two rational items, giving an overall rating from 1-9 (from intuitive belief-
basis to rational belief-basis)




of future belief 
changed
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Results 
In their original study Griffin and Ohlsson presented graphs that visually illustrate the 
belief-basis differences for the topics.  While these are not statistical tests, it was 
deemed to be useful to compare the results from the present sample with those of 
Griffin and Ohlsson, since if belief profiles for topics are robust then they should 
transcend the samples used.  For the purposes of the graphs, believers are classed as 
those rating belief as 7 or above and disbelievers are classed as those scoring 3 or below 
(the numbers in brackets below the columns indicate the number of participants 
contributing to that column – current study on the left and USA sample on the right).  
As per Griffin and Ohlsson’s original graphs, those participants scoring between 4 and 
6 are not on the graphs.  The graphs below (Figures 2 and 3) show Griffin and 
Ohlsson’s original results shaded with diagonal lines and the results from the present 
study in solid colour.  Overall, the results tend to be very similar.  This is all the more 
impressive when the variation in the number of participants contributing to each 
column is taken into account.  For example, in the present sample only 7 participants 
believed in creationism, while 59 of the USA sample believed in it, yet the belief profile 
is almost identical.  The comparison does show some variations, mainly regarding ESP 
and Opposites, but generally the graphs are not indicating an alarming difference 
between the two samples. 
 
Figure 2 - Comparison between Study 1 and Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) USA sample for 
believers' belief-bases (numbers of contributing participants are given for each topic, with 
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Figure 3 - Comparison between Study 1 and Griffin and Ohlsson's (2001) USA sample for 
disbelievers' belief-bases (numbers of contributing participants are given for each topic, with 
USA sample on the right; error bars not available for USA sample) 
Griffin and Ohlsson also included self-predictions of belief change in their graphs and 
this is shown in the two graphs below (Figures 4 and 5).  Again, the USA sample is 
shaded with diagonal lines and the sample from the present study is in solid colour.  
As can be seen, the self-predicted belief change was very similar in the two samples, 
even generally following the rise and fall of likelihood of belief change across the five 
topics. 
 
Figure 4 - Comparison between Study 1 and Griffin and Ohlsson's (2001) USA sample for 
believers' self-predicted belief change (numbers of contributing participants are given for 
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Figure 5 - Comparison between Study 1 and Griffin and Ohlsson's (2001) USA sample for 
disbelievers' self-predicted belief change (numbers of contributing participants are given for 
each topic, with USA sample on the right; error bars not available for USA sample) 
Prior to statistical analysis of the results, the integrity of the belief-basis measure was 
checked.  The overall Cronbach’s alpha was .574.  Factor analysis showed two factors 
with the expected items loading on them.  Cronbach’s alpha for intuitive items was 
.688 and for rational items it was .850.  Neither Griffin and Ohlsson (2001) nor Griffin 
(2008) provide reliability analysis for the belief-basis scale, although the 2008 study 
does provide factor analysis, which confirms the current finding of the expected split 
on the two types of belief-basis. 
It worth noting here that the Cronbach’s alpha is provided above chiefly as a standard 
measure of internal consistency.  However, in this instance it is the factor analysis that 
is the more important analysis to focus on.  This is all the more so due to the low 
number of items in the scale, which necessarily tends to reduce the size of Cronbach’s 
alpha.  Therefore, considering the small number of items in the scale and within each 
part of the scale, these reliability results and the factor analysis can be considered to 
indicate that the scale is useful (Lance, Butts, & Michels, 2016; Tavakol & Dennick, 
2011; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014).  Reliability measures and low-item scales will 
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Hypothesis 1 predicted that belief-basis would correlate with belief in the topics in the 
same pattern as found in Griffin and Ohlsson’s study.  A bivariate correlation of belief-
basis and belief was conducted.  A positive correlation indicates that belief in a topic 
has a more rational basis and a negative correlation indicates the belief has a more 
intuitive basis.  The statistics given are from the non-parametric analyses.  Where 
possible non-parametric analyses are used right across the programme in order to 
avoid issues with comparing disparate samples, as well as providing a tougher 
statistical test; if the results are significant then greater confidence can be attached.   
This is obviously at the risk of inflating type-2 errors, but generally speaking non-
parametric analyses are not overly insensitive compared to parametric ones so this was 
considered to be an appropriate trade-off (Howell, 2007). 
Table 3 presents the correlations between belief-basis and belief for each topic.  All but 
Opposites show a significant effect at p < .0005.  Opposites fails to correlate 
significantly at rho = -.192, p = .104.  Creationism, afterlife, and ESP all correlate 
negatively with belief-basis while evolution correlates positively, as found in Griffin 
and Ohlsson’s original study.  They also found that Opposites correlated negatively, 
but this was not replicated here. 
Table 3 - Correlations between belief-basis and belief 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
-.513 -.617 -.554 -.192 .593 
Significance <.0005 <.0005 <.0005 .104 <.0005 
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Figure 6 - Scatterplots of belief-basis vs belief 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that a greater rational belief-basis would correlate with greater 
self-ratings of belief change likelihood.  A bivariate correlation was conducted between 
belief-basis and self-predicted belief change.  A positive correlation indicates that 
participants who report a greater rational belief-basis are more likely, than those with 
an intuitive belief-basis, to feel that they will change their view later if challenged by 
strong contradictory evidence, whereas a negative correlation indicates the opposite 
situation.  For all topics, except ESP, there was a significant positive correlation 
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between self-predicted belief change and rational belief-basis (correlations ranging 
from .266 to .360, p-values from .046 to .002).  Griffin and Ohlsson found this positive 
correlation significant for all topics, however, so the finding for ESP was not replicated 
here (rho = .148, p = .214).  This is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 - Correlations between belief-basis and self-predicted belief change 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Spearman’s 
Rho .266 .360 .148 .234 .303 
Significance .023 .002 .214 .046 .009 
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Figure 7 - Scatterplots of belief-basis vs self-predicted belief change 
 
Extending from the original analyses that Griffin and Ohlsson conducted, an exploratory 
bivariate inter-correlation of belief-basis was also conducted to look at whether participants 
presented a consistent belief style.  As shown in  
Table 5, belief-basis inter-correlated positively across all topics, ranging from rho = .324 
to rho = .728 (p-values from .005 to < .0005). 
 
Table 5 - Inter-correlations between belief-basis on each topic (Spearman’s Rho) 
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 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Creationism  .575 .551 .442 .634 
Afterlife   .728 .324 .450 
ESP    .387 .541 
Opposites     .454 
Discussion 
With some exceptions Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) findings were replicated in Study 1.  
The belief-basis hypothesis was supported, with greater rational belief-basis correlating 
with greater self-reported likelihood of belief change.  The exception to this was the 
topic of ESP, which did not show the predicted effect, although it was in the correct 
direction.  Griffin and Ohlsson’s other finding, that each topic correlated more with 
one type of belief-basis than the other, was also replicated.  Therefore, while the sample 
of topics in the present study is small it seems plausible that the principle would 
generalise: topics will tend to have an associated ‘belief profile’.  The exception to this 
finding was for Opposites, which did not correlate with one type of belief-basis more 
than the other (p = 0.104), although it is unclear whether there was a good reason for 
this or whether it was a statistical fluke born of conducting multiple analyses on the 
data (cf. Study 2).  Overall, however, despite drawing upon a very different population 
sample, these results generally confirm Griffin and Ohlsson’s findings, suggesting that 
the reason people hold their beliefs influences how likely they are to change those 
beliefs and that topics vary consistently on belief-basis. 
Going beyond the original Griffin and Ohlsson analyses, the most interesting finding 
was that, while belief-basis varied across topics, participants nevertheless seemed to 
have a preferred ‘belief style’.  This was demonstrated by the positive inter-correlation 
of belief-basis across all topics.  This is, of course, an exploratory analysis, although the 
high degree of statistical significance does provide some confidence in the finding. 
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Overall, the findings of the present study add to the robust result found in the 
literature that belief-basis can vary for rational and intuitive reasons and be associated 
with a certain thinking style (Clarke, 1995; Legare et al., 2012; Lindeman, 1998).  In this 
instance it might be referred to as a believing style, but the implication in terms of the 
path-dependency model is that consistency of belief style indicates an underlying 
consistency of processing style.  Such consistency should further bolster the likelihood 
of detecting an effect in the next intervention study, since those participants with a 
more rational belief-basis in ESP will also be more likely to generally use a rational 
processing style, which will better help them to assimilate the rational disconfirmation 
presented in such an intervention.  Indeed, this agrees with literature finding that 
cognitive style moderates the effects of reasoning biases.   For example, across four 
studies Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997) looked at various factors, such as critical 
reasoning skills, personal goals, and general intellectual ability, and found that 
thinking biases were predicted best by thinking style. 
However, a striking anomaly in the present findings was the lack of a correlation 
between belief-basis and self-predicted belief change for ESP.  This is notable in light of 
the participants’ special interest in topics such as ESP.  This result implies that people 
may respond differently to contradictory knowledge involving topics in which they 
have (or perceive themselves to have) substantial knowledge already.  This would not 
be such an issue in a general population sample, but it is worth considering why it 
might have occurred.  One idea that might be offered in relation to this finding is the 
‘backfire effect’.  Betsch and Sachse (2013) demonstrated this effect in their paper on 
debunking vaccine myths.  They found that strong beliefs meeting strong 
disconfirmation lead to an even stronger belief response instead of adjustment of the 
beliefs.  This effect is generally explained as a defence against a core belief, much as 
people would defend themselves against a physical attack, more strongly the stronger 
the attack is.  However, this would only be true for the present sample if they rated low 
on self-predicted likelihood of belief change (i.e. resistance to change), which a cursory 
look at the belief change graphs indicates is not the case; self-predicted belief change 
was similar to Griffin and Ohlsson’s sample and actually presents some of the highest 
openness to belief change across the five topics.  This apparent openness to belief 
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change also implies that ESP is not seen by participants as unfalsifiable, and thus ESP 
does not gain the advantages that Friesen, Campbell, and Kay (2015) argue such a 
property confers on a belief.  Advantages, such as being easier to defend, tend to give 
unfalsifiable beliefs or belief systems an advantage in spreading.  However, this does 
not appear to be the case here.  The openness of the group to belief change also 
mitigates against the likelihood that they are engaged in motivated reasoning (Westen, 
Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006).  This type of reasoning is where individuals 
process information in line with their own goals, such as wanting ESP to be real, or not.  
Of course, there is always the possibility of demand effects and participants may have 
been responding in a way that they feel was expected of them as members of a group 
interested in anomalous phenomena – i.e. open mindedness.  However, if this is the 
case then the demand effect clearly did not generalize to other topics outside of the 
specialist area.  This is particularly interesting, since Afterlife is a topic in the study and 
is included in omnibus measures, such as the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & 
Milford, 1983), yet the responses of participants differed substantially in this area.  This 
may be due to religious connotations with that particular phenomenon, but it 
underlines the need to avoid treating paranormal beliefs as a homogenous group if it is 
possible to treat them separately in any given study. 
All of the above relates to self-predicted belief change, however, and was also obtained 
under laboratory conditions online rather than actually testing belief change in the real 
world.  It is worth heeding Mitchell’s (2012) warning that laboratory research has a 
worrying tendency to fail in the real world.  This is all the more concerning when the 
laboratory results rely upon self-predictions of future behaviour as people are known 
to be poor at this sort of prediction.  This particular issue will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next chapter, but an example has already been encountered in the 
literature review for this thesis, with people showing biased predictions of their own 
behaviour even when they were aware of the base-rates involved (Nisbett & Borgida, 
1975).  This indicates that there may be validity issues when relying upon self-reports 
of future behaviours of the kind used in the present study. 
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Finally, the study also collected qualitative data on people’s reasons for belief in the 
five topics.  Analysis of this will be deferred to a later chapter, where it will be used as 
part of a refinement of the original belief-basis measure, which has a number of 
obvious shortcomings, such as the imbalance in the number of intuitive and rational 
items presented.  This revised belief-basis measure will then be used for other studies 
in the programme, although not for the first intervention study as it is important that 
the results of that study can be compared directly with the present replication study, 
and Griffin and Ohlsson’s original.  Finally, the mode of the questionnaire did not 
seem to influence the results, thus, adding to the literature supporting equivalence of 
online and offline modes. 
In conclusion, the present study demonstrated that Griffin and Ohlsson’s findings 
largely replicate with a different sample and mode of presentation.  This provided 
some nascent support for the path-dependent model of belief formation and change 
and indicated that the avenue was worth pursuing using a more naturalistic 
adaptation of the methodological template.  The next step was therefore to adapt the 
methodology for use in an intervention study, which would be similar to existing 
intervention studies on reduction of paranormal belief.  However, unlike those studies 
the aim was not simply to look at whether belief change occurs, but to investigate why 
it might be changing for some people more than for others. 
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Study 2 – Does Belief-Basis Influence Real 
World Belief Change? 
Background 
The previous study generally replicated Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) finding that belief 
change was more likely when beliefs had a greater rational component to belief-basis.  
It also confirmed that belief-basis profiles vary across topics, with belief in ESP being 
more intuitively based.  With respect to belief change, the study only looked at self-
predicted likelihood of belief change.  However, there are problems with relying upon 
self-prediction, and self-report more generally.  Therefore the present study measured 
real belief change rather than self-prediction of belief change and did so in a 
naturalistic setting. 
In their classic paper, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) take an anti-introspectionist view, 
raising doubts about the validity of self-reports of higher-order cognitive processing.  
They argue that it may be true that people can report accurately on higher-order 
cognitive processes when the stimuli are salient and are also probably causes of the 
responses.  However, when this is not the case, when stimuli are not salient to the 
person or salient stimuli are not actually the causes of responses, then this sort of self-
report cannot be relied upon.  They compare the common use of self-report of higher-
order thinking processes with the absurdity of asking people to introspect upon lower 
level processes, such as how much they are using parallel line convergence when 
judging distances. 
This problem was demonstrated by Nisbett and Borgida (1975) when they investigated 
teaching students about classic studies with non-intuitive results, such as bystander 
apathy and experiments involving delivering electric shocks.  They found that whether 
or not they presented students with the base-rate information about how likely people 
were to help or not, it did not alter the students’ predictions of their own behaviours or 
their attributions about the personalities of people in the studies.  Nor did any of the 
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students make reference to the participants in the studies when explaining the 
predictions of their own behaviour.  In other words, the students showed a complete 
disregard for information that was useful in predicting their own behaviours and 
which therefore should have caused them to adjust their predictions.  They remained 
biased in predicting their own behaviours, predicting that they would be nicer people 
than those in the studies they had been taught about.  This raises the question of 
whether Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) findings regarding self-predicted belief change 
are simply a case of biased responding. 
As it stands, however, the study by Nisbett and Borgida could be written off as an 
insufficient test, since the participants in the study really might have behaved 
differently had they themselves taken part in bystander or shock test studies, even 
though the statistics from many such studies suggest this is unlikely.  Stronger 
evidence of the problem of relying upon self-prediction, however, comes from a study 
by Balcetis and Dunning (2013).  They looked at two psychology study situations: 
variations in group size in bystander helping situations, and the effect of mood on 
giving a charitable contribution.  They found that people were more accurate when 
predicting other people’s likely behaviours in these two situations than in predicting 
their own likely behaviour.  Unlike in Nisbett and Borgida’s study, however, the 
students were (unbeknownst to them) being told about results of studies their peers 
had actually taken part in.  This meant that the students making the self-predictions 
about their own behaviour in those situations were, on average, expected to behave in 
the same way as their peers did, thus removing the excuse that those making the 
predictions may really be so different that their optimistic self-predictions were 
actually accurate. 
The phenomenon of choice blindness adds further reason to heed Nisbett and 
Borgida’s (1977) warning.  It turns out that people not only make errors in predicting 
potentially far future behaviours, but they also find it hard to report accurately on 
current behaviours that have only just been completed.  In the choice blindness 
paradigm, Johansson, Hall, Sikstrom, Tarning, and Lind (2006) demonstrate that 
people are ‘blind’ to choices they have only just made.  This effect was achieved by 
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asking participants to decide which of two female faces they like more and then 
placing the cards on the table face down.  When the chosen card is lifted up again it has 
the other face on it, which was not the one chosen.  This is achieved by use of a very 
simple card trick and participants were generally unaware of the switch (see also 
'change blindness' - e.g. Simons & Levin, 1998).  Participants then proceed to explain 
their choice to the experimenter, creating a justification for why they chose the face that 
they did not really choose.  The same effect has also been demonstrated in self-
transforming surveys on topics, such as political views (Hall, Johansson, & Strandberg, 
2012).  Again, using a simple trick, participants’ responses are reversed, yet they 
proceed to explain why they chose the opposite response to the one they had really 
chosen.  In doing so, participants often gave perfectly coherent and even strong 
arguments in support of their illusory choice, which could be in direct contradiction to 
their actual choice.  The lesson for the present research programme from choice 
blindness and self-prediction studies is that people may say one thing now, but this 
does not reliably predict what they will do or say in the future – even if that future is 
only seconds away from the present. 
The current study therefore used a lecture-based intervention in order to measure real-
world belief change, drawing upon an existing lecture session for first year students at 
Goldsmiths College, University of London.  This also presents a naturalistic 
intervention, since the presentation of rational counterevidence and argument is 
exactly the sort of thing sceptics of the paranormal are thinking of when they make 
recommendations on belief change – i.e. typically the approach is a deficits one, usually 
regarding a knowledge gap.  As already mentioned in the general background, there is 
a precedent for the use of interventions, such as lectures, to induce belief reduction. 
For example, Harrington (2013) used an intervention study to change the beliefs of 
biology students about a selection of topics in biology.  The changes in belief were 
moderate, but detectable and in line with course objectives – i.e. incorrect beliefs 
tended to change in the direction of correct beliefs, rather than vice versa.  The present 
study hoped for similar results, demonstrating a reduction in belief in ESP after the 
intervention.  Indeed, Jones and Zusne (1981) specifically provided an intervention on 
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paranormal topics, including ESP, and found that this led to the expected reduction in 
paranormal belief.  As with Harrington’s study, this one used a course-length 
intervention.  Banziger and College (1983) demonstrated the same belief reduction 
effect in a course-length intervention with older participants (mean age of 67 years 
old), demonstrating that the effect is not limited to younger, student samples.  The 
course itself was not a typical university course, but was similar.  The course covered 
topics of an anomalous nature for 1.5 hours per day.  At 6 months after the 
intervention, belief reduction still remained, a reduction on the Paranormal Belief Scale 
(Tobacyk & Milford, 1983) of about 7 to 8 points (the scale being scored from 0 to 100). 
McLean and Miller (2010) included the addition of a standard research methods course 
in their study, as a comparison with their anomalistic psychology course, in order to 
control for skill acquisition versus specific knowledge acquisition.  Both courses 
showed improvements in critical thinking skills.  However, only the anomalistic 
psychology course showed reduction in paranormal beliefs, indicating that it is subject-
specific knowledge that leads to reduction in paranormal belief rather than thinking 
skills.  Morier and Keeports (1994) presented similar results in their own study, also 
using a control group, this time students studying a course on psychology and law vs 
students studying a course on science and pseudoscience.  Once again, belief in the 
paranormal was reduced and the implication was that topic-specific interventions are 
required for belief change to happen. 
It might be, however, that students in the courses focusing on anomalistic topics are 
responding with lower post-test belief levels due to a demand effect, based upon being 
on that particular course.  A different approach was therefore taken by Kane, Core, and 
Hunt (2010) in order to address this concern.  Their novel approach was to use a 
cognitive bias as a measure of belief change.  The specific bias they used was the 
hindsight bias, where people tend to think that their previous belief states are more 
similar to their current belief states than they actually are.  In this way asking 
participants about their previous belief state actually gives a good indication of their 
current belief state, thanks to the biased responding.  With this technique they aimed to 
avoid a response bias in participants’ post-intervention belief ratings, because 
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participants are not being directly asked about their current level of belief.  A limitation 
of this approach is that the belief level reported is likely to be higher than the real 
current belief level, which reduces the power to detect belief reduction.  However, as a 
means of determining if belief change is due to a demand effect it was useful, and there 
was sufficient power that the study in question did indeed show that belief reduction 
occurred. 
There is therefore a clear precedent for the use of interventions for belief change in the 
present study.  However, a key difference is that the above studies all used extensive, 
course-length interventions, whereas the present study planned to use a single one-
hour lecture on anomalistic psychology.  The difference in the amount of knowledge 
that can be communicated in a one-hour lecture compared to a full course of lectures is 
obvious and the difference might well be expected to reduce the size of the effect and 
thus the power to detect an effect.  However, there is precedent for the use of a ‘single-
dose’ intervention technique.  Happs (1991) found long-term belief change after one 
such intervention with trainee primary school teachers.  Happs showed participants 
videos of water dowsers repeatedly failing to succeed under controlled conditions.  
Dowsing involves using sticks that apparently move when there is water, or some 
other desired substance, nearby.  However, there is no real mechanism for this and it 
has not been shown to work under scientifically controlled conditions (French, 2014).  
Nevertheless, it is a common paranormal belief.  Encouragingly for the present study, 
Happs found that, even though the intervention was short, there was long-term 
reduction of belief. 
However, none of these studies addresses the variance in belief change across 
individuals, yet in none of the studies was belief change black and white.  Not 
everyone changed their beliefs and when they did the belief change was only partial.  
This is the kind of variance that the path-dependent model attempts to account for and 
which the present study is therefore designed to investigate.  The present study 
therefore applied the same measures from the previous study as pre- and post-test 
measures within an intervention paradigm.  The belief-basis measure was not updated 
at this point, in order to ensure the real-world intervention results could be directly 
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compared with the online replication study.  However, the self-predicted belief change 
question was omitted in order to avoid any potential demand effects that would not be 
present in the online study.  Similarly, for practical reasons, the free response questions 
were omitted to shorten the questionnaire.  All five topics from the previous study 
were included, with the intention that the non-ESP topics would act as a check on 
whether the intervention was specifically influencing ESP.  Additionally, they 
provided a broader range of data for the pre-intervention analysis, allowing fuller 
comparison with the previous study.  Predictions and related rationale remained the 
same as for the previous study except that the measure of belief change was actual 
belief change rather than self-predicted belief change. 
Hypotheses 
H1 – pre-intervention belief-basis would correlate with belief in the topics in the same 
pattern as Griffin and Ohlsson’s study. 
H2 - Belief in ESP would be lower after the lecture than before. 
H3 - The more rational the basis for their belief in ESP before the lecture, the more 
likely participants would be to reduce their belief in ESP afterwards. 
Method  
This study extended the methodology from Study 1 for use in an intervention 
paradigm.  There were two variables measured pre- and post-intervention: belief-basis 
and belief-level, each of which was measured across the five topics used previously: 
creationism, afterlife, opposites attract, ESP, and evolution.  In contrast to Study 1, 
there was no free-text response option and no self-predicted belief change question.  
Belief change was measured directly as the difference between pre- and post-
intervention belief levels. 
Participants 
Participants were first year students enrolled in a research course, which included a 
one-hour slot each week where students participated in questionnaire-based research 
for course credits.  The course also included 5 one-hour lectures, one of which was an 
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introduction to anomalistic psychology.  The original sample size was 112, but 32 were 
removed due to incomplete datasets or not taking part in both the pre- and post-
intervention questionnaires.  This left a sample of 80 participants for the analysis.   
There were 22 male and 58 female participants, ages ranging from 17 to 43 (mean 21.4, 
SD = 4.888). 
Materials 
The questionnaire from Study 1 was reused for the present study, although presented 
in paper and pencil format.  The free-response questions and the self-predicted belief 
change question were omitted, however.  Free-response questions were omitted to 
make the questionnaire quicker to complete, since it was not the only questionnaire 
that students were completing within the one-hour research participation session.  Self-
predicted belief change was omitted in order to limit the potential for demand effects.  
Although Kane et al. (2010) did not find evidence of a demand effect in their sample, it 
was deemed better to limit the possibility anyway, in order to have greater confidence 
in the results when comparing them with the non-intervention versions of the present 
study. Asking a question about belief change before the intervention adds unnecessary 
risk of generating a demand effect.   The original belief-basis measure was also used in 
the study in order to best facilitate comparison with the non-intervention studies – this 
measure was refined for use in later studies in the programme, but at this point it was 
more appropriate to use the original measure, despite the presence of some potential 
issues, such as imbalance in the number of each type of item.  Finally, the intervention 
itself consisted of a single one-hour lecture, presented as an introduction to anomalistic 
psychology.  The lecture covered disconfirming material (i.e. sceptical explanations) 
across a wide range of topics, including dowsing, UFOs, ESP, ghosts, waking sleep 
paralysis, and so on.  Presentation of the material used multiple media types: text, 
images, video, and audio, and presentation style was engaging.   Overall, the content 
and presentation were such that students would be expected to enjoy learning about 
the material and to engage with the disconfirming material that was presented. 
Scoring 
 
Belief in each topic was measured in the same way as in Study 1. 
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Belief-basis on each topic was also measured in the same way as in Study 1. 
Belief change on each topic was calculated by subtracting belief after the intervention 
from belief before the intervention.  The score ranged from -8 to +8, where -8 represents 
the greatest possible decrease in belief and +8 represents the greatest possible increase 
in belief.  
Procedure 
The time sequence of the study is illustrated in Figure 8.  Participants completed the 
questionnaires in a special research session that they attended weekly to complete 
research questionnaires for course credits.  This session was one hour long and the 
students filled in multiple questionnaires in a single session.  The printed questionnaire 
included a briefing sheet and consent form (Appendix 2), which was signed by them.  
The consent sheet was removed from the rest of the questionnaire after data collection 
and stored separately in order to provide anonymity to the participants.  The briefing 
included being told that they would be asked about such views as the ones in the 
questionnaire at multiple points during the year – they did not know that this was an 
intervention study, but simply presenting a second questionnaire later without prior 
explanation may have been suspicious, leading to participants catching on to the aims 
of the study and producing unwanted demand effects.  Approximately two weeks after 
the first questionnaire the participants attended a one-hour lecture introducing 
anomalistic psychology.  After another two weeks they filled in the questionnaire 
again.  This time, after they had completed the questionnaire they were given a 
debriefing sheet (Appendix 2).  As always the study followed BPS ethical guidelines 
(BPS, 2018) and students were told of their right to exit the study.  This study was 
approved by the ethics committee at Goldsmiths College, University of London. 
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Figure 8 - Time sequence and measures for Study 2 
Intervention




a Belief in topic rated from 1-9 (none to completely).
b Belief-basis – calculated from 5 ratings of reasons for belief (1-9, from not at all to 
completely). Mean rating for the three intuitive items is subtracted from the mean 
rating for the two rational items, giving an overall rating from 1-9 (from intuitive belief-
basis to rational belief-basis)
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As in Study 1, graphs of the belief-basis in each topic for believers and non-believers 
are presented, compared alongside the results from Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) 
original study (see Figures 9 and 10).  A close visual match can be seen between the 
present sample and Griffin and Ohlsson’s sample.  This holds for both believers and 
non-believers across all of the topics, despite variations in the number of participants 
contributing to the columns in the graph (the bracketed numbers indicate how many 
participants’ data is being charted – USA sample on the right-hand side).  For example, 
the current study had only 7 believers in creationism, whereas the USA sample had 59 
believers, yet the belief profile for this topic was almost identical. 
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Figure 9 - Comparison between Study 2 and Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) USA sample for 
believers' belief-bases (numbers of contributing participants are given for each topic, with 
USA sample on the right; error bars not available for USA sample) 
 
 
Figure 10 - Comparison between Study 2 and Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) USA sample for 
disbelievers' belief-bases (numbers of contributing participants are given for each topic, with 
USA sample on the right; error bars not available for USA sample) 
Prior to statistical analysis of the results, the integrity of the belief-basis measure was 
checked.  The overall Cronbach’s alpha was .558.  Factor analysis showed two factors 
with the expected items.  Cronbach’s alpha for the intuitive items was .721 and for 
rational items it was .807. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that pre-intervention belief-basis would correlate with belief in 
the topics in the same pattern as Griffin and Ohlsson’s study.  A bivariate correlation of 
belief-basis and belief was conducted.  Table 6 presents the correlations between belief-
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a more rational basis and a negative correlation indicates the belief has a more intuitive 
basis.  All but Opposites show a significant effect at p < .0005, with p = .035 for ESP.  
Opposites fails to correlate significantly at rho = .093, p = .414.  Creationism, afterlife, 
and ESP all correlate negatively with belief-basis while evolution correlates positively, 
as found in Griffin and Ohlsson’s original study and in Study 1 of the present 
programme.  Griffin and Ohlsson also found that Opposites correlated negatively, but 
this was not replicated here although this does replicate the result from Study 1. 
 
Table 6 - Correlations between belief-basis and pre-intervention belief 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
-.674 -.658 -.236 .093 .494 
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Figure 11 - Scatterplots of belief-basis vs pre-intervention belief 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that belief in ESP would be lower after the lecture than before.  
A Wilcoxon test of belief ratings before and after the intervention was conducted (the 
Wilcoxon test is a non-parametric version of a paired samples t-test).  Belief reduction 
was observed in three of the topics.  Belief in ESP reduced the most, from 4.81 to 3.94 (-
.88), Z = -3.653, p < 0.0005, while belief in evolution reduced from 7.78 to 7.41 (-.36), Z = 
-2.737, p = .005, and belief in afterlife reduced 5.18 to 4.74 (-.44), Z = -2.459, p = .013.  
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Belief in creationism did not show any reduction: Z = -.584, p = .569, nor did belief in 
opposites attracting: Z = -1.109, p = .27.  This is shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 – Belief change after the intervention 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Mean belief 
change 




.569 .013 <.0005 .271 .005 
 
 
Figure 12 - Boxplots of belief for each topic, before and after the intervention 
 
* the difference in belief before and after the intervention was significant, p < .05 
Since there was significant belief change observed in ESP, additional analysis was 
conducted to determine if ESP was actually reducing more than belief in the other 
topics that were not targeted by the intervention.  Wilcoxon tests between ESP belief 
change and belief change in each other topic were conducted.  The results are 
displayed in Table 8 below.  The results largely support the idea that ESP belief 
reduced more than the other beliefs.  This was indisputably the case in relation to 
evolution and creationism, but compared to opposites and afterlife, the effect was of 
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borderline significance (p = .051 and p = .053, respectively).  Given the number of 
analyses conducted, this does not warrant disregarding the ESP belief reduction in the 
present study, however. 
 
Table 8 - Differences in belief change between ESP and the other topics 









.004 .053 n/a .051 .029 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the more rational the basis for participants’ belief in ESP 
before the lecture, the more likely they would be to reduce their belief in ESP 
afterwards.  For each topic a partial correlation between belief-basis and belief change 
was conducted, controlling for pre-intervention belief level.  While ESP was the focus 
of the hypothesis, some other topics had shown belief reduction as well and therefore 
all topics were included in the analysis for comparison.  As shown in Table 9, ESP 
showed the predicted effect of greater belief reduction when belief-basis was more 
rational, r = .303 p = .007.  The topic of Evolution also showed a correlation, however: r 
= .304, p = .006.  No other topics showed a significant correlation.  
Table 9 - Correlations between belief-basis and belief change 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Pearson’s r 
-.024 -.028 -.303 -.021 -.304 
Significance .832 .808 .007 .854 .006 
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Figure 13 - Scatterplots of belief-basis vs belief change (pre-intervention belief partialled out) 
 
Finally, the analyses were once again extended to include a check on the belief style of 
the participants.  To this end a bivariate inter-correlation was conducted on belief-basis 
across all five topics.  With the exception of two correlations with evolution the topics 
were all positively correlated, with a high degree of statistical significance.  The 
correlations between evolution and afterlife, and between evolution and opposites 
were not significant, although the effect sizes remained in the same direction as the 
other correlations.  This is shown in Table 10. 
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Table 10 - Inter-correlations between belief-basis on each topic (Spearman’s Rho) 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Creationism  .424 .394 .237 .612 
Afterlife   .399 .424 .180 (p=.111) 
ESP 
 
   .460 .319 
Opposites 
 
    .150 (p=.185) 
Discussion 
The main hypothesis gained some initial support in a real-world test of belief change.  
Belief in ESP reduced after the intervention and this was associated with a greater 
rational belief-basis.  Therefore the previous findings regarding self-predicted belief 
change do, at first glance, appear to replicate in a real-world scenario.  However, 
Afterlife and Evolution also showed belief reduction, but only changes in belief in 
Evolution were associated with belief-basis.  These conflicting results add a note of 
caution to acceptance of the hypothesis.  Nevertheless, other aspects of the findings did 
more clearly replicate those of previous studies.  The findings showed that beliefs are 
held for different reasons and that these can be usefully divided into intuitive and 
rational.  Furthermore, it showed that individuals tend to have a consistent belief style 
across multiple topics. 
The present study has shown, once again, that belief-basis and processing style are 
robust effects.  Aside from the topic of opposites attracting, belief-basis was consistent 
with the findings of the previous study and Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) original 
findings.  The belief profiles thus shown were also consistent with what wider 
literature would predict for them, with ESP being related to a greater intuitive belief-
basis, as was afterlife, and creationism, both of which are largely religious beliefs 
(Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Boden et al., 2012; Clarke, 1995; Irwin & Young, 2002; King 
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et al., 2007; Wolfradt et al., 1999).  On the other hand, belief in evolution was 
consistently associated with a greater rational belief-basis.  This can be expected since 
knowledge of evolutionary theory is arguably more likely to arise due to encountering 
rationally-based material on the topic.  In particular, the present and previous research 
findings combine to cast doubt on Schouten’s (2010) finding that there was no 
correlation between paranormal belief and intuitive belief-basis.  In contrast, the 
present findings provide evidence that different topics tend to maintain a particular 
belief-profile across multiple sample groups (three so far: USA students, UK non-
students, UK students). 
Furthermore, while the belief-profile findings of Griffin and Ohlsson (Griffin, 2008; 
Griffin & Ohlsson, 2001) and Study 1 have been replicated and seem likely to be robust,  
there is also some initial indication that their belief change findings do generalise to the 
real world.  The present study held the materials and relevant factors as close as 
possible to the original studies, and succeeded in finding a differential effect of belief-
basis on belief change, in line with the predictions of the path-dependency model.  This 
interpretation of the results must be tempered, however, by the observation that 
observed changes in belief for Afterlife and Evolution were not consistent with the 
hypothesis: Evolution showed the expected correlation, but Afterlife showed no 
correlation at all.  The fact that belief in other topics varied is certainly plausible in 
itself, since participants will have been exposed to more than just the intervention 
lecture within the time period of the study.  However, if this was the case then one 
would still predict that the hypothesized correlations for Afterlife and Evolution, but 
the results were, in fact, inconsistent on this point.  Doubt is therefore cast upon the 
extent to which the path-dependent belief change hypothesis can be accepted. 
It may be, as Alcock (2018) states, that beliefs are all the same kind underneath, no 
matter how they were arrived at.  For example, it may be that beliefs are simply highly 
resistant to change in general, and that this general resistance overshadows much 
subtler influence, such as belief-basis or even cognitive processing style.  Green and 
Donahue (2011) found this Spinozan type of effect in their study on people’s 
judgements about characters in stories they read.  Green and Donahue arranged it so 
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that participants found out that the original story was incorrect.  This inaccuracy was 
explained as either being an accident on the part of the author or deliberate on the part 
of the author.  Participants were quick to derogate the author who intentionally 
provided false details.  But, surprisingly, finding out that the stories were incorrect did 
not cause participants to change their story-based judgments (e.g. their beliefs about 
characters in the stories).  It did not matter if the inaccuracy was known to be 
deliberate.  Nor did it matter if the story was presented as fictional or factual.  In short, 
once people’s beliefs about the characters in the stories were formed, they did not 
easily change.  Derogation of a lying source did not extend to correction of story-based 
beliefs.  This showed that countering people’s beliefs may have no effect even when 
they know the original source was misleading.  If beliefs about stories, some of them 
fictional, can be this hard to change, then it is plausible that real world beliefs may be 
even harder to change.  Effects, such as those predicted by the path-dependency 
model, might exist but be too subtle to detect, or simply not have a chance to influence 
belief change at all. 
However, the present study did induce belief reduction; it was not the case that beliefs 
were resistant to change per se, but that there is some doubt regarding the robustness 
of the differentiation that was found.  Therefore, another possibility is that the rational 
actor approach is, in fact, correct and that people are rational actors generally speaking.  
In which case, how people arrived at their beliefs may be less important than the new 
information that they are being presented with – i.e. the closure of a knowledge gap 
(Anderson & Rausch, 2009; Bucher et al., 2014; Hample, 1979; Lange & Fishbein, 1983; 
McFarland & Thistlethwaite, 1970; Morris, 1996).  This would, of course, also cast 
doubt upon rational actor theories that take path-dependence into account, such as 
Bleile’s (2014) proposal.  On the other hand, it may be simply that the path-dependency 
model is overly simple or missing important parts and this will be tackled in the next 
study. 
Furthermore, should the nascent support for the path-dependent hypothesis fail to 
replicate then this would also raise important issues regarding researching real belief 
change rather than self-predicted belief change.  It certainly seems that people are 
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predictably bad at self-prediction (Balcetis & Dunning, 2013; Johansson et al., 2006; 
Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  On the other hand, if the findings 
replicate, then this would mean that simpler and cheaper laboratory based studies can 
be conducted instead of logistically more demanding real-world studies, such as the 
one conducted here.  For now, however, the present recommendation must be that 
real-world study of belief change is to be strongly preferred in order to avoid the 
possible confound that self-prediction may introduce. The next study in the current 
programme was therefore another naturalistic intervention study, both for the above 
reasoning and to test whether the current study’s findings replicated. 
Methodologically, the present study was successful.  While most existing intervention 
studies have used course-length interventions, the present study detected belief 
reduction after just a single one-hour lecture (Banziger & College, 1983; Harrington, 
2013; Jones & Zusne, 1981; McLean & Miller, 2010; Morier & Keeports, 1994).  This adds 
to the findings of Happs (1991), suggesting that single-dose interventions can be an 
effective way to study belief change.  This is encouraging for research on belief change 
interventions generally, as it is clearly much easier, faster, and cheaper to administer a 
single one-hour lecture intervention than an entire course. 
In conclusion, the findings of the present study were mixed, but promising.  Robust 
dual-process related findings garnered further support, while the key hypothesis of the 
proposed dual-process model received cautious initial support.  Assuming that the 
model is not fundamentally wrong it may be that the model is overly simplistic and the 
next study introduced an additional factor that emerges from the dual-process 
literature as important: the primacy of intuitive thinking and the consequent need to 
inhibit it in order for rational thinking to have its influence.  Finally, due to the mixed 
nature of the findings in the present study regarding the potential unreliability of self-
predictions, it was decided that all future studies in the programme would focus on 
measuring real belief change. 
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Refining the Belief-Basis Measure 
Background 
Before embarking on further studies, the belief-basis measure was in need of 
refinement.  It was not used in the previous study because of the need to avoid varying 
too many parameters in the study, so that confidence could be placed in the results 
when comparing real-world belief change effects with self-predictions measured in the 
lab; moving from the laboratory to the real world is a big enough change in itself and 
modifying a measure is also non-trivial.  It was reassuring to know that the belief-basis 
findings were still replicated and that the study was all but identical to the non-
intervention study.  However, there remained a number of issues with the current 
measure that were addressed for use in further studies in the series. 
Firstly, it can be observed that the original belief-basis measure is not balanced in terms 
of the number of items (Griffin, 2008; Griffin & Ohlsson, 2001).  There are three items 
for intuitive reasons, but only two items for rational reasons.  A second issue is that the 
evidence-based reason presented for participants to rate is not specified as being 
rational or intuitive.  However, people can perceive their personal experiences as 
‘evidence’ (Clarke, 1995) or they might be referring to scientific evidence.  This clearly 
confounds the meaning of the item.  Indeed, Griffin (2008) does note that types of 
evidence are collapsed within the belief-basis measure, but cites this as an advantage, 
since it does not limit participants to only rational evidence.  However, it is unclear 
how this achieves the aims of measuring the relative contribution of intuitive and 
rational reasons for beliefs since it is not possible to determine if a participant’s 
response to that item is intended as relating to rational or intuitive evidence.  In fact, 
Griffin (2008) goes on to state that: 
“It is important to note that while the last item refers specifically to “Science”, the 
item labeled “Evidence” provides no constraints on how respondents interpret the 
meaning of “evidence” and the phrase “that I am personally aware of” was 
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included to encourage respondents to include anything they would consider a type 
of “evidence”.  Testing revealed that the Evidence and Science items are only 
correlated at r = .50, meaning that 75% of the variance in Evidence ratings is 
independent from the Science item.” (p.3) 
Here the correlation confirms the suspicions that the evidence item is confounding the 
two types of evidence that a path-dependent model of belief change would be seeking 
to separate. 
Finally, from the replication data it was noted that the faith item was essentially a 
subset of ‘head versus heart’.  Only 7% of responses rated faith as higher than 
head/heart as a reason for belief or disbelief.  This implies that the two items need 
conflating into a single item rather than doubling up on the intuitive belief-basis 
scoring and artificially influencing the overall score. 
The refinement proposed in the present chapter therefore aimed to provide a more 
balanced belief-basis measure.  In doing so, the free-response text from the replication 
study was also drawn upon, similarly to how Griffin and Ohlsson (2001) did in their 
original study to produce their original items.  The aim was not to develop a 
completely new measure, however, it was merely to refine the existing one in a logical 
and careful way.  Part of this process involved qualitative analysis of the free-response 
text, but it was not limited to this. 
Materials 
As a convenience to the reader the original belief-basis items are replicated in Table 11, 
for ease of reference.  This was the base from which the present refinement developed. 
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Table 11 - Original belief-basis measure items 
Intuitive Rational 
 
My belief about [topic] makes me feel 
good or is comforting. 
 
When it comes to issues like [topic], I trust 
my 'heart', not my 'head' to tell me the 
truth. 
 
I don't need proof, I have faith that my 




My belief about [topic] is a result of 
examining all of the evidence I'm aware of 
and choosing the most convincing 
explanation. 
 
My belief about [topic] is supported by 
current scientific knowledge. 
 
The only other material used directly in the revision was the free-response text from 
Study 1, which can be found in full in Appendix 3.   As stated in Study 1 the sample 
size for the study was 72, consisting of 30 men and 42 women, ranging in age from 20 
to 70 (mean 36.16, SD = 14.873).  All free-text responses by participants were checked 
for anonymity before including in Appendix 3 (no redactions were required). 
Analysis 
The responses were analysed using an inductive (bottom-up) thematic analysis, 
looking for semantic (explicit-level) themes, following the basic process outlined in 
Braun and Clarke (2006).  Points of interest in the responses were noted before bringing 
them together under initial higher level themes, trying to allow the data to speak for 
itself and not fall into the trap of using the question/prompts as ready-made categories, 
although it must be acknowledged that the original items from Griffin and Ohlsson 
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(2001) could not be completely ignored.  Indeed, one would expect to find similarity.  
The responses were then recoded in terms of the themes, before revisiting the 
responses and distilling the themes further (what Braun and Clarke refer to as ‘define 
and refine’).  At this point, typical thematic analysis would proceed to attempt to link 
the themes together into an overarching ‘story’ that explains the results.  However, for 
the purposes of the present study it was sufficient to identify key themes that might 
form the foundation of any new items.  In the end only one such additional theme was 
produced by the analysis and this was “internal consistency”.  This was a rational 
reason for not holding competing points of view or for disbelieving in a particular 
view.  This kind of thinking often centred around contradictions in Bible scripture, for 
example, with participants stating that: 
“The Bible is even internally inconsistent. There are two creation stories in Genesis 
that contradict each other.” 
“The bible stories of creation have internal contradictions.” 
This was not a theme that emerged due to being numerous in the responses, but it was 
one that came out as critical to some reasons for belief or disbelief and thus had 
importance overall.  In thematic analysis the importance of a theme needs to be 
considered rather than just frequency (which is a different kind of analysis).  The 
ultimate aim in a typical thematic analysis is to tell a meaningful, and hopefully 
accurate, story.  Individual items can carry more weight than multiple other items in 
such a scenario therefore and internal consistency was deemed to be one such theme. 
In addition to analysing the free-response data there was also some modification of the 
existing belief-basis items.  The original scale is unbalanced, with 3 intuitive items and 
2 rational items, as well as omitting personal experience, which is a known correlate of 
paranormal belief.  One of the aims was therefore to balance the items and also include 
personal experience.  It was also noted that the item on evidence did not specify what 
type of evidence, however, so this was split into two items, one on subjective evidence 
(including personal experience) and one on objective evidence, because ‘evidence’ may 
mean different things to different people, as illustrated by the colloquial parlance of 
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believing the evidence of one’s own eyes.  This provided an item on personal 
experience while at the same time separating out the types of evidence.  In contrast, 
two of the intuitive items were collapsed down to one item.  The original item on faith 
was removed as this was deemed to be a subset of ‘head versus heart’ (only 7% of 
responses rated faith as higher than head/heart as a reason for belief/disbelief).  The 
internal contradiction theme found in the thematic analysis was also added as a 
rational item, balancing out the number of items of each type.  Also influenced by the 
free-response Study 1, the ‘scientific knowledge’ item was changed to just ‘science’ to 
allow a broader scope of application.  Finally, the question prompt itself was changed 
from using the term ‘belief’ to using the term ‘view’.  This was done to bring the usage 
more in line with academic operationalisation of belief and avoid cultural connotations 
the term may hold for some people, such as conflating it with ‘faith’.  In the colloquial 
sense, some people may argue that one does not ‘believe’ in a scientific theory, for 
example, since faith is not required.  Table 12 (see next page) presents the final items 
used in the revised belief-basis measure. 
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Table 12 - Predefined reasons for belief and disbelief 
Intuitive Rational 
 
I hold my particular view about [topic] 
because that view of things makes me feel 
good or is comforting. 
 
 
Personal experience or observation is the 




When it comes to issues like [topic], I trust 




I have arrived at my particular view about 
[topic] after careful evaluation of the 
objective evidence both for and against 
my view. 
 
Science is the reason that I hold my 
particular view on [topic]. 
 
I hold my particular view on [topic] 
because the arguments offered for other 
points of view are internally inconsistent – 
i.e. the arguments contain contradictions 




The aim of this chapter was to modify the belief-basis measure to allow participants to 
better express their reasons for belief.  The refined measure achieved the aims set out 
for it.  It is balanced in terms of the number of items.  Conflated items have been 
separated and ‘doubled’ items have been conflated.  And where necessary new 
elements have been introduced, such as personal experience and internal consistency.  
The terminology has also been changed from ‘belief’ to ‘view’ in order to use a more 
neutral term that does not imply any of the cultural connotations that some people 
may associate with the term, such as faith versus knowledge.  Academics may 
operationalise such terms as belief, but it is important that when gathering responses 
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from participants, that appropriate terms for the audience are used – this is long 
known as an issue in cross-cultural studies (van de Vijver & Leung, 2016) and it could 
be argued that academia is itself a culture with its own language, so care is needed. 
There is, of course, with any qualitative analysis or measure refinement, a tension 
between letting the data speak for itself and the agenda of the researcher in creating a 
new scale.  So, in this instance, for example, the free-response text could not be 
neutrally analysed, since there was already knowledge of the existing items from the 
original belief-basis measure, and there was also some expectation of developing a 
scale with an equal number of items for intuitive and rational belief-basis.  It is hoped, 
however, that the resulting treatment of the belief-basis measure has achieved the 
balance of fairly representing the data, whilst also achieving refinement of the 
measure.  The full list of free-response texts is included in Appendix 3, so that the 
reader is free to draw their own judgments upon this matter. 
In conclusion, the belief-basis measure is now arguably more balanced than the 
original, and suitable for use in further intervention studies in the research 
programme.  The present chapter only covers the refinement of the measure and has 
not included any testing of it.  The measure has good face validity, however, and was 
tested in the next intervention study.  That study was almost identical to the first 
intervention study other than the inclusion of a new factor (inhibition of intuitive 
cognition) and the self-predicted belief change question being reinstated.  It was not 
expected that the results would change dramatically.  It was expected that the same 
belief-profiles would be seen, since the general belief-basis finding is robust not just 
within Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) paradigm, but within the wider literature as well.  
However, the revised measure would hopefully provide a greater chance of detecting 
real effects due to the revised construction of the measure in terms of intuitive and 
rational belief-basis items. 
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Study 3 – Does Inhibition of Intuition 
Contribute to Belief Change? 
Background 
It has been argued in this thesis that dual-process accounts of cognition have good 
empirical support.  In this respect, the present research programme has so far added to 
this body of literature by providing support for the idea that beliefs have varying 
belief-bases – in particular, that paranormal belief, in ESP, is associated with a greater 
intuitive component to belief-basis.  Furthermore, the path-dependent belief change 
hypothesis has received some early support, albeit that this needs interpreting with a 
note of caution.  The path-dependent model proposed was deliberately simple, 
however, only introducing the factors that were thought to be needed to predict 
variation in belief change, whereas, dual-process accounts of cognition include another 
key factor that was not included in the original model.  This factor is the evolutionary 
primacy of intuitive cognition.  In dual-process accounts it is generally agreed that 
intuitive cognitive processing comes more easily and/or prior to any rational cognitive 
processing (see the General Background chapter for a detailed discussion of this).  With 
regards to the present study, it will be argued that in order for rational cognition to 
take centre stage and have an effect, intuitive cognition must be inhibited and that 
therefore this factor will need to be included in the model if it is to accurately predict 
belief change. 
The classic incarnation of rational thinking is critical thinking, defined by Ennis (Ennis, 
1991, 2018) as “... reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or 
do ...” (p.1).  Indeed, Aarnio and Lindeman (2005) argue, based upon their study on 
educational level and paranormal beliefs, that it is the stronger preference for analytical 
thinking (i.e. critical thinking) that leads to a reduction in levels of paranormal belief as 
educational level gets higher.  However, while their data did find the association 
between educational level and thinking style, it remains an assumption that education 
Study 3 – Does Inhibition of Intuition Contribute to Belief Change?      106 
or educational ability is associated with a greater tendency for analytical thinking style.  
There is also the problem that the assumption refers only to preferences for an 
analytical thinking style, rather than a tendency to actually apply it.  Under academic 
conditions of study or examination it seems obvious that people’s thinking style might 
be cued (Inbar et al., 2010) and the person could choose to apply their preferred style of 
analytical thinking.  However, paranormal beliefs may not necessarily form in 
situations where cueing is available within the situational context and in this sense it 
would be better to talk of a tendency to apply rational thinking.  Indeed, it is possible 
to read Aarnio and Lindeman’s (2005) ‘preference for analytical thinking’ as equating 
to ‘tendency for analytical thinking’.  Semantically it may be clearer to avoid the 
implication that people are consciously choosing the type of thinking to apply. 
Interpreted in this way, Aarnio and Lindeman‘s (2005) suggestion finds some support 
from a study by Rogers, Davis, and Fisk (2009).  They tested believers and non-
believers in the paranormal on conjunction tasks relating to both paranormal and non-
paranormal events.  They found that believers made more errors on both topics, 
implying that they had a lesser tendency to apply rational thinking to the problems, as 
suggested by Aarnio and Lindeman.  Indeed, this is interesting in relation to the 
inverse association with educational level that Aarnio and Lindeman found.  While 
educational level does, of course, act as a proxy for intellectual ability in many cases, 
Aarnio and Lindeman did not conclude that it was intellectual ability that correlated 
with lower paranormal belief.  Instead, they refer to a preference or tendency, or 
simply a difference in thinking style, but not a difference in ability. 
There is good reason for such a hesitancy to equate paranormal belief with intellectual 
mediocrity, largely because the body of literature on thinking skills and thinking errors 
demonstrates that the two tend to dissociate more often than not.  In short, it is one 
thing to have thinking skills, but it is quite another thing to actually apply them.  This 
dissociation is evidenced again and again in the literature.  For example, Blackmore 
(1997) found that the thinking error of misjudging probabilities is not correlated with 
greater paranormal belief.  This suggests that there is no difference in the abilities of 
the believers and non-believers.  Similarly, Dagnall et al. (2007) found few differences 
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between believers and sceptics on a range of probabilistic reasoning tasks.  The only 
exception was on the perception of randomness, in which believers tend to see more 
meaning.  This is arguably less of a thinking error, however, and more one of 
perception.  Indeed, they refer to the test as being “perception of randomness” and it 
was conducted by asking participants to make judgments about the likelihood of 
various sequences of coin tosses.  However, they also tested participants on the use of 
base rate information, the conjunction fallacy, and derivation of expected value, all of 
which are very much non-perceptual tasks.  There was no difference between sceptics 
and believers on these tasks, suggesting they share similar thinking abilities on these 
particular problems. 
Critical thinking and reasoning skills are also found to dissociate from thinking errors.  
Hergovich and Arendasy (2005) found no relationship between critical thinking skills 
and paranormal belief, using the Cornell Critical Thinking Test and Watson–Glaser 
Critical Thinking Appraisal.  And while they do claim an inverse correlation between 
reasoning skills (measured on the Wiener Matrizen-Test), this was only true for a few 
of the paranormal beliefs that were investigated, making it less likely that this is a real 
effect rather than a statistical artefact, since the specific pattern of correlations and non-
correlation was not predicted in advance.  Similarly, Royalty (1995) looked at critical 
thinking skills (measured on the Cornell Critical Thinking Test) in relation to 
paranormal belief and concluded that there is indeed a difference between having such 
skills and applying them. 
In addition to the above examples, the general background chapter of the present 
thesis also presented evidence that thinking ability is independent of the likelihood of 
falling foul of thinking errors (Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008a, 2008b).  Furthermore, in 
the same chapter, it was seen that even experts fall foul of these types of errors 
(Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2015), such as the ethics philosophers who did no better 
than lay participants on reframed, structurally identical versions of classic ethical 
problems, such as the trolley problem or the Asian disease problem.  All it took was a 
change of framing or ordering of the scenarios.  Nor was there any pressure for a 
speeded response; the experts were free to take their time.  This suggests that intuitive 
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cognition has primacy over rational cognition and that the former is not easily 
suppressed.  Speeded response tests add further weight to the argument for evolved 
primacy of intuitive cognition, however (e.g. Kelemen et al., 2013).  The general finding 
here was that when cognitive resources were reduced due to time constraints, experts 
did no better than lay people on physics problems.  In short, rational thinking takes 
time.  However, by the time the rational system has put its boots on, the intuitive 
system has already arrived with an answer, unless the intuitive system is inhibited 
somehow.  An alternative solution is to reject the initial intuitive answer once the 
rational system catches up.  However, in a speeded test, this means that the rational 
system simply never stands a chance.  Indeed, even in an unspeeded test, it has a 
distinct disadvantage. 
The general theme emerging from the preceding discussion is that it is therefore not 
enough to simply have the ability think rationally; this type of thinking must also be 
applied.  Even in the case of experts, it is possible to construct conditions where they 
fall back on intuitive cognition (Kelemen et al., 2013).  Most people are not experts in 
the paranormal and it is therefore reasonable to expect people to fall back on intuitive 
cognition unless they have a tendency to use a rational thinking approach generally.  
Indeed, the reference to an internal tendency to apply rational thinking is deliberate 
here.  While there is also an argument for external cueing of rational thinking (Inbar et 
al., 2010), it seems unlikely that in real world situations, where paranormal beliefs 
might form, that such rational thinking cues would be present.  Most people will not be 
forming their belief in the paranormal based upon academic papers, such as Cardena’s 
(2018) recent review.  The individual must therefore rely upon their own cognitive 
style; their tendency to think in a certain way. 
Direct support for this suggestion is found in a study by Irwin and Young (2002) who 
found that intuitive thinking style (measured by the Rational-Experiential Inventory) 
correlated with greater paranormal belief.  A tendency for an individual to inhibit 
intuitive thinking therefore seems to be an appropriate factor to incorporate into the 
path-dependency model of belief formation and change.  Support for this specific 
suggestion is found in the literature for the existence of this kind of inhibition.  For 
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example, Lindeman, Svedholm, Riekki, Raij, and Hari (2013) provide fMRI evidence of 
greater activation in sceptics of areas of the brain previously associated with inhibition, 
when asked whether they thought that there was meaning in pictures unrelated to a 
story.  This kind of inhibition, the ability to inhibit seeing meaning where there is none, 
is appropriate with respect to cognitive processing styles being investigated in the 
present study, but not all inhibition is the same and it is therefore worth briefly 
delineating the difference. 
A study by Lindeman, Riekki, and Hood (2011) illustrates the difference well.  This 
study aimed to investigate whether believers and sceptics of the paranormal differed in 
their tendency to inhibit default (i.e. intuitive type) responses.  Participants were 
therefore tested using the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and the Stroop Colour-
Word task.  In the card sorting test, participants are trying to guess a card sorting rule 
and get feedback for each card they place.  However, once they get it right ten times in 
a row the rule is changed, unbeknownst to the participants.  This tests their tendency to 
inhibit continuing with the old rule even though it is now incorrect.  The Stroop task 
requires participants to name the colour that a word is printed in.  This is made harder 
when the word is itself the name of a colour that is different from the colour it is 
printed in.  This measures a participant’s ability to inhibit their low-level automatic 
reading processes – name the colour, do not read the word.  The study found that 
sceptics demonstrated a greater tendency to inhibit the use of the rule set in the card 
sorting test, but that there was no difference in the ability of sceptics and believers to 
inhibit their reading processes on the Stroop task.  If one took the results of the Stroop 
test on their own this might be taken to show that believers and sceptics do not differ 
in their tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking.  Or if taken together, the study presents a 
mixed result at best. 
However, on this point the study has confounded two types of inhibition.  In the above 
discussion the words ‘tendency’ and ‘ability’ were highlighted in italics.  This is 
because the two tests are measuring two different things, one of which is far more 
relevant to inhibition of intuitive thinking than the other.  The card sorting test 
measures the tendency of people to inhibit a higher order cognitive process (guessing 
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and applying a rule); they do not know that the rule has been changed so they are not 
consciously deciding to inhibit their response.  Whereas the Stroop task measures 
people’s ability to inhibit a low-level, automatic cognitive process; people know ahead 
of time that they need to try to inhibit one response so it is measuring ability not just 
tendency and the inhibition was extremely low level rather than influencing higher-
order cognitive thinking.  It was therefore important for the present study to select a 
test that would measure the appropriate kind of inhibition. 
Although the REI (e.g. Irwin & Young, 2002) has been used in relation to paranormal 
beliefs before, it was considered too long for inclusion in the present study.  Instead, a 
short, 3-item test called the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was chosen to fill the role.  
The CRT measures people’s tendency to inhibit default, intuitive responses to three 
relatively simple questions (Frederick, 2005).  Such as: 
A bat and a ball together cost £1.10.  The bat costs £1 more than the ball.  What 
does the ball cost? 
The intuitive answer is 10, while the correct answer is 5.  Neither answer is difficult to 
work out, but the first answer tends to spring to mind with less effort.  Participants are 
required to inhibit this default response, however, and reflect upon the problem to get 
the correct answer. 
The test is extremely short, and has been validated against large samples (Frederick, 
2005; Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009).  The CRT will be discussed in far greater 
detail in the next chapter, which details a study programme designed to extend the 
CRT to improve its validity further.  The rest of the present Study will therefore be 
using the CRT5, the 5-item extended version of the CRT, that aims to correct for issues, 
such as the numeracy bias in the original (see the next chapter for detailed discussion). 
The expectation was that those scoring higher on CRT (i.e. greater inhibition of 
intuitive cognition) would be less likely to believe in ESP.  In accordance with research 
showing a greater intuitive element to paranormal belief, they would generally be less 
likely to hold beliefs for intuitive reasons due to their processing style tending to be 
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less intuitive than average.  Furthermore, they would be more likely to reduce their 
belief in response to rational counterevidence. 
Finally, the current study reintroduced the self-prediction measure, previously omitted 
to avoid potential demand effects.  The finding in the previous study was that the main 
hypothesis received only cautious support in relation to real-world belief change.  It 
therefore remains unclear whether self-predictions of belief change are accurate in 
relation to real-world belief change and a more direct comparison would be useful.  
The current study therefore looked at both actual and self-predicted belief change, 
along with belief-basis, and tendency to inhibit intuitive, default cognitive processing.  
Based upon previous findings in the research programme and the wider literature, the 
following hypotheses were tested: 
Hypotheses 
H1 – pre-intervention belief-basis would correlate with belief in the topics in the same 
pattern as Griffin and Ohlsson‘s (2001) study. 
H2 - Belief in ESP would be lower after the lecture than before. 
H3 - The more rational the basis for their belief in ESP before the lecture, the more 
likely participants would be to reduce their belief in ESP afterwards. 
H4 – In line with the original replication study, it was predicted that for each topic, a 
greater rational belief-basis would correlate with greater self-ratings of belief change 
likelihood. 
H5 – Self-predicted belief change would correlate with actual belief change. 
H6 – it was predicted that greater (i.e. more rational) belief-basis scores would correlate 
with greater CRT5 scores. 
H7 – it was predicted that higher CRT5 scores would correlate with lower ESP belief. 
H8 – higher CRT5 scores would correlate with greater belief reduction in ESP. 
H9 – CRT5 would interact with belief-basis, leading to greater reduction of ESP belief 
when belief-basis was rational and CRT5 scores were higher. 
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Note: CRT validation hypotheses and the rationale for them are presented in the next chapter.  
The results of validation analyses will also be discussed there. 
Method 
This study used the same the intervention paradigm used in Study 2.  However, in 
addition to belief-basis and belief-level, the self-predicted belief change question was 
also included, measured on a 9-point scale.  This was only included in the pre-
intervention measures, however.  The CRT5 was also included as a measure of 
tendency to inhibit default responses (i.e. intuitive thinking) and CRT validation 
measures were also included: delay of reward and loss-aversion (see Study 4 for 
details). 
Participants 
As in Study 2, the Participants were first year students enrolled in a research course, 
which included a one-hour slot each week where students participated in 
questionnaire-based research, for course credits.  As before, the course also included 5 
one-hour lectures, one of which was an introduction to anomalistic psychology.  The 
sample in the present study were from the cohort in the year following the sample in 
Study 2.  125 participants took part in both halves of the intervention.  36 were 
removed due to one or more missing responses, leaving 89 for analysis.  There were 31 
male, 58 female participants, aged 17 to 45 (mean 20.60, SD = 5.066). 
Materials 
The present study used the revised belief-basis measure developed and presented in 
the previous chapter (see that chapter and Appendix 4 for details of the measure – this 
included changing the questions to use the term ‘view’ instead of ‘belief’).  The study 
also used the CRT5, which is covered in detail in the next chapter, detailing the 
research programme aimed at extending the original CRT measure (see the following 
chapter and Appendix 4 for details on the content of the CRT5).  The CRT5 was 
accompanied by 4 additional questions, two of which tested delay of reward, and two 
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of which tested loss-aversion (details of the questions and the rationale for their 
inclusion are presented in the following chapter – Study 4).  The CRT5 validation items 
were only included in the pre-intervention questionnaire, as they were not necessary 
post-intervention.  Finally, the self-prediction question from the replication study 
(Study 1) was reintroduced, but with the term ‘belief’ changed to the term ‘view’.  This 
measure was also only present in the pre-intervention questionnaire.  The intervention 
itself was the same lecture for the same course, had the same title, and was almost 
identical in content to the one presented in Study 2.  It was also presented by the same 
lecturer and presented in a similar manner as previously. 
Scoring 
 
Belief in each topic was measured in the same way as in Study 1. 
Belief-basis on each topic was scored in the same way as in Studies 1 and 2, except that 
the average for the rational component was divided by 3 instead of 2, due to the 
additional item introduced in the revised belief-basis measure.  The range and meaning 
of the resulting score remain the same as in Studies 1 and 2. 
Belief change on each topic was measured in the same way as in Study 2.  
Self-predicted belief change on each topic was measured in the same way as in Study 
1.  
CRT5 was scored as detailed in Study 4.  One point was assigned for each correct 
answer and this was added together for an overall score between 0 and 5.  Where 0 
indicates a low tendency to inhibit default responses and 5 indicates a high tendency to 
inhibit default responses. 
CRT validation measure was not analysed in the present chapter.  Analysis and 
scoring of this measure are deferred until the chapter on Study 4. 
Procedure 
The time sequence of the study is illustrated in Figure 14.  The procedural details were 
almost identical to those of Study 2, other than the different measures included in the 
questionnaire.  In particular, the pre- and post-intervention questionnaires differed in 
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the items they presented, with the post-intervention questionnaire omitting CRT5, the 
associated validation items, and the self-predicted belief change question.  The first 
questionnaire therefore took slightly longer to complete than the one presented in 
Study 2, whereas the second questionnaire was almost identical to the one presented in 
Study 2 – the revised belief-basis measure adding a total of only five additional items, 
one for each of the five topics.  As in all studies in the programme, BPS ethical 
guidelines (BPS, 2018) were followed, and participants’ data was anonymous.  All 
participants were briefed, informed consent obtained, and debriefed after completion 
of the second questionnaire (Appendix 4).  This study was approved by the ethics 
committee at Goldsmiths College, University of London. 
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Figure 14 - Time sequence and measures for Study 3 
Intervention







Rate belief in 
topicb
Rate reasons for 
belief in topicc
Rate likelihood 
of future belief 
changed
a CRT5 – one point for each correct answer, added together for a range of 0-5 (low to 
high tendency to inhibit default responding).  Two validation items, on delayed reward, 
providing a range of 0-2 (low to high preference to accept a delay for a greater reward).
b Belief in topic rated from 1-9 (none to completely).
c Belief-basis – calculated from 6 ratings of reasons for belief (1-9, from not at all to 
completely). Mean rating for the three intuitive items is subtracted from the mean 
rating for the three rational items, giving an overall rating from 1-9 (from intuitive 
belief-basis to rational belief-basis)
d Self-predicted belief change on a topic rated from 1-9 (not at all to very likely).
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Results 
 
As in the previous studies, graphs of the belief-basis in each topic for believers and 
non-believers are presented, compared alongside the results from Griffin and 
Ohlsson‘s (2001) original study.  Once again, there is a close visual match between the 
present sample and Griffin and Ohlsson’s sample.  This holds for both believers and 
non-believers across all of the topics, despite variations in the number of participants 
contributing to the columns in the graphs – once again, the UK sample (11) have a 
much lower number of believers in creationism than the USA sample (59), yet the belief 
profile for creationism is almost identical between the two samples. 
 
Figure 15 - Comparison between Study 3 and Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) USA sample for 
believers' belief-bases (numbers of contributing participants are given for each topic, with 
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Figure 16 – Comparison between Study 3 and Griffin and Ohlsson's (2001) USA sample for 
disbelievers' belief-bases (numbers of contributing participants are given for each topic, with 
USA sample on the right; error bars not available for USA sample) 
Prior to statistical analysis of the results the integrity of the belief-basis measure was 
checked.  The overall Cronbach’s alpha was .467.  Factor analysis shows two factors, 
with the expected items generally loading on the two factors.  Intuitive (items 1 & 3) = 
0.684 and Rational (items 2, 4, 5 & 6) = 0.629.  However, item 4, which is on intuitive 
evidence (such as personal experience), loaded on the rational factor, although it was 
not loading strongly.  Indeed, rotation clarified this situation, showing item four was 
actually more clearly loaded on the intuitive items.  After rotation Intuitive (items 1, 3 
& 4) = 0.538 and Rational (items 2, 5 & 6) = 0.637.  The findings from additional studies 
in the programme will also add to evaluation of the revised belief-basis measure.  The 
discussion of reliability analyses for low-item scales is covered in Study 4 and the 
results section of Study 1.  For the CRT5, the reliability and validation analyses are 
collectively discussed in the Study 4 results section, together with those from other 
studies in the programme, since Study 4 was dedicated to evaluation of the CRT5. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that pre-intervention belief-basis would correlate with belief in 
the topics in the same pattern as Griffin and Ohlsson‘s (2001) study.  A bivariate 
correlation of belief-basis and belief was conducted.  Table 13 presents the correlations 
between belief-basis and belief for each topic.  A positive correlation indicates that 
belief in a topic has a more rational basis and a negative correlation indicates the belief 
has a more intuitive basis.  All of the topics showed the predicted correlations: positive 
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to -.644 and for all topics p < .0005.  This represents a clear replication of Griffin and 
Ohlsson’s (2001) original findings. 
Table 13 - Correlations between belief-basis and pre-intervention belief 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
-.644 -.535 -.511 -.515 .460 
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Figure 17 - Scatterplots of belief-basis vs pre-intervention belief 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that belief in ESP would be lower after the lecture than before.  
A Wilcoxon test of belief ratings before and after the intervention was conducted.  
Statistically significant belief reduction was not observed in any of the topics, although 
ESP did show the largest effect size in the correct direction (-.36).  This was 
substantially lower than in the previous study, however (-.86 for belief in ESP).  P-
values ranged from .117 to .590, with p = .185 for ESP.  This is shown in Table 14. 
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Table 14 - Belief change after the intervention 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Mean belief 
change 
-.26 -.11 -.36 -.10 -.10 
Significance 
(exact 2-tailed) 
.117 .590 .185 .441 .484 
 
Figure 18 - Boxplots of belief for each topic, before and after the intervention 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the more rational the basis for participants’ belief in ESP 
before the lecture, the more likely they would be to reduce their belief in ESP 
afterwards.  The association between belief-basis and belief change was tested with a 
partial correlation controlling for pre-intervention belief level.  Belief change was 
calculated as the difference between pre- and post-intervention belief levels on each 
topic.  A positive correlation indicates that participants who report a greater rational 
belief-basis are more likely, than those with an intuitive belief-basis, to change their 
view after the intervention, whereas a negative correlation indicates the opposite 
situation.  As can be seen in  
Table 15, reduction in ESP belief correlated with a greater rational belief-basis, as 
expected: r = .357, p = .001.  However, with the exception of Opposites, belief change in 
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all other topics also correlated with belief-basis as would be expected for each topic: all 
negatively correlated apart from Evolution, which is associated with a greater rational 
basis for belief. 
Table 15 - Correlations between belief-basis and actual belief change 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Pearson’s r 
-.315 -.238 -.357 -.068 .323 
Significance .003 .025 .001 .530 .002 
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Hypothesis 4 predicted that a greater rational belief-basis would correlate with greater 
self-ratings of belief change likelihood.  A bivariate correlation of belief-basis and self-
predicted belief change was conducted (see Table 16).  A positive correlation indicates 
that participants who report a greater rational belief-basis are more likely, than those 
with an intuitive belief-basis, to feel that they will change their view later if challenged 
by strong contradictory evidence, whereas a negative correlation indicates the opposite 
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situation.  As expected the correlation was positive for creationism (rho = .257, p = .014) 
and opposites (rho = .245, p = .021), with afterlife approaching significance (rho = .204, 
p = .055).  Evolution did not correlate significantly (rho = .145, p = .176) and the 
correlation with ESP was extremely weak, in contrast to Griffin and Ohlsson’s original 
findings (rho = -.083, p = .473).  These results therefore offer only a partial replication of 
the original findings.  The results map more closely to the replication study in the 
current programme, which also found no correlation for ESP. 
Table 16 - Correlations between belief-basis and self-predicted belief change 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
.257 .204 -.083 .245 .145 
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Hypothesis 5 predicted that self-predicted belief change would correlate positively 
with self-reported actual belief change.  The correlation between self-predicted belief 
change and actual belief change was tested with a partial correlation controlling for 
pre-intervention belief level.  As shown in Table 17, this demonstrated no correlation 
on any of the topics, with the correlation coefficient being extremely low across them 
all (ranging from rho = -.105 to rho = .020).  P-values ranged from .326 to .939.   For ESP 
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specifically, rho = .020, p = .850.  This does not support the idea that self-predicted 
belief change is an accurate prediction of actual belief change in the real world.  
However, the lack of a general actual belief change effect does mean that the power of 
this analysis to detect any correlation is substantially weakened and a significant 
correlation would not generally be expected in this scenario. 
Table 17 - Correlations between self-predicted belief change and actual belief change 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Pearson’s r 
-.187 -.065 .189 -.094 .124 
Significance .082 .459 .078 .382 .251 
 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that greater (i.e. more rational) belief-basis scores would 
correlate with greater CRT5 scores.  A bivariate correlation was conducted between 
belief-basis and inhibition (as measured on the CRT5).  A positive correlation indicates 
that participants who have a greater tendency to inhibit default responding are more 
likely to have rational reasons for their beliefs.  Across all five topics belief-basis 
correlated positively with tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking (see Table 18).  
Correlations ranged from rho = .211 to rho = .240.  P-values ranged from .002 to .047. 
Table 18 - Correlations between belief-basis and inhibition 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
.327 .211 .233 .240 .239 
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Hypothesis 7 predicted that higher CRT5 scores would correlate with lower ESP belief.  
A bivariate correlation was conducted between CRT5 scores and belief in each topic.  A 
negative correlation indicates that participants were less likely to believe in a topic if 
they had a greater tendency to inhibit default processing, whereas a positive 
correlation indicates that participants were more likely to believe in a topic if they had 
a greater tendency to inhibit default responding.  As can be seen in Table 19, CRT5 
scores and pre-intervention belief levels correlated negatively, across all topics except 
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evolution, which correlated positively, ranging from rho = -.371 to rho = -.232, and p < 
.0005 to p = .028, and for Evolution rho = .239, p = .19. 
Table 19 - Correlations between belief level and inhibition 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
-.303 -.371 -.232 -.297 .249 
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Hypothesis 8 predicted that higher CRT5 scores would correlate with greater belief 
reduction in ESP.  This was tested with a partial correlation between CRT5 scores and 
real-world belief change, controlling for pre-intervention belief level.  A negative 
correlation would indicate that belief in a topic reduced more for those participants 
with a greater tendency to inhibit default responding, whereas a positive correlation 
would indicate that belief reduction is associated with a lower tendency to inhibit 
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default responding.  As shown in Table 20, no significant correlation was found for 
ESP: r = -.070, p = .520.  Across all topics, only Evolution showed a significant 
correlation (r = .254, p = .017), but this result would not withstand correction for family-
wise error rate. 
Table 20 - Correlations between inhibition and actual belief change 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Pearson’s r 
.140 .037 -.070 -.080 .254 
Significance .193 .735 .520 .458 .017 
 
Hypothesis 9 predicted that CRT5 would interact with belief-basis, leading to greater 
reduction of ESP belief when belief-basis was rational and CRT5 scores were higher.  
The interaction between CRT5 scores and belief-basis was therefore analysed with 
respect to belief change.  The interaction term was calculated after centering of the 
CRT5 and belief-basis variables, and a partial correlation was conducted between the 
interaction term and belief change, controlling for pre-intervention belief level.  A 
positive correlation would indicate that when participants report greater rational belief 
basis in a topic at the same time as having a greater tendency to inhibit default 
responding, then they would be more likely to reduce their belief after the 
intervention.  However, no significant interaction was found: r = .115, p = .285. 
Discussion 
The robust effect of belief-profiles across the five topics was once again supported in 
the present study, with all topics correlating with belief-basis as previously (the topic 
of ‘opposites attract’ having the least stable belief-profile).  This time the study was also 
able to provide direct support for thinking style, however, with a greater tendency to 
inhibit intuitive thinking correlating with greater rational belief-basis, and with lower 
belief in ESP.  No general belief reduction effect was found for belief in ESP in this 
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study.  Nor was there any specific belief reduction effect associated with inhibition, or 
the interaction between  inhibition and belief-basis.  However, there was a specific 
belief reduction effect found for ESP in relation to belief-basis on its own, although this 
is tempered by the fact that the same association was found for all other topics except 
Opposites.  Finally, Griffin and Ohlsson‘s (2001) original association between self-
predicted belief change and belief-basis was partially replicated. 
Looking at the belief-basis graphs shows the same pattern as in Griffin and Ohlsson’s 
original study and the previous intervention study in the current programme (Study 
2).  This provides confidence that the revised belief-basis measure, used in the current 
study, is effectively measuring the same thing, albeit with improved items.  The 
statistical analyses of belief-basis against belief also support this conclusion.  In 
particular, it was interesting to see that belief in opposites attracting did not correlate 
significantly with either rational or intuitive belief-basis, replicating the finding from 
Study 1, and suggesting that the belief-basis for this topic is less stable or simply more 
borderline between intuitive and rational than the belief profiles for the other four 
topics. 
Unfortunately, however, the present study was not able to come to a conclusion 
regarding the direct comparison of self-predicted belief change and actual belief 
change.  Due to the lack of a general belief change effect, the power is lacking to detect 
any relationship between self-predicted and actual belief change should one exist.  This 
lack of a general belief change effect may have been due to the initial belief levels of the 
participants in the present study being lower than that of the participants in Study 2 
(3.82 in the present study vs 4.81 in Study 1).  This also potentially reduces the power 
to detect correlations between belief-basis and actual belief change, as well as CRT5 
and actual belief change.  However, these are individual differences factors rather than 
group-level ones, and therefore it remains valid to consider those particular findings, 
especially in the light of concurring findings from Study 1, where general belief change 
was successfully induced. 
In this respect, there was a significant association between belief-basis and belief 
change, which initially appears to indicate that Griffin and Ohlsson’s findings do 
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generalise to the real world.  Although there was no general effect of belief reduction, it 
might still be expected that there would be a specific reduction effect for those 
participants whose ESP belief profile was relatively more rational, although power to 
detect this would be reduced.  Nevertheless, doubt is cast upon this finding by the fact 
that the association was also found with three of the other four topics.  This suggests 
that one possible explanation for the finding is a demand effect, where participants 
reporting greater rational belief-basis are also modifying their reported beliefs in line 
with what they might deem to be expected or socially desirable.  Indeed, self-predicted 
belief change did still correlate with belief-basis as expected on a number of the topics, 
although not for ESP.  This latter result replicates the results from Study 1, where ESP 
was the outlier, being the only topic for which belief-basis did not correlate with self-
predicted belief change.  Indeed, it was useful to observe the lack of correlation 
between belief in ESP and self-predicted belief change, which replicates the finding 
from Study 1.  It seems that this result is therefore not merely due to the use of a 
specialist interest group sample.  
The most important new factor introduced into the present study was, however, the 
idea of inhibition of intuitive thinking, as measured by the CRT5.  It was argued that, 
based upon the existing evidence, rational thinking needs to be either cued or intuitive 
thinking inhibited in order for rational thinking to be applied.  This was further 
refined, noting that cueing is unlikely naturalistically with respect to paranormal 
beliefs, so that a person’s own tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking will be the main 
factor in activation of rational thinking.  As already noted, it is not enough simply to 
possess the ability to think rationally, it must actually be applied in the face of the 
evolved primacy of intuitive thinking.  As a measure of thinking style, it makes sense 
that inhibition would correlate with belief-basis and this was indeed the case.  
Moreover, greater inhibition (a more rational thinking style) correlated with lower 
belief in ESP.  Overall, these findings therefore add to the body of evidence showing 
that belief in the paranormal is associated with intuitive thinking style and belief-basis. 
An alternative explanation to inhibition would be to reframe this thinking style as a 
tendency to detect the need for rational thinking – a kind of ‘self-cueing’ effect, as 
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suggested by Johnson, Tubau, and De Neys (2016).  Using the bat and ball problem 
from the CRT, they looked at confidence and response times (under cognitive load or 
not under cognitive load).  They found that participants showed reduced confidence 
ratings and increased response times when they provided incorrect answers.  The 
authors argue that this indicates participants did have some degree of sensitivity to the 
need for rational thinking.  The fact that they were still giving the wrong answers 
suggests that this detection was occurring, but not reaching the threshold required to 
actually activate rational thinking.  The conclusion the authors made was that people 
have a ’substitution monitoring process’ that is actually part of intuitive cognition, but 
activates rational cognition.  This explanation retains the same properties as required 
by the path-dependent model and makes the same predictions as inhibition.  The 
difference in interpretation is that instead of CRT being a measure of tendency to 
inhibit default processing, it would be seen as a measure of sensitivity to the need for 
rational processing.  The present findings support both theoretical positions: inhibition 
and cueing. 
However, neither of the above explanations nor the path-dependent model can explain 
the lack of association between inhibition and belief change.  It ought to be the case 
that a tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking, or a tendency to detect the need for 
rational thinking, leads to greater engagement with the rational disconfirming 
evidence provided in the intervention, and thus produces greater belief change.  
However, this was not found in the present study.  Nor did inhibition interact with 
belief-basis to predict belief change, as the path-dependent model predicts it should: a 
more rational belief-basis should be more influenced by rational counterevidence, and 
a greater inhibition will facilitate rational processing of the rational material, thus 
leading to overall greater likelihood of belief change.  As already noted, however, the 
lack of a general belief change effect may have reduced the power to detect belief 
change effects related to individual differences in the present study.  The next 
intervention study addressed that issue, however (see Study 5). 
There is one idea that may offer a starting point to explaining the findings, however, 
and this is the viewpoint that has been referred to in this thesis as inoculationism.  As 
Study 3 – Does Inhibition of Intuition Contribute to Belief Change?      133 
the name implies the idea is that people can be inoculated against beliefs forming in 
the first place.  So in this case those with greater tendency to inhibit intuitive cognition 
would be less likely to form paranormal beliefs – they are partially ‘inoculated’ against 
it, so to speak.  Extending the analogy further, if the inoculation fails then the belief 
takes hold and beyond this point the inoculation is of little use (it has already failed in 
its job).  This might explain why the correlations with belief and belief-basis (as a proxy 
for mechanism of belief formation) appear to be robust, while the effects at the point of 
belief change have entirely eluded the present research programme so far – and, in fact, 
in the present study general belief change was also elusive. 
There is a certain amount of support for this idea in the literature.  In particular, 
research by Green and Donahue (2011) demonstrated that finding out that a story was 
inaccurate, or even deliberately fake, did not change story evaluations made by 
participants.  Once the beliefs were formed they did not change even though in 
normative terms they should have done.  Research by Hadjichristidis et al. (2007) 
demonstrates this indirectly when they tested the effect of category similarities in 
‘if/then’ evaluation scenarios.  For example, given the following statement participants 
were asked if the consequent (the claim about rhinos) was true: 
“If squirrels have a left aortic arch, then rhinos will have a left aortic arch.” 
As the reader may experience, the antecedent (the claim about squirrels) is held as 
being true, at least for a while, with the focus of scepticism drawn towards the rhino 
claim instead.  Overall, this approach is very similar to the view of Spinoza (1677/1996) 
who thought that at first people believe, upon initially comprehending an idea, and 
only after this can they unbelieve it (Downing, 1992; Gilbert, 1991, 1992; Gilbert, Krull, 
& Malone, 1990; Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993).  In relation to Donahue and 
Green’s findings, this relates to the ease with which beliefs were formed, but with the 
added finding from their study that, once formed, beliefs may be hard to change. 
Alternatively, the lack of effect of inhibition on belief change could be explained by the 
various rational actor models of belief discussed at the start of this thesis.  Simply put, 
if it is assumed that rational cognition has primacy, then a tendency to inhibit intuitive 
Study 3 – Does Inhibition of Intuition Contribute to Belief Change?      134 
thinking will have little effect on belief change, especially when people are reasoning 
about abstract problems or counting letter F’s.  However, the apparent effect of 
inhibition at the point of belief formation (measured via the proxy of belief-basis) is 
much harder for rational actor models to account for.  Some rational actor accounts, 
such as Bleile (2014), do predict asymmetry between belief formation and change, but 
this does not account for the correlation with inhibition specifically, which is a factor 
that is outside rational actor models, since it is a thinking style and thus part of the 
thinking process rather than merely feeding ‘data’ into an underlying rational process. 
In terms of the methodology of the present study, the use of the CRT5 made significant 
contributions to overall understanding of belief formation and change, although not in 
line with the proposed model.  Unfortunately, the present study did fail to provide a 
direct comparison between self-predicted belief change and actual belief change, 
however, due to the lack of a general belief change effect, contrary to the other 
intervention studies in the literature and Study 2 in the present programme.  The 
present study used a single lecture intervention, however, whereas most intervention 
studies in the literature use course-length interventions.  Arguably such interventions 
provide a higher ‘dose’ of knowledge than a single lecture can.  For this, and other 
reasons, Study 5 therefore addressed this issue by using a course-length intervention. 
In conclusion, the dual-process, path-dependent model of belief formation and change 
once again received only mixed support within the present research programme, 
although dual-process conceptions of cognition in general were supported by the 
robust belief-basis and the new belief style findings (i.e. tendency to inhibit intuitive 
thinking). The path-dependency model therefore requires further investigation and a 
stronger intervention was therefore needed to provide the best chance to demonstrate a 
clear effect. 
Study 4 – The CRT5: Extending the 3-Item Cognitive Reflection Test      135 
Study 4 – The CRT5: Extending the 3-Item 
Cognitive Reflection Test 
Background 
The background of the previous chapter outlined the rationale for including inhibition 
of intuitive cognition in the path-dependent model of belief change.  This was in 
recognition of the evolved primacy of intuitive cognition, evidenced in part by the fact 
that possessing critical thinking skills dissociates from actually applying them.  It was 
also noted that the situations in which paranormal beliefs are likely to form are also 
less likely to include external cues for rational thinking.  The conclusion drawn was 
that the person’s internal tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking would therefore be the 
differentiating factor at the point of belief formation, in relation to the formation of 
beliefs for intuitive reasons.  The basic path-dependency model predicts that people 
will be more likely to change their belief in response to counterevidence or argument 
that appeals to the type of thinking via which the belief was formed (intuitive or 
rational).  Since there will be variation in the reasons for belief in the paranormal, the 
prediction was that people would be differentially affected by rational disconfirmation, 
of the kind presented in the interventions.  However, in order to engage with this 
rational material at the point of belief change, the inhibition of intuitive cognition may 
still be required.  If intuitive cognition has primacy, as theorised, then it will need to be 
inhibited in order for rational disconfirmation to influence rationally held beliefs. 
In order to measure inhibition, CRT5 was used, which is an extended version of the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005).  The original CRT has a number of 
shortcomings, chiefly a strong numeracy bias, and a more balanced version was 
therefore sought.  Although a number of alternatives and extensions to the original 
CRT have recently become available, they were not available at the time of the main 
study programme and therefore the present sub-programme was convened to extend 
the original CRT.  The present chapter covers the development of the five-item CRT5 
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from the original 3-item CRT and the associated research sub-programme (4 cohorts 
plus additional data from other studies in the main research programme).  The CRT 
asks people questions such as: 
If it takes five machines, five minutes to make five widgets, how many minutes 
would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? 
The correct answer is 5 minutes, but the intuitive answer that usually comes to mind 
faster is 100.  The correct answer is not overly hard to arrive at, but it does require 
inhibiting the speedy incorrect, intuitive answer.  As such the CRT claims to be a 
measure of inhibition of default response, or intuitive thinking, in favour of rational 
thinking. 
One of the important things to note about the questions on the CRT is that they are not 
trick questions.  Nor are they what is often classed as ‘insight’ problems, such as the 
nine-dot problem (Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004), where the problem is hard to solve until 
the moment of insight is reached; in this case one must literally think outside the box of 
the 3x3 nine-dot grid in order to draw the least number of lines to join dots.  The CRT 
presents problems that are easy to solve, but that also present an intuitive answer that 
springs quickly to mind.  There is no attempt to trick people and there is no need for 
special insight.  In this sense, the questions are similar to the exclusion problems used 
in other research, where one route to obtaining an answer must be excluded (e.g. 
Ferreira et al., 2006). 
Notably, in Frederick’s (2005) original study, the sample sizes were extremely large (n 
= 3428) and validation of the measure was conducted against inhibition measures, such 
as delay of reward; the inhibition of the intuitive desire to have something now instead 
of something better later.  This particular cognitive bias is a common psychological tool 
used in selling products: ‘fear of losing out’ is all too familiar in the guise of the closing 
down sale, limited time special offers, and so on (Cialdini, 2007).  As noted in the 
previous chapter, however, there are various types of inhibition and the type relevant 
to the present research programme is the inhibition of higher order cognition, similar 
in kind to those referred to by Gilbert (1991).  For example, this would include 
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inhibition of intuitive thinking processes, or delay of a reward, but not the inhibition of 
automatic processes under speeded conditions, such as exhibited in the Stroop task.  
Although there may be some relationship between the types of inhibition, the latter is 
less relevant and using such measures may be misleading (e.g. Lindeman et al., 2011). 
Initially then, the CRT would appear to be a suitable measure of inhibition for the 
present programme.  And, indeed, this is supported by a body of literature 
demonstrating that the CRT associates with thinking styles and errors in the ways that 
a dual-process account would predict.  That is to say, that lower CRT scores (lesser 
tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking) associate with a more intuitive thinking style 
and with more thinking errors; the very kinds of errors that critical thinking skills tend 
to dissociate from.  For example, Toplak, West, and Stanovich (2011) found evidence 
that CRT was a good measure of a cognitive miser processing tendency – i.e. the 
tendency to go with whatever comes to mind most easily and not waste precious time 
and energy resources; another way of stating the evolved primacy of intuitive thinking.  
They argue from their findings that neither intelligence tests, nor executive function 
tests, are as good at measuring this as the CRT is.  They base this claim upon the fact 
that they found a unique contribution of CRT to predicting results of various heuristics 
and biases tasks, once executive function and intelligence tests were factored out.  For 
example, they found that CRT correlated with their ‘rational-thinking composite’ score 
contributing 11.2% to the multiple linear regression with other measures factored out 
(p < .001).  Similarly, CRT correlated with a composite heuristics and biases score 
explaining 8% variance, almost twice the correlations of the other factors combined.  In 
total, across a number of measures Toplak and colleagues found that CRT accounted 
for 23.7% of the variance if used without factoring out other measures (i.e. as the CRT 
would be used normally).  Meanwhile, the Stroop task explained only 2% of the 
variance.  Similarly, Oechssler et al. (2009) found that higher CRT scores predicted less 
susceptibility to errors in thinking biases, such as the conjunction fallacy.  Such 
findings are in striking contrast to the failure of intellectual ability and thinking skills 
to correlate with these sorts of thinking errors, discussed in earlier chapters. 
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However, while the CRT appears well suited to the needs of the research programme, 
it does have some potential issues.  One thing that is especially noticeable about the 
CRT is that all of the items are based upon numeracy.  While the numeracy 
requirements are not high, they are nevertheless a factor.  It may be the case that CRT 
is measuring numeracy skills rather than inhibition, which for some reason happens to 
be correlated with various other factors.  For example, the CRT correlated well with the 
math element of SAT scores (Frederick, 2005).  Such correlations with ability do not 
explain the CRT’s correlation with thinking style, which dissociates from ability, so the 
CRT must be measuring something more than just numeracy skills.  However, the 
concern that prompted the present study was that access to the correct answers on the 
CRT questions relies entirely upon a certain degree of numeracy, which may be an 
unnecessary limitation on the measure. 
This line of thought has been followed in a number of more recent papers, such as 
Campitelli and Gerrans (2014).  That paper is particularly interesting as they compared 
mathematical models in an attempt to find out if the CRT is measuring more than just 
numeracy.  Their findings support the other literature, with the model that included 
inhibition providing the best fit.  However, they also found that there was a numeracy 
component being measured and this confirms the concerns that prompted the present 
study programme.  The numeracy issue is raised by other researchers as well, such as 
in Erceg and Bubić’s (2017) paper on scoring of the CRT, which will be covered in more 
detail in the discussion of the present study, along with other recent projects to modify 
or extend the CRT (e.g. Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). 
The present study therefore aimed to extend the original 3-item CRT (Frederick, 2005) 
in order to address the numeracy issue.  The reason for conducting a study on the new 
measure was to validate the new CRT items against known CRT correlates from 
Frederick’s study, thus giving validity beyond face validity for the extended measure.  
The validation items used related to delay of reward and were selected from 
Frederick’s original study series (3428 participants) on the basis of them having the 
greatest levels of significance in that series and thus most likely to detect an effect with 
the new items in the present study, and more likely to validate the original items.  In 
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logistical terms, the present study series ran in parallel to the main one in order to 
collect enough data.  Furthermore, it also used the main study series as opportunities 
for further data collection on CRT5.  This meant that it was particularly important to 
retain the already validated, original CRT so that this was available for analysis 
regardless of the outcome of the present findings – hence extending rather than 
replacing the CRT.  Finally, the present study also took the opportunity to gather 
additional data in relation to belief-basis using the revised belief-basis measure, thus 
making best use of time and resources overall. 
Hypotheses 
H1 – Scores on the original CRT would correlate positively with the score on the new 
items, since both sets of items purport to be measuring inhibition. 
H2 – higher scoring on the original CRT and the new items would correlate with 
higher measures of delayed reward. 
H3 – pre-intervention belief-basis would correlate with belief in the topics in the same 
pattern as Griffin and Ohlsson’s study. 
H4 – Higher CRT5 scores would correlate with greater (i.e. more rational) belief-basis 
scores. 
H5 – Higher CRT5 scores would be correlated with lower levels of belief in ESP. 
Method 
The CRT element of the study included the scores on two separate sets of CRT items 
and the overall score for all CRT items.   The original CRT contains three items and is 
scored on a scale of 0 to 3, with one point for each correct answer given.  The two new 
CRT items were scored in the same way, giving a scoring range of 0 to 2.  The 
combined CRT5 score was simply the total of the original and new CRT items.  A 
measure of delayed reward was also included as a validation measure for the original 
CRT and CRT new items.  This was formed from a combination of two delay questions, 
with one point given for a delay response, giving a range of 0 to 2.  A measure of loss-
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aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) was also included as a control.  Finally, 
measures of belief-basis and belief level from the previous studies were also included. 
Participants 
Participants were 4 cohorts of students (mainly 17 to 19 years of age), visiting 
Goldsmiths College, University of London.  As part of their visit, they spent some time 
with the Anomalistic Psychology Research Unit and this included taking part in the 
present study.  There was a total of 102 participants, after 4 were removed due to 
missing responses to one or more items on the questionnaire.   There were 20 male 
participants and 82 female participants, ages ranging from 17 to 25 (mean 18.92, SD = 
1.772). 
Materials 
A questionnaire (Appendix 5) was used that combined the CRT items, validation items, 
and belief-basis and level measures.  The sections of the questionnaire were in the 
order just given, with CRT items being first so that participants were mentally fresher 
for that section.  The aim was to avoid any potential effects of ego depletion (e.g. 
Wheeler, Briñol, & Hermann, 2007) in order to allow participants to better demonstrate 
their tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking – ego depletion is the finding that mental 
‘energy’ can be used up.  This was also important since the CRT was the main focus of 
the present study and presenting other sections of the questionnaire first was avoided 
so as to avoid them having any influence on CRT responses. 
The original CRT items were taken directly from Frederick (2005) and are given in full 
below: 
1. A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total.  The bat costs £1 more than the ball. How 
many pence does the ball cost?  (answer: 5p) 
2. If it takes five machines, five minutes to make five widgets, how many minutes 
would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?  (answer: 5 minutes) 
3. In a lake there is a patch of lily pads.  Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how many days would it 
take for the patch to cover half the lake?  (answer: 47 days) 
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Mixed in with these items were two new items developed to address the numeracy 
bias of the original CRT.  For development of these new items, an initial pool of 
potential new CRT items and types of items was created.  This was based upon three 
key selection criteria.  The first two criteria follow the rationale behind the original 
CRT items.  The final criterion is an additional constraint. 
1. There must be an obvious intuitive answer that is, however, clearly wrong 
upon further reflection. 
2. There must be a clear right answer that is easy to arrive at upon reflection (the 
CRT is measuring inhibition not cognitive ability). 
3. It must not rely upon numeracy. 
The initial pool of ideas for new items was: 
1. The F’s test (or similar reading test) 
2. Modus pollens/tollens 
3. Producing a random sequence of numbers 
4. The Wason 4 card selection test or a reframing thereof to make it easier and to 
make it less recognizable as the classic test 
5. Hyperbolic discounting 
6. Framing effect – odd one out test 
The F’s test involves participants reading a sentence and stating how many letter F’s it 
contains.  This requires disengaging fluent reading and thus requires sustained 
cognitive effort of inhibition for the whole sentence.  The task is easy enough from an 
intuitive perspective and requires no numeracy skills.  But mistakes are easy to make 
unless additional effort is applied, yet there is no ambiguity about the correct answer, 
which is easy to arrive at if inhibition is applied.  This item was therefore deemed to be 
a good match to the selection criteria and a useful item to include in the extended CRT 
measure. 
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Modus pollens or modus tollens was also considered, as a form of exclusion problem, 
presented as misleading syllogisms.  However, this option was dismissed for a number 
of reasons.  Firstly, it is the kind of problem that is used in tests of thinking ability and 
this would confound any correlations between the CRT and such studies, since they 
would have content that was too similar.  Secondly, it is unclear if a single syllogism 
would be effective enough as a measure (studies on thinking skills always use a battery 
of syllogisms). 
Producing a sequence of random numbers was considered as demonstrating ability to 
inhibit intuitive thinking, since this requires suppressing the intuitive notion that 
repetition should be avoided in random sequences.  However, there may be issues 
with it involving numbers even though no numeracy skills per se are required.  This 
option was therefore dismissed. 
A variation on the Wason 4 card selection test was also considered (Sperber, Cara, & 
Girotto, 1995).  This test involves four cards with information on each side of each card.   
Participants can therefore see what is face-up, but not what is face-down on the cards.  
Participants are given a statement and asked to specify which cards to turn over in 
order to check if the statement is true (i.e. the minimal set of cards to turn over rather 
than just turning over all of the cards).  This type of question is used in some research 
on thinking skills and styles, but is typically presented in a guise that is abstract, such 
as using letters and numbers.  There is a tendency for people to turn over cards that 
confirm their hypothesis (i.e. the statement).  But, confirming cards add no new 
information so that it is actually more informative to turn over cards that could 
disconfirm the hypothesis.  This demonstrates inhibition of higher order cognitive 
processes, but there is a tendency towards a floor effect due to the difficulty of the task 
when framed in abstract terms.  However, the problem can be framed in a concrete 
way and this makes it much easier, but not too easy, to complete.  The concrete 
presentation of the Wason 4 card selection task was therefore included as an item in the 
extended CRT. 
Hyperbolic discounting was initially considered, but quickly dismissed as a form of 
delayed reward – i.e. the tendency to prefer payoffs that are closer in time, but are of 
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lower value.  This was far too similar to the CRT validation items being used already, 
making it unsuitable without changing the validation items. 
Finally, framing was considered as a way to measure inhibition of intuitive thinking.  
Three simple problems would be presented.  Two of them would be identical in 
structure, but framed differently.  The third would be different in structure, but framed 
to be similar to one of the other two problems.  Participants would need to specify 
which problem was the odd one out.  However, this was dismissed as it might not be 
clear to participants what they were being asked to do.  There was also the difficulty of 
constructing such a problem set to be short enough to fit into the CRT without 
overwhelming it. 
Overall therefore, two items were selected for addition to the original CRT, forming a 
new five-item measure, the CRT 5.  The additional two items are given below (see 
Appendix 5 for the actual order of presentation of all 5 items in the CRT5).   Answers 
are given further on the next page. 
The F’s test 
How many letter F’s are there in the following paragraph? 
 
 
FINISHED FILES ARE 
THE RESULT OF YEARS 
OF SCIENTIFIC STUDY 
COMBINED WITH 
MORE THAN A FEW 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 
 
Wason 4 Card Selection Test 
The City Council of Padua has asked for volunteers to take care of visiting English 
schoolchildren.  Volunteers have to fill in a card.  Mr Rossi and Mrs Bianchi are about 
to sort the cards.  Mrs Bianchi argues that only women will volunteer.  Mr Rossi says 
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she is wrong, and states that men will volunteer as well.  Mrs Bianchi counters that if 
that is the case, then the men will be married.  
Cards filled in by the volunteers show gender on one side and marital status on the 
other.  Given the four cards below, circle the two cards that you must turn over to 










The correct answer for the F’s test is 7 and the correct answer for the card selection task 
is cards 1 and 3 (‘male’ and ‘unmarried’, respectively). 
The two CRT validation items, relating to delayed financial gain, were taken from 
Frederick’s (2005) original study and in that study series had p-values less than .0001 in 
a chi-square test involving groups scoring high and low on the CRT.  The total sample 
size was 3428.  Oechssler et al. (2009) also replicated the correlation of CRT with these 
two items.  These items were therefore selected as likely to be the most robust 
validation items for use in the present study.  The items were modified slightly to fit 
the UK audience (the originals were in dollars), and are given in full on the next page. 
  
Male Female Unmarried Married 
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1) Which would you prefer to receive? 
a) £100 now 
b) £140 this time next year 
 
2) Which would you prefer to receive? 
a) £3000 now 
b) £3800 this time next month 
The number of validation items included was kept small so as not make the 
questionnaire too long, especially as they were also used in some of the main research 
programme studies in order to gather additional data.  However, considering the 
apparent robustness of the items this was considered to be sufficient.  Loss avoidance 
items were also included, both as filler items so that participants would be less likely to 
catch on to the delay items, and as a check, since loss avoidance is known to be a robust 
effect (Silberberg et al., 2008). 
Finally, the revised belief-basis measure and belief rating questions were used as per 
the other studies in the main research programme.  The free-text response questions 
were omitted for brevity of the questionnaire due to time available and self-prediction 
of belief change was also omitted to avoid introducing any unnecessary bias. 
Scoring 
 
Belief in each topic was measured in the same way as in Study 1. 
Belief-basis on each topic was measured in the same way as in Study 3. 
Original CRT was scored by assigning one point for each correct answer to the three 
original CRT questions.  These points were added together for an overall score between 
0 and 3.  Where 0 indicates a low tendency to inhibit default responses and 3 indicates 
a high tendency to inhibit default responses. 
New CRT was scored by assigning one point for each correct answer to the two new 
CRT questions.  These points were added together for an overall score between 0 and 2.  
Study 4 – The CRT5: Extending the 3-Item Cognitive Reflection Test      146 
Where 0 indicates a low tendency to inhibit default responses and 2 indicates a high 
tendency to inhibit default responses. 
CRT5 was scored as the sum of original CRT and new CRT (i.e. using all five items).  
This gave a score ranging from 0 to 5, where 0 indicates a low tendency to inhibit 
default responses and 5 indicates a high tendency to inhibit default responses. 
CRT validation measure, delayed reward, was calculated by assigning one point for 
choosing to delay on each of the two delayed financial gain questions, giving a score 
between 0 and 2, where 0 indicates a greater preference for smaller financial rewards 
now and 2 indicates a greater preference for greater financial rewards later.  That is to 
say, a higher score on this measure indicates a greater tendency to accept a delay in 
return for a greater reward later on. 
 
Procedure 
The time sequence of the study is illustrated in Figure 23.  Participants from each 
cohort were given the questionnaire which had a briefing and consent sheet on the 
front (Appendix 5).  The signed consent sheet was detached from the questionnaire 
after data collection to maintain anonymity of the participants.  Participants also had 
the right to withdraw from the study.  After signing the consent form they completed 
the questionnaire.  Once everyone in the room had completed the questionnaire they 
were briefed on the nature of the study.  This included an extended discussion of 
related topics, as part of the students’ visit to Goldsmiths.  As usual (BPS, 2018) ethical 
guidelines were followed.  This study was approved by the ethics committee at 
Goldsmiths College, University of London. 
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Rate belief in 
topicb
Rate reasons for 
belief in topicc
a CRT5 – one point for each correct answer, added together for a range of 0-5 (low to 
high tendency to inhibit default responding).  Two validation items, on delayed reward, 
providing a range of 0-2 (low to high preference to accept a delay for a greater reward).
b Belief in topic rated from 1-9 (none to completely).
c Belief-basis – calculated from 6 ratings of reasons for belief (1-9, from not at all to 
completely). Mean rating for the three intuitive items is subtracted from the mean 
rating for the three rational items, giving an overall rating from 1-9 (from intuitive 






As in the previous studies graphs of the belief-basis in each topic for believers and non-
believers are presented, compared alongside the results from Griffin and Ohlsson‘s 
(2001) original study.  Once again, there is a close visual match, although disbelievers 
show a little more variation from Griffin and Ohlsson’s sample than believers do. 
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Figure 24 - Comparison between Study 4 and Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) USA sample for 
believers' belief-bases (numbers of contributing participants are given for each topic, with 
USA sample on the right; error bars not available for USA sample) 
 
 
Figure 25 - Comparison between Study 4 and Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) USA sample for 
disbelievers' belief-bases (numbers of contributing participants are given for each topic, with 
USA sample on the right; error bars not available for USA sample) 
Prior to statistical analysis of the results, the integrity of the belief-basis measure was 
checked.  The overall Cronbach’s alpha was .492.  Factor analysis without rotation is 
relatively clear on the expected split, but with item 4 perhaps a little less clear (not a 
negative correlation).  However, rotation makes it clear that 1, 3, 4 are all on a single 
factor.  After rotation, Cronbach’s alpha for intuitive was 0.537 and for rational it was 
0.685. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the CRT5 is given in Table 21, along with the same analysis 
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ranged from .413 to .655 across the four studies.   The value of .413 is a little on the low 
side, even for the original 3-item CRT, but overall the results are not too far off the 
range found in the literature where researchers have attempted to extend the CRT.  
Indeed, the Cronbach’s alpha is included here chiefly as a standard measure, but for 
low-item measures Cronbach’s alpha is liable to lead to lower alpha values simply due 
to the low number of items and this factor needs to be taken into account when using it 
as a measure of internal consistency (Lance et al., 2016; Tavakol & Dennick, 2011).  For 
example, Toplak et al. (2014) goes so far as to state that .72 for their 7-item test indicates 
“substantial reliability”.   Meanwhile, Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) report 
Cronbach’s alpha for the original CRT alpha as .642 and for their four new items as 
.511, with the combined 7-item scale achieving .705.  Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, 
and Hamilton (2016) reviewed CRT studies and found a range from .57 to .74 for the 
original CRT, whereas Frederick (2005) does not cite Cronbach’s alpha at all in his 
original paper on the CRT.  Similarly, Erceg and Bubić (2017) do not cite the 
Cronbach’s alphas for their scoring of CRT in ‘five different ways’, even though they 
studiously present tables of the reliability metrics for six other measures that they 
correlated with CRT.  This included stating the mean, SD, min, and max, in addition to 
the Cronbach’s alpha, for each of the 6 measures.  Finally, it must be noted that the 
items added to the original CRT were not simply added to strengthen the existing scale 
in terms of measuring exactly the same thing.  They were added to mitigate the 
numeracy bias of the original scale and this means that there will inevitably be some 
difference in what the new and original items are measuring.  However, as will be 
seen, the items do intercorrelate, indicating that they are related and not measuring 
completely unrelated constructs. 
Table 21 - Cronbach's Alpha for CRT5 in each study from the wider research programme 
 Study 3* Study 4* Study 5* Study 6* 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
.548 .413 .596 .655 
* significant at p < .05 
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Hypothesis 1 predicted that scores on the original CRT would correlate positively with 
the score on the new items, since both sets of items purport to be measuring inhibition.  
A bivariate correlation was conducted on original CRT score and CRT score for new 
items only (the data from each study in the main research programme was analysed 
separately -  
Table 22).  The correlations were significant in all datasets, with rho ranging from .209 
to.526, and p-values from < .0005 to .048.  It is also worth noting that all five items were 
individually significantly intercorrelated, ranging between rho = .209 and rho = .526. 
Table 22 - Intercorrelations of original and new CRT scores 
 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5 Study 6 
Spearman’s Rho 
.211 .209 .526 .364 
Significance .048 .035 .001 <.0005 
 
 
Figure 26 - Scatterplots of original CRT scores vs new CRT scores 
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Hypothesis 2 predicted that higher scoring on the original CRT and the new items 
would correlate with higher measures of delayed reward.  Bivariate correlations 
between each of the CRT scores (original and new items only) were conducted against 
the validation measure.  A positive correlation indicates that a greater tendency to 
inhibit default responding is associated with a greater tendency to accept a delay for 
increased financial gain later.  The results were mixed, with only 3 of 9 correlations 
being significant and no discernible pattern within the results – both new CRT items 
and original CRT scores correlated with the validation measure at different times (see 
Table 23).  Considering the family-wise error rate involved in this number of 
calculations and no clear pattern to the results, it must be concluded that neither the 
original CRT nor the modified CRT validated consistently against the selected items in 
this instance.  This was the case across three different studies, drawing upon three 
different sample populations.  Note that Study 5 did not include the CRT validation 
items. 
Table 23 – Original CRT, new CRT, and CRT5 scores correlated with delay of reward 
Study 4 – The CRT5: Extending the 3-Item Cognitive Reflection Test      152 
 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5 Study 6 
Original CRT 
.035 (.742) -.082 (.414) n/a .276 (.007) 
New CRT .211 (.048) -.086 (.392) n/a .139 (.178) 
CRT5 .131 (.233) -.098 (.328) n/a .267 (.009) 
The table shows Spearman’s Rho with p-value in brackets, for each correlation.  
 
With respect to the loss-aversion check, the items testing for loss-aversion actually 
showed participants tended to have a strong preference for certainty instead (this was 
the case across all of the studies).  That is, participants answered in a way that 
demonstrated they preferred not to take chances, even if the odds were that their losses 
would be reduced. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that pre-intervention belief-basis would correlate with belief in 
the topics in the same pattern as Griffin and Ohlsson’s study.  A bivariate correlation 
was conducted between belief-basis and belief level across all five topics.  A positive 
correlation indicates that belief in a topic has a more rational basis and a negative 
correlation indicates the belief has a more intuitive basis.  As can be seen from Table 24, 
Griffin and Ohlsson’s original pattern of findings were replicated in the present study.  
All topics apart from evolution correlated negatively with belief-basis, rho ranging 
from -.402 for opposites to -.656 for ESP.  Evolution correlated positively at rho = .358.  
All correlations were at p < .0005. 
Table 24 - Correlations between belief-basis and belief 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
-.527 -.571 -.656 -.402 .358 
Significance <.0005 <.0005 <.0005 <.0005 <.0005 
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Hypothesis 4 predicted that higher CRT5 scores would correlate with greater (i.e. more 
rational) belief-basis scores.  This was tested with a bivariate analysis between belief-
basis and CRT5 score.  A positive correlation indicates that participants who have a 
greater tendency to inhibit default responding are more likely to have rational reasons 
for their beliefs.  No significant correlations were found on any topic, in contrast to the 
findings of Study 3.  P-values ranged from .106 to .595 (see Table 25). 
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Table 25 - Correlations between belief-basis and inhibition 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
-.057 .110 -.161 -.053 -.111 
Significance .570 .270 .106 .595 .268 
 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that higher CRT5 scores would correlate with lower belief in 
ESP.  This was tested with a bivariate correlation between ESP belief and CRT5.  A 
negative correlation indicates that participants were less likely to believe in a topic if 
they had a greater tendency to inhibit default processing, whereas a positive 
correlation indicates that participants were more likely to believe in a topic if they had 
a greater tendency to inhibit default responding.  However, the correlation for belief in 
ESP was not significant, rho = .144, p = .149.  Bivariate correlations with the other topics 
are also presented in Table 26 for comparison.  Again, these findings are in contrast to 
the findings from Study 3. 
Table 26 - Correlations between inhibition and belief 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
-.039 .074 .144 -.040 -.017 
Significance .696 .460 .149 .686 .865 
 
Discussion 
As predicted, the original and new CRT items were positively correlated, although not 
to an especially high degree (rho = .209).  However, neither new or original CRT items 
validated against the selected validation items taken from Frederick’s (2005) original 
study.  This remained the case with the full CRT5.  Similarly, no loss aversion effect 
was observed in this study.  The robust belief profile effect across the five topics was 
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replicated again in the present study.  But, inhibition was not associated with belief-
basis or belief levels, contrary to the findings in Study 3, which demonstrated these 
associations clearly. 
The fact that the belief-basis graphs and the belief-basis correlations replicated Griffin 
and Ohlsson’s (2001) original findings and those of previous studies in the main 
research programme, suggests that anomalies in the CRT-related results were not 
simply due to participants being inattentive to the demands of the questionnaire.  
However, the failure of the original CRT to validate against the carefully selected 
validation items and the failure to find the usually robust loss aversion effect 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Silberberg et al., 2008) does raise questions about whether 
there is something different about the sample.  Indeed, this is underlined by 
comparison with the results of Study 3, but they did produce the predicted associations 
between inhibition and belief, and belief-basis.  On the other hand, the present study 
also failed to validate either the original CRT or the CRT5, and did not find a loss 
aversion effect.  This finding was replicated across the other studies in the wider 
programme where CRT5 validation was included.  The implication is that the absence 
of loss-aversion and lack of validation of the original CRT are potentially due to a 
methodological issue, although it is unclear in what way the questionnaires presented 
differ sufficiently from the original studies, such that these robust associations and 
effects disappear as convincingly as they have done here. 
One possibility is the age of the participants in the present study and main study 
programme, which were often students and thus relatively young.  However, Hertzog, 
Smith, and Ariel (2018) did not find any differences in CRT scores relating to age, in 
their study comparing young (age 17 to 35) and older adults (age 60-80).  On the other 
hand, gender differences are commonly observed in CRT scoring (Erceg & Bubić, 2017; 
Ring, Neyse, David-Barett, & Schmidt, 2016; see also: Zhang, Highhouse, & Rada, 
2016).  Gender differences were not analysed in the present research programme as 
they are not relevant to the proposed model, but it can be observed that the ratio of 
men to women in the present study and in Study 3 are very similar, so that it is very 
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unlikely that gender differences in CRT scoring are playing a part in the anomalies 
observed. 
Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) also attempted to address the numeracy issue of the 
CRT with their own extended version.  In doing so, they included validation items 
relating to risk preference (greater preference for risky than certain outcomes) and time 
preference (referred to in the present study as delaying reward, also known as 
hyperbolic discounting).  The range of items included was much broader than in the 
present study, with 11 risk preference items and 8 time preference items.  They did not 
fully replicate Frederick’s (2005) findings regarding these items, however, with only 1 
of the 11 risk items and 3 of the 8 time preference items correlating significantly with 
original CRT scores.  Considering the family-wise error rate in so many analyses, it is 
not surprising that a few correlations were found.  Nevertheless, in general the CRT 
does tend to be validated and correlate with measures of inhibition, in addition to its 
correlation with thinking errors, which is a particularly important factor for the present 
study. 
For example, Oechssler et al. (2009) replicated the original risk and time delay 
associations with CRT on a student sample, thus making it very similar to the present 
study.  Oldrati, Patricelli, Colombo, and Antonietti (2016) built upon previous research 
demonstrating an association between the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and 
inhibitory control.  They found that there was some reduction in correct responding on 
the CRT when transcranial direct current stimulation was applied to disrupt its 
function.  This sort of finding offers a degree of triangulation regarding the validity of 
the CRT measuring inhibition, although care must be taken in generalising from this 
study to inhibition of higher cognitive processes of the type included in the path-
dependency model of belief formation and change.  Further triangulating evidence 
comes from Travers et al. (2016), discussed in the general background chapter.  They 
used mouse tracking to explore the directional time-path of participants’ responses.  
Given a number of answers on screen to choose from, participants tended to move the 
mouse initially towards the incorrect intuitive answer, even if they went on to click on 
the correct answer; thus demonstrating inhibition of the initial, intuitive response, all of 
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which does suggest that the CRT remains a valid measure with respect to inhibition.  
Certainly in relation to the present study, it would seem foolish to cast it out on the 
basis of a lack of correlation with two validation items. 
It was not expected that the original CRT would fail to validate and considering the 
similar, if not better, face value of the new CRT items the whole CRT5 was used across 
the rest of the main research programme, since it does not seem at this point to differ 
appreciably from the original CRT in validity terms, but it does improve on the issue of 
numeracy bias.  Indeed, the present study is not the only one to have addressed issues 
with the original CRT.  Although at the time the present study was proposed and 
carried out there were no alternative CRT measures, more recently a number of studies 
that extend or critiqued the original CRT have appeared. 
The study by Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) was motivated by the same numeracy 
issue as the present study, although ironically the four new items they provide do all 
include number references or numeracy to varying degrees.  Recall that one reason for 
not including a production of random sequences item on the CRT5 was precisely 
because it has a connection to numbers.  It is therefore not entirely clear that the new 
items proposed by Thomson and Oppenheimer do properly address the issues they 
were trying to address.  Indeed, they limit their overall claims to the new measure 
items as not requiring as much numeracy as the original, rather than eliminating the 
requirement altogether, as was the aim in the present study.   Although, of course, it 
could also be argued that the F’s Test from the present study does, strictly speaking, 
involve numbers; it does appear to be a difficult thing to avoid entirely. 
Primi et al. (2016) go even further, however, arguing that it is not merely that 
numeracy is an issue for the CRT, but that even the limited numeracy it requires is too 
hard for many participants except those in elite groups.  Indeed, Frederick’s (2005) 
samples were from top universities across the United States rather than a more general 
sample.  Such a population would not be expected to have much trouble with the level 
of numeracy required on the CRT.  However, Primi et al. (2016) demonstrated that this 
might not be the case for other populations.  Although they used student samples they 
also included measures of intellectual ability in combination with an item-response 
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theory approach to analysing the data.  Item-response can be visualised as an S-shaped 
curve on a graph of probability of correct response against a latent trait (such as 
intelligence) on the x-axis, with a flattening out at bottom left and top right.  Ideally, 
the S-shaped curve should be centred and symmetrical, indicating that the item in 
question, such as the bat and ball problem, are optimal for measuring variance (in CRT 
scoring) within that population.  They found that this was not the case for the original 
CRT items. Their response was to develop the CRT-L, although this measure has 
debatable application in relation to their claims about its potential for use with 
developmental samples, since the improvement over the original CRT in samples of 
young adolescents was marginal.  However, their general point and their findings 
regarding the difficulty of the test items needs taking into account when sampling from 
less elite populations. The present research programme tended to use student samples, 
so this is less likely to be an issue in this instance, although it is interesting to note the 
relationship of the F’s test to Primi et al.’s cautionary findings, since that particular test 
is undemanding of intellectual ability.  Indeed, it was observed that some participants 
even physically highlighted the F’s that they found so as to avoid taxing working 
memory.  Interestingly, they still made mistakes, implying that inhibition measured by 
the F’s test is not simply due to working memory, since participants could take their 
time going over the sentence multiple times if they wanted to, although that in itself 
requires inhibition. 
On the other hand, in contrast to findings linking CRT, at least partially, to inhibition, 
Erceg and Bubić (2017) come to the much stronger conclusion that CRT does not 
measure anything more than numeracy.  They argue that CRT associations with non-
CRT measures are largely down to numeracy and analytical thinking abilities.  
However, they did not actually look at correlations between CRT and such measures in 
their study, relying instead upon measures of need for cognition, faith in intuition, 
superstitious thinking, maximising and post-choice regret.  They therefore seem to be 
overreaching in their conclusion, considering the wider body of literature and the lack 
of direct testing in their study in relation to their conclusions. 
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Numeracy bias is a serious charge for the CRT, however, as it could invalidate not just 
current findings, but previous ones in the literature as well.  It is therefore fortunate 
that the CRT benefits from triangulating evidence on its association with inhibition 
beyond simply measuring numeracy (e.g. Oldrati et al., 2016; Travers et al., 2016).  
However, a number of researchers have also raised the potential issue of over-exposure 
of the CRT, suggesting that the CRT may be a victim of its own popularity, meaning 
that participants are likely to have seen the questions before and that this will alter the 
way they respond.  This body of research was not available prior to the start of the 
current study, but it is an issue that bears attention with regards to the results of the 
study. 
The issue of over-exposure was an additional motivating factor in Thomson and 
Oppenheimer ‘s (2016) extension of the CRT.  They note, for example, that in their 
study using Amazon’s ‘Mechanical Turk’, an online pool of research participants and 
associated tools, 72% of participants had encountered at least one of the CRT items 
before.  Although in relation to this, they also note that Mechanical Turk participants 
may take part in more studies than most undergraduates do, so have a higher 
likelihood of exposure.  Nor did they actually test for whether familiarity altered the 
utility of the CRT.  However, a study by Bialek and Pennycook (2017) did test whether 
utility was retained.  Motivated by the potential problem of over-exposure of the CRT, 
they examined the effect of multiple exposures.  With a sample of approximately 2500 
participants, they failed to find any evidence for reduction of the predictive validity of 
the CRT.  That is, although they found that participants scored higher in later 
exposures to the CRT, this was only a relative difference and the CRT retained its 
association with other variables, such as susceptibility to thinking errors.  This adds an 
important caveat to the likes of (Haigh, 2016), where it was found that scoring on the 
CRT increased after prior exposure, raising concerns about the measure’s continued 
usefulness.  Perhaps inevitably, such a short and popular measure will become too well 
known, however, and it is certainly a good thing that alternatives are being devised 
(see also: Toplak et al., 2014). 
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In relation to the non-CRT findings of the present study, it was noteworthy that the 
belief-basis findings were, yet again, robustly demonstrated.  However, it is equally 
noteworthy that the predicted association between inhibition and belief-basis was not 
found.   Nor was the predicted association with belief.  This does need to be taken 
within the context of the wider study series, however, and as a whole the CRT5 scores 
do tend to correlate with intuitive belief-basis and paranormal belief.  Nevertheless, the 
lack of association in the present study may have implications regarding the nature of 
the CRT and discussion therefore now turns to whether the CRT is measuring what it 
claims to measure, rather than whether there are contaminating issues, such as 
numeracy bias.  For example, it may be that beliefs are not influenced by inhibition, or 
that other factors can override the effect. 
This is what Kahan and Stanovich (2016) argue for in their paper.  They looked at 
religiosity, belief in evolution, and CRT scores, and concluded that group membership 
(as measured by religiosity) influences beliefs more than critical thinking skills (CRT 
scores).  Here the authors make the mistake of taking CRT as a measure of thinking 
skills rather than as a tendency to apply said skills, but this aside, the finding still 
requires discussion.  Their suggestion has similarities to the backfire effect (e.g. Betsch 
& Sachse, 2013), which suggests that strongly held beliefs become even more strongly 
held when ‘attacked’ by disconfirming evidence.  In this case they observed that those 
higher in religiosity were equally unlikely to believe in evolution regardless of their 
tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking, and they go further than this arguing that, in 
fact, it is likely that those with a greater tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking would 
have even lower belief in evolution.  However, against this claim they find an overall 
correlation between CRT scores and belief in evolution, driven mostly by the low 
religiosity participants.  These findings therefore imply that inhibition does generally 
correlate with belief in a particular topic, such as evolution or ESP, as found in Study 3, 
but that, if the sample population has a strongly rooted group identity that is in 
competition with such a belief, then the effect of inhibition will be minimal if not 
counter-productive.  While plausible as a general explanation, it is unclear whether the 
sample in the recent study had such a group identity or what it might be, beyond being 
of similar ages (mainly 17 to 19 years of age).  The cohorts were from three different 
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years, different schools, and of mixed ethnicity and gender. Nevertheless, it remains an 
interesting possibility in contrast to writing the finding off as a statistical anomaly. 
Another alternative is presented by Stupple, Pitchford, Ball, Hunt, and Steel (2017), 
who argue that the CRT is really measuring mindware gaps rather than inhibition.  
They conclude this based upon their findings that the time taken to reach correct 
answers was only minimally longer than when responding with incorrect, intuitive 
answers.  This would mean that CRT scores would not correlate with belief-basis 
because the latter is due to inhibition (i.e. thinking style), whereas the CRT is really 
measuring whether people possess the mindware to solve the problems the CRT 
presents.  However, this explanation fails to explain the findings of other studies in the 
wider programme, which did find a correlation between inhibition and belief-basis.  
This would require that participants in the present study lacked that particular set of 
mindware, yet at the same time they still formed beliefs with the expected belief-basis 
profiles, implying two distinct sets of mindware.  An alternative explanation for 
Stupple et al.’s findings, however, is that taking a longer time to come to a decision 
does not rule in or out the need for inhibition of intuitive processing to arrive at correct 
answers; it may simply mean that people detect the need for something more (Johnson 
et al., 2016), but are unable to inhibit the intuitive response in the end (Denes-Raj & 
Epstein, 1994).  It must therefore be acknowledged that Stupple et al.’s conclusion 
requires an assumption that is not warranted by the wider body of literature, such as 
the evidence from speeded task studies (e.g. Kelemen et al., 2013). 
Finally, some researchers, notably Erceg and Bubić (2017), have recently turned their 
attention to how the CRT is scored.  Traditionally the CRT has been scored on correct 
answers, but it is argued that this is not a true measure of inhibition, since people may 
lack the numeracy skills to get the right answer; even if they do inhibit the intuitive 
incorrect answer they may arrive at a rational incorrect answer.  They therefore 
recommend alternative scoring, such as only scoring intuitive incorrect answers as 
intuitive and scoring the rest as rational (i.e. demonstrating inhibition).  Campitelli and 
Gerrans (2014) findings support this assertion.  They investigated CRT, syllogistic 
reasoning, actively open-minded thinking, and numeracy, and concluded that looking 
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only at the inhibition element of the responses proved to be a better predictor of 
actively open-minded thinking (AOT).  AOT is measured via a questionnaire, similarly 
to REI (Rational-Experiential Inventory – Epstein et al., 1996) and asks people about 
their views and preferences on various points relating to thinking style.  As such it is 
not a direct measure of inhibition, but as a measure of thinking style it is useful.  
Therefore, based upon the sound logic behind the argument and the findings of 
Campitelli and Gerrans, the analyses for all studies in the main research programme 
were reanalysed with inhibition-only scoring of the CRT.  This did not make any 
appreciable difference, however, beyond a handful of noisy statistical spikes that are 
expected when such a large number of exploratory analyses are conducted. 
In conclusion, the results of the validation programme are mixed.  While the new CRT 
items did not consistently validate (only 1 in 3 correlations), neither did the original 
items (again, 1 in 3 correlations).  This is clearly in contrast with other findings 
regarding the correlation of the CRT with the chosen items.  It does not mean, 
however, that the CRT5 is not measuring what it claims to measure in relation to the 
research being conducted, which is not investigating delayed reward, but rather is 
investigating inhibition of higher order cognitive processes more generally in relation 
to belief formation and change.  In this respect, the lack of the original CRT validation 
in the current sub-programme means that the CRT5 cannot be dismissed as useful in 
the present research context.  Indeed, the items used have good face validity.  
Therefore, since it did not differ appreciably in validity from the original CRT and has 
the advantage of reducing the numeracy bias, it was decided, on balance of evidence, 
to use the full CRT5 in the analyses in the present research programme. 
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Study 5 – An Extended Intervention on Path-
Dependent Belief Change 
Background 
The studies in the research programme so far have consistently supported the idea of 
belief-profiles varying across topics in terms of intuitive and rational components of 
belief-basis.  At the same time, however, the programme has only been able to provide 
cautious support for a relationship between thinking style and belief change.  In 
addition to this, there was variation in whether the intervention studies produced 
general reduction of belief in ESP or not.  The interventions so far both used single 
lectures, however, and the majority of the literature demonstrating belief reduction 
after interventions relies upon course-length interventions rather than single-dose 
versions.  For a number of reasons, a higher dose intervention was therefore prescribed 
for the present study. 
There are a number of existing intervention studies on belief change, including 
interventions specific to reduction of paranormal belief.  All demonstrate belief 
reduction, although most do not examine why change is occurring, only that it does 
happen; a knowledge deficits model typically being assumed or implied.  These mainly 
use course-length interventions (Banziger & College, 1983; Harrington, 2013; Jones & 
Zusne, 1981; McLean & Miller, 2010; Morier & Keeports, 1994), although one did use a 
single-dose approach (Happs, 1991).  Such studies are liable to be 8 weeks long or more 
and arguably provide a greater dose of knowledge than a single one-hour lecture can 
do.  In a similar vein, they will also provide a much greater amount of time within 
which the slower process of rational cognition can be applied.  Indeed, multiple doses 
of knowledge (and thinking skills) also give more chances for inhibition to be applied 
than in the single-dose setting.  It was thought that this might therefore explain 
inability to detect the predicted path-dependent belief change effect in the previous 
Study 5 – An Extended Intervention on Path-Dependent Belief Change      165 
intervention studies, and, furthermore, the lack of a general belief reduction effect in 
the second intervention study (Study 3). 
Although the one-hour lecture intervention was arguably highly intellectual and 
rational in its approach, as well as engaging, it does not necessarily mean that critical 
thinking skills were applied by the students.  Inbar et al. (2010) argue that the problem 
situation should cue rational thinking and arguably such a lecture should therefore be 
doing so.  However, as discussed previously, it is also known that the ability to think 
critically dissociates from actually applying it.  Indeed, as any lecturer or teacher will 
report, it is not unusual for students to let a lecture ‘wash over them’.  They may fail to 
engage in what Ennis (1991) refers to as critical thinking.  A longer intervention, on a 
course that is graded and contributes to students’ overall degree classification, should 
help to address this and other issues.  Such an intervention should provide greater 
motivation to engage with the course materials.  It should allow greater time for 
rational thinking preferences to be applied and/or more chances for them to be applied 
(since intuition has primacy according to the model).  It should provide a greater dose 
of knowledge, thus being better at closing the knowledge gap suggested by 
exceptionalists (i.e. those taking the view of exceptionalism, as discussed in the General 
Background chapter).  And, it should also promote greater engagement with the 
materials/depth of learning, due to the coursework included in the particular course 
used in the present study. 
Greater engagement with materials in this way is delivered due to greater depth of 
processing of the material in the course.  It is well known that there are degrees of 
engagement with material from shallow verbatim recall to engagement with 
underlying principles (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).  The course used in the present study 
includes a coursework component, which should create depth of engagement, since the 
material must be processed more elaborately in order for a sufficient piece of work to 
be produced.  It is unclear whether other studies included coursework, however, or 
exactly what the mode of teaching was.  Typically a chalk and talk approach would 
therefore be assumed.  There was also an element of teaching others in the students’ 
coursework as they were asked to write a blog for a lay audience rather than write in 
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their usual academic essay style.  This included a workshop on how to write for such 
an audience, including the need to teach them about the topic (although not all 
participants would necessarily choose to write about ESP-related phenomena, it is one 
of the broader topics in the field). 
The knowledge deficits model of belief change would suggest that the greater the dose 
of knowledge in a course-length intervention, the more likely there will be belief 
change.  A longer intervention would provide this, due to the greater breadth and 
depth of material that can be covered.   In contrast, even a single-dose intervention has 
been shown to lead to long-term belief change (see Study 1 and Happs, 1991).  The 
argument is therefore not that belief change cannot be elicited in a shorter intervention, 
but that that there may be a dose-response curve involved.  Indeed Ghose, Hadjinian, 
Sattar, You, and Goebel (2004) argue that belief change is a stepwise process, not an 
either/or change.  On these lines, a longer course gives time for more steps and more 
knowledge to produce those steps.  There is also an argument that a course on 
anomalistic psychology is likely to teach thinking skills and mindware.  Osborne (2013) 
argues that this sort of thing needs teaching in schools.  Furthermore, Edward, Maggie, 
and Christopher (2013) argue that mindware gaps may be what the CRT is really 
measuring – if so, then a longer intervention that introduces ways to think about 
anomalous phenomena would be likely to have a detectable effect.  However, the path-
dependent model of belief change goes further than this and suggests it is not enough 
to have thinking skills if they are not applied.  Indeed, the model is premised on the 
relationship between the way a belief is formed and the way it can therefore be 
changed, rather than the existence of knowledge gaps per se.  But, nevertheless, 
knowledge must be a part of that change – this cannot be sensibly denied.  However, 
where the path-dependency model differs from the above deficits accounts is that the 
reduction in belief will not merely be a general one, as occurred in the first intervention 
study, it will be associated with the way the belief was formed. 
In this respect, discussion therefore turns to the newly introduced inhibition factor – 
new to the model in the previous intervention study (and Study 4).  The argument for a 
longer study in this respect is that the CRT5 only claims to measure a tendency to 
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inhibit intuitive thinking.  It is not claimed that CRT5 measures the actual application 
of such thinking or that such thinking is applied routinely by the person.  Rather it is 
explaining a tendency for such thinking.  Framed in probabilistic terms therefore a 
longer time period allows for more opportunities for such thinking to be activated.  
Indeed, Benassi, Singer, and Reynolds (1980) concluded that errors in reasoning 
fallacies accounted for participants being resistant to changing their beliefs about the 
psychic abilities of the performer in a specially commissioned demonstration.  
Therefore, if such fallacious reasoning can be inhibited then it would be expected to 
lead to greater reduction in belief in response to the rational counterevidence presented 
in the intervention.  A greater number of chances to inhibit intuitive thinking and a 
greater amount of time to take the new knowledge on board may better allow for 
reasoning skills to have their effect at a detectable level in the study. 
A course-length intervention should also provide a much greater ability to cue 
students’ rational thinking (e.g. Inbar et al., 2010).  Therefore all participants should be 
getting cued more strongly to use rational thinking, regardless of belief-basis.  
According to Inbar et al., this will mean a greater general reduction in belief in ESP, 
since students are more likely to actually apply their critical thinking skills.  However, 
the path-dependency model predicts that despite such skills being engaged, the 
counterevidence will be less likely to influence intuitively held beliefs, because those 
beliefs are formed via, and stored in, intuitive cognitive systems in the brain and thus 
less amenable to influence by rational inputs.  Thus greater cueing should actually help 
to enhance the originally predicted basic effect, over and above the natural tendency of 
participants to inhibit intuitive thinking, which was introduced in the revised version 
of the model. 
Finally, the present study presents an interesting situation where a direct comparison 
of single and multi-dose interventions is possible.  This was not something that was 
possible based upon the existing literature, since the single dose and multi-dose studies 
were all conducted separately.  Moreover, setting aside the point that there was only 
one single-dose study (Happs, 1991), this study used a different kind of counter-
evidence to the other studies (Banziger & College, 1983; Harrington, 2013; Jones & 
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Zusne, 1981; McLean & Miller, 2010; Morier & Keeports, 1994): the use of videos 
instead of typical taught materials and discussion.  It is therefore difficult to compare 
the effect sizes between the single and multi-dose studies found in the literature as 
there is only a small sample of them and very few single-dose studies to include.  
However, it is possible to directly compare the different length intervention studies in 
the current programme directly as they use almost identical materials.  Self-predicted 
belief change was not measured in the present study, however, so as not to introduce 
unnecessary risk of demand effects.  Unlike in studies 2 and 3, the participants in the 
present study were encountering the questionnaires within the context of being taught 
about anomalistic psychology, whereas previously the participants encountered the 
questionnaires separately from the intervention itself. 
In summary then, the course-length intervention should increase the likelihood of 
detecting a clear path-dependent effect, due to greater motivation, greater depth of 
engagement with the material, greater amount of knowledge, and a greater chance of 
inhibiting intuitive processing. 
Hypotheses 
H1 – pre-intervention belief-basis would correlate with belief in the topics in the same 
pattern as in Griffin and Ohlsson‘s (2001) study. 
H2 - Belief in ESP would be lower after the lecture course than before. 
H3 - The more rational the basis for their belief in ESP before the lecture course, the 
more likely participants would be to reduce their belief in ESP afterwards. 
H4 – it was predicted that greater (i.e. more rational) belief-basis scores would correlate 
with greater CRT5 scores. 
H5 – it was predicted that higher CRT5 scores would correlate with lower ESP belief. 
H6 – higher CRT5 scores would correlate with greater belief reduction in ESP. 
H7 – CRT5 would interact with belief-basis, leading to greater reduction of ESP belief 
when belief-basis was rational and CRT5 scores were higher. 
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Method 
This study used the same intervention paradigm as used in Study 3.  However, the 
self-predicted belief change measure was not included.  Variables measured were 
belief-basis and belief-level, both on a 9-point scale.  The CRT5 was also included as a 
measure of tendency to inhibit default responses (i.e. intuitive thinking).  Belief change 
was measured as the difference between pre- and post-intervention belief levels. 
Participants 
Participants were third year undergraduates enrolled on a course in Anomalistic 
Psychology.  Data was collected across three cohorts, in separate years, in order to 
provide a greater sample of participants taking part in both parts of the study.  Taking 
part in both parts of the study also gave students a chance to win £50 – this prize 
applied separately to each cohort.  In total, 94 participants participated in the first half 
of the study, after one participant was removed due to apparently misinterpreting 
instructions with respect to rating belief/disbelief.  There were 26 male participants and 
68 female participants, aged 20 to 46 (mean 22.46, SD = 3.582).  The sample size for 
participants completing both halves of the study was 39, consisting of 9 male and 30 
female participants, aged 20 to 32 (mean 22.16, SD = 3,063). 
Materials 
The study relied mainly upon pencil and paper presentation of the questionnaire, as in 
Study 3, with CRT validation items removed, to reduce the length of the questionnaire, 
which was at the start of a lecture.  However, an online presentation was created to 
increase the number of students completing the second half of the study.  Due to the  
tendency for non-attendance on most university courses late in the year, it was 
anticipated that an online option would be needed to maximise participation.  As 
discussed, and demonstrated, in Study 1, these modes of presentation are generally 
equivalent and it was not expected that the differences in presentation would be an 
issue.  The questionnaire was the same as the one used in Study 3, with the self-
prediction question omitted.  The online presentation was via Lime Survey version 1.92 
(http://www.limesurvey.org/) hosted on computer servers at Goldsmiths College, 
University of London.  The intervention itself was one semester long and covered the 
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material in a textbook co-written by the course’s principal lecturer (French, 2014).  This 
included material on ESP.  The course contributed to students’ overall degree 
classification and included a piece of written coursework and a written exam. 
Scoring 
 
Belief in each topic was measured in the same way as in Study 1. 
Belief-basis on each topic was measured in the same way as in Study 3. 
Belief change on each topic was measured in the same way as in Study 2.  
CRT5 was measured as detailed in Study 4. 
Procedure 
The time sequence of the study is illustrated in   
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Figure 28.  Participants were briefed via a sheet on the front of the pre-intervention 
questionnaire (Appendix 5).  They also signed the consent form, which was removed 
from the front of the questionnaire after data collection to preserve participant 
anonymity.  BPS ethical guidelines were followed and participants were free to 
withdraw from the study (BPS, 2017, 2018).  Participants completed the first 
questionnaire in the first lecture of the course.  Then, one or two lectures before the end 
of the course participants completed the second questionnaire – typically this was 
during the exam revision lecture as this type of lecture tends to produce the highest 
attendance.  Those who did not attend the lecture were emailed and given a link to the 
questionnaire online.  This mailing was repeated once more for those who had still not 
participated.  Within each of the three cohorts, those who took part in both halves of 
the study were eligible for a £50 cash prize, drawn at random after data collection had 
finished.  Since data collection continued online, participants were debriefed via email 
once data collection had been completed (Appendix 5).  This study was approved by 
the ethics committee at Goldsmiths College, University of London. 
  
Study 5 – An Extended Intervention on Path-Dependent Belief Change      172 








a CRT5 – one point for each correct answer, added together for a range of 0-5 (low to 
high tendency to inhibit default responding).
b Belief in topic rated from 1-9 (none to completely).
c Belief-basis – calculated from 6 ratings of reasons for belief (1-9, from not at all to 
completely). Mean rating for the three intuitive items is subtracted from the mean 
rating for the three rational items, giving an overall rating from 1-9 (from intuitive 
belief-basis to rational belief-basis)
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As in the previous studies, graphs of the belief-basis in each topic for believers and 
non-believers are presented, compared alongside the results from Griffin and 
Ohlsson’s (2001) original study, using the full dataset of 94 participants in the present 
study.  Once again, there is the close visual match that was seen in the previous studies 
in the current research programme. 
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Figure 29 - Comparison between Study 5 and Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) USA sample for 
believers' belief-bases (numbers of contributing participants are given for each topic, with 
USA sample on the right; error bars not available for USA sample) 
 
 
Figure 30 - Comparison between Study 5 and Griffin and Ohlsson's (2001) USA sample for 
disbelievers' belief-bases (numbers of contributing participants are given for each topic, with 
USA sample on the right; error bars not available for USA sample) 
Prior to statistical analysis of the results the integrity of the belief-basis measure was 
checked.  The overall Cronbach’s alpha was .458.  Factor analysis without rotation 
presented a clear loading of the items on intuitive and rational belief-basis.   
Cronbach’s alpha for intuitive items was .755 and for rational items it was .859. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that pre-intervention belief-basis would correlate with belief in 
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with a bivariate correlation between belief-basis and belief level on each of the five 
topics, using the full data set of 94 participants.  A positive correlation indicates that 
belief in a topic has a more rational basis and a negative correlation indicates the belief 
has a more intuitive basis.  As can be seen in Table 27, belief-basis correlated as 
expected, with all topics correlating positively apart from the negative correlation for 
evolution.  Rho ranged in absolute values from .437 to .678, with significance at p < 
.0005 for all topics, thus replicating Griffin and Ohlsson’s original findings and those in 
earlier studies in the present programme. 
Table 27 - Correlations between belief-basis and belief 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
-.507 -.625 -.678 -.437 .484 
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Hypothesis 2 predicted that belief in ESP would be lower after the lecture than before.  
A Wilcoxon test was conducted on belief before and after the intervention (n = 39).  
Table 28 shows that the only topic to show belief reduction on the 9-point scale was 
ESP (reduced by -.67 from 3.15), z = -2.059, p = .037.  All other differences were non-
significant.  There was therefore no need to compare belief change in ESP with belief 
change in the other topics. 
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Table 28 - Belief change after the intervention 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Mean belief 
change 




.821 .256 .037 .877 .852 
  
 
Figure 32 - Boxplots of belief for each topic, before and after the intervention 
* the difference in belief before and after the intervention was significant, p < .05 
Since there was significant belief change observed in ESP, additional analysis was 
conducted to determine if ESP was actually reducing more than belief in the other 
topics that were not targeted by the intervention.  Wilcoxon tests between ESP belief 
change and belief change in each other topic were conducted.  The results are 
displayed in   
Study 5 – An Extended Intervention on Path-Dependent Belief Change      177 
Table 29 below.  Belief change for ESP did not differ significantly for in comparison to 
any topic apart from Creationism.  However, this latter result would not survive 
correction for family-wise error rate.  Overall, it cannot be concluded with confidence 
that belief in ESP reduced after the intervention. 
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Table 29 - Differences in belief change between ESP and the other topics 









.030 .210 n/a .312 .643 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the more rational the basis for their belief in ESP before 
the lecture, the more likely participants would be to reduce their belief in ESP 
afterwards.  A partial correlation, controlling for pre-intervention belief level, was 
conducted between belief-basis and belief change (calculated as the difference between 
belief and pre- and post-intervention stages, n = 39).  A positive correlation indicates 
that participants who report a greater rational belief-basis are more likely, than those 
with an intuitive belief-basis, to change their view after the intervention.  Whereas as 
negative correlation indicates the opposite situation.  This was not significant for belief 
in ESP, however (rho = .219, p = .181).  No correlation for other topics was significant 
either, with p-values ranging from .159 to .971 (see Table 30). 
Table 30 - Correlations between belief-basis and belief change 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Pearson’s r 
-.066 -.097 .118 -.188 -.079 
Significance .561 .393 .299 .096 .487 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that greater (i.e. more rational) belief-basis scores would 
correlate with greater CRT5 scores.  A bivariate correlation was conducted between 
CRT5 and belief-basis on each topic (n = 94).  A positive correlation indicates that 
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participants who have a greater tendency to inhibit default responding are more likely 
to have rational reasons for their beliefs.  As shown in Table 31, ESP, afterlife, and 
opposites all showed a positive correlation between CRT5 score and belief-basis score 
(rho ranging from .265 to .429 and p-values ranging from < .0005 to .010).  Creationism 
also showed a positive correlation that was approaching significance: rho = .200, p = 
.053.  Evolution did not show a significant correlation, however, p = .244.  The results of 
Study 3 were therefore partially replicated. 
Table 31 - Correlations between belief-basis and inhibition 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
.200 .429 .319 .265 .121 
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Hypothesis 5 predicted that higher CRT5 scores would correlate with lower ESP belief.  
A bivariate correlation was carried out between CRT5 and pre-intervention belief 
levels (n = 94).  A negative correlation indicates that participants were less likely to 
believe in a topic if they had a greater tendency to inhibit default processing, whereas a 
positive correlation indicates that participants were more likely to believe in a topic if 
they had a greater tendency to inhibit default responding.  Table 32 shows a significant 
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negative correlation for ESP (rho = -.330, p = .001) and afterlife (rho = -.355, p < .0005), 
with opposites approaching significance at rho = -.202, p = .051.  There was no 
significant correlation for creationism or evolution. 
Table 32 - Correlations between inhibition and pre-intervention belief 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
-.033 -.355 -.330 -.202 .093 
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Hypothesis 6 predicted that higher CRT5 scores would correlate with greater belief 
reduction in ESP.  A partial correlation was conducted between CRT5 and belief 
change, controlling for pre-intervention belief level.  A negative correlation would 
indicate that belief in a topic reduced more for those participants with a greater 
tendency to inhibit default responding, whereas a positive correlation would indicate 
that belief reduction is associated with a lower tendency to inhibit default responding.  
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Significant correlations were found for Creationism and Afterlife, but no significant 
correlation was found for the focal topic of ESP: rho = .140, p = .217 (see Table 33). 
Table 33 - Correlations between inhibition and belief change 
 Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution 
Pearson’s r 
.252 .291 .140 .196 .124 
Significance .025 .009 .217 .083 .276 
 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that CRT5 scores would interact with belief-basis, leading to 
greater reduction of ESP belief when belief-basis was rational and CRT5 scores were 
higher.  The interaction between CRT5 scores and belief-basis was therefore analysed 
with respect to belief change.  The interaction term was calculated after centering of the 
CRT5 and belief-basis variables, and a partial correlation was conducted between the 
interaction term and belief change, controlling for pre-intervention belief level.  A 
positive correlation would indicate that when participants report greater rational belief 
basis in a topic at the same time as having a greater tendency to inhibit default 
responding, then they would be more likely to reduce their belief after the 
intervention.  However, no significant interaction was found: rho = .140, p = .217. 
Discussion 
As in previous studies in the series, the belief profile findings were once again 
supported, including an inverse correlation between rational belief-basis and opposites 
at a high level of significance.  Similarly, inhibition was associated with a more rational 
belief-basis in each topic, apart from evolution, which did not approach significance 
(note: for creationism p = .053).  Furthermore, inhibition was associated with lower 
belief in ESP, afterlife, and opposites (for opposites p = .051), although there was no 
association on the topics of creationism or evolution, thus presenting a partial 
replication of the findings from Study 3.  A general reduction in belief in ESP was also 
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found, although this reduction was not significantly greater than belief change in other 
topics, so must be interpreted with caution.  However, there was no evidence of the 
predicted correlation between belief-basis and belief reduction.  Furthermore, there 
was no association between inhibition and belief reduction.  Nor did belief-basis and 
inhibition interact to predict belief reduction. 
The present study provided a higher ‘dose’ intervention and the fruits of this can be 
seen in the general clarity of the statistical analyses, such as the clear correlations 
between belief-basis and belief across the topics.  There were a few cases where the 
association was just outside statistical significance (see above), but generally the 
delineation was clear; even where differences were found between the topics it was a 
clear difference – e.g. belief-basis vs belief for creationism and evolution had very low 
significance in contrast to the other topics.  This is helpful when it comes to 
interpreting the results as it is expected that topics might differ on some factors and it 
helps to ascertain better whether such results are due to noise in the data or real effects 
(or lack of real effects).  For example, the clear difference on evolution and creationism 
noted above might be explained by group identity, such as religiosity, as proposed by 
Kahan and Stanovich (2016).  In this case, belief-basis would be expected to correlate, 
but inhibition would not influence the level of belief due to the overriding effect of 
group identity defences. 
The contrast between the consistently robust presence of belief-profiles versus the 
absence of clear predicted belief change effects was also drawn out clearly in the 
present study.  Belief in ESP showed a clear reduction, with no parallel reduction in 
belief in any other topic, including afterlife, which is included in measures of general 
paranormal belief (Tobacyk, 2004).  However, ESP did not differ significantly from 
most other topics, meaning that one cannot be completely confident that the observed 
reduction in ESP belief is due to the intervention or is not a demand effect, or 
regression to the mean.  Nevertheless, belief-basis correlated to a highly significant 
degree with belief in each topic, all in the predicted directions.  Yet, associations of 
belief-basis and inhibition with belief reduction were very clearly non-significant.  This 
appears to clarify the mixed findings from earlier studies in the programme, which 
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could only offer cautious support for the path-dependent belief change hypothesis.  
The longer intervention has resulted in generally clearer results across the board, but in 
this instance the findings are not in favour of the proposed hypothesis. 
These findings echo the claim of Haidt (2001), from a study on making ethical 
judgments, that such judgments are rationalised post-hoc.  In the present context this 
can be interpreted as people forming their beliefs in topics such as ESP, and then 
rationalising their reason for belief.  This would explain why belief-basis did not 
correlate with actual belief change, but at the same time raises the issue of whether self-
reported belief-basis can therefore be relied upon.  Belief-basis was therefore addressed 
more directly in the next, and final, study in the series.  
Another issue that needed addressing in the next study was the nature of the 
disconfirming material, which has so far only been of a rational nature.  In contrast, 
Edwards (1990) found that emotionally based beliefs were altered by increasing 
emotional arousal, but intellectually based beliefs were not.  This mirrors the path-
dependency model on the idea that belief-basis affects belief change, but the finding 
only applies to the influence of affect. Strictly speaking it was the effect of emotional 
arousal that was being investigated, but this can be deemed to come under the 
umbrella of intuitive thinking.  The present study series has not yet presented any kind 
of intuitively-based disconfirming material, however, and it may be that path-
dependency is asymmetrical at the point of belief change, as found by Edwards. 
A key rationale behind the longer intervention was the idea of a dose response effect.  
The higher dose included more knowledge, more time, and more engagement with the 
materials.  As already noted, most of the published intervention studies on belief 
change, in relation to paranormal belief, presented course-length knowledge-deficit 
interventions (Banziger & College, 1983; Harrington, 2013; Jones & Zusne, 1981; 
McLean & Miller, 2010; Morier & Keeports, 1994), although some did use a single-dose 
approach (Happs, 1991). However, unlike the existing published studies, the present 
study can be directly compared to other, single-dose interventions.  The knowledge 
deficits hypothesis would predict a dose-response effect, where more knowledge leads 
to greater reduction in the knowledge gap and thus greater belief change. 
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However, this was not what was found, even if one sets aside the lack of belief change 
difference between ESP and the other topics and takes the ESP belief change at face 
value.  The first intervention study (Study 2) actually found a greater reduction in 
belief (-.88) than the present study (-.67).  While the second single-dose intervention 
study (Study 3) did not produce a general belief reduction effect (-.36, p = 185).  
Averaging between the two single-dose studies gives a reduction of -.44, which does 
not provide the kind of dose-response effect that might be expected between a single 
one-hour lecture and a full course of lectures (which resulted in a reduction of -.67).  It 
is worth noting that amount of content specifically on ESP did also increase 
proportionally with the length of the intervention, so a dose response would be 
expected. However, it may be that a dose response was hidden by the differences in 
pre-intervention belief levels.  Study 2 and 3 had mean pre-intervention belief levels of 
4.81 and 3.82, respectively, on the 9-point scale.  Study 3 had a mean pre-intervention 
belief level of 3.38.  Study 2 showed the largest belief change, but the participants also 
had the most room for belief reduction, whereas Study 3’s participants had much less 
room to reduce their beliefs.  However, the present study’s participants had least room 
of all for belief reduction, yet still showed a sizeable belief change effect.  This could be 
interpreted as evidence of the predicted dose-response effect, in line with the 
knowledge deficits hypothesis and Ghose et al.’s (2004) emphasis on step-wise belief 
change, although further research would be needed using participants from the same 
cohort or balanced for initial belief levels, so that a more direct comparison can be 
made.  Indeed, in the analysis of belief-basis and belief change, initial level of belief 
was controlled for, but no significant association was found, despite some support for 
this association being found in the earlier studies. 
Another type of dose-response proposed was greater time spent studying the material, 
giving greater time for participants’ tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking to have an 
effect.  Similarly, depth of engagement should have been greater, due to extrinsic 
motivation of course grades and the intrinsic process of engagement with the material 
for producing the coursework component.  Furthermore, there should be more time for 
external, situational cueing of rational thinking processes, which would help to 
highlight any belief-basis association with belief reduction.  These factors were 
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therefore thought likely to facilitate the influence of variables involved in path-
dependent belief change – inhibition of intuitive thinking and processing of rational 
disconfirming material.  However, this differential type of belief reduction was not 
demonstrated in the present study, suggesting that while belief formation might be 
associated with thinking style and situational cueing, belief change might work in a 
different way. 
Perhaps, contrary to assumptions made in the rationale for this study, a greater 
amount of thinking time does not lead to a greater likelihood of avoiding thinking 
errors.  The assumption was based upon a broad body of literature demonstrating that 
having thinking skills dissociates from applying those skills to avoid thinking errors 
(e.g. Benassi et al., 1980; Dagnall et al., 2007; Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005; Irwin & 
Young, 2002; Kelemen et al., 2013; Royalty, 1995; Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2015; 
Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008a, 2008b).  However, this body of evidence does not 
include studying over an extended period of time where there is a greater likelihood of 
applying critical thinking and avoiding thinking errors.  Therefore the assumption 
made for the present study may be incorrect and a greater amount of thinking time 
makes no difference to the likelihood of inhibiting intuitive thinking or otherwise 
engaging critical thinking skills to avoid thinking errors.  An alternative to this is that 
there is greater likelihood of avoiding thinking errors, but that path-dependency of 
belief change does not occur and therefore this greater avoidance of thinking errors 
applies regardless of belief-basis.  Indeed, Sperber (1997) argued  that initially people 
evaluate things intuitively and only then, with further engagement, do they reflect 
upon their belief and form a reflective belief.  This suggests that, regardless of belief-
basis, people are on an equal footing when it comes to belief change via rational 
reflection.  This is in line with the knowledge deficits hypothesis and would require 
similar research to establish the existence of a dose-response effect. 
With respect to belief change the results are also in line with rational actor models, 
however, where it would be assumed that people are processing the disconfirming 
information rationally anyway (e.g. Anderson & Rausch, 2009; Bucher et al., 2014; 
Hample, 1979; Lange & Fishbein, 1983; McFarland & Thistlethwaite, 1970; Morris, 1996; 
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Schulte, 2002; see the General Background chapter for further examples).  However, 
this type of explanation has problems explaining the belief-basis differences, which 
implies a difference in belief formation that differentiates between rational and 
intuitive thinking.  Meanwhile, rational actor models that take prior experiences into 
account (e.g. Bleile, 2014) do not help to explain the lack of a path-dependency effect.  
Rational actor accounts are therefore not capable of explaining the findings, despite the 
failure of the proposed dual-process account to do so.  Further research is clearly 
needed. 
As already noted, the next study would need to look at belief-basis in more detail in 
case self-reports of this are inaccurate and thus hiding path-dependency, which would 
rely upon actual belief-basis.  This concern echoes the one about self-predicted belief 
change, which studies in the series have demonstrated was a legitimate concern.  
Furthermore, although the path-dependency model predicts variation depending upon 
the type of disconfirming material, so far only rationally based material has been 
presented and this means that the model is not being fully tested.  Indeed, Edwards 
(1990) found something similar to the path-dependency model of belief change, but 
with asymmetry at belief change, such that affect-based beliefs were better influenced 
by affect-based disconfirmation, whereas rationally based beliefs showed no 
differential effect of the type of disconfirming material.  A follow-up study to the 
present one should therefore seek to test this aspect of the model. 
In conclusion, while the present study adds yet more support for belief-basis findings 
(as a proxy for belief formation), it also finally clarifies a lack of support for path-
dependent belief change.  A longer intervention may have produced a dose-response 
effect for knowledge and the reduction of associated knowledge gaps, although this 
needs further research.  Arguably, however, it did not produce a dose-response effect 
that had any kind of impact upon individual differences in belief change.  One 
explanation for this is that the model itself is simply incorrect.  However, in line with 
Kluger and Tikochinsky’s (2001) argument, it is hasty to overgeneralise from specific 
null findings and the model should be more fully investigated before that line of 
inquiry can be closed with confidence.  Bearing in mind that even a lengthy 
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intervention did not appear to demonstrate any influence of material type or cognitive 
processing style, it seems that a different approach is needed.  Indeed, this is the case 
regarding belief-basis as well, and therefore it was proposed that the next study should 
change tack and bring the study of the model back into the laboratory where such 
variables can be controlled. 
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Study 6 – Belief Formation and Change in the 
Lab 
Background 
Up to this point the research programme has consistently demonstrated the existence 
of belief-profiles for various topics.   However, it has been clarified that there was no 
relationship between belief-basis and belief change, despite some promising early 
results.  Nor has it demonstrated this effect for associated factors, such as inhibition of 
intuitive thinking.  However, previous studies have two major omissions in their 
testing of the model.  Firstly, the type of disconfirming material has been limited to 
rational material, of the type presented in university lectures and textbooks.  This 
limits the conclusions that can be drawn about belief change in relation to the general 
dual-process account and the proposed model specifically.  Secondly, all of the studies 
have relied entirely upon self-reported belief-basis as a proxy for the cognitive 
processes involved in belief formation.  However, while this was a necessary 
assumption within an ecologically valid intervention paradigm, the concern is that self-
reports cannot always be relied upon to be accurate, as indeed was found within the 
present study series.  The path-dependent model makes its predictions based upon 
true belief-basis (i.e. the way the beliefs were formed) and thus self-report might be 
confounding proper testing of the model.  The present study therefore aimed to 
investigate both points in the belief process – formation and change – in greater detail, 
under more controlled conditions than previously used in the research programme. 
Haidt (2001) argues, with respect to moral reasoning, that the reasons given for ethical 
decisions are rationalised post-hoc.  In the context of belief this would mean people 
forming a belief and then coming up with a reason for the belief.  This latter reason 
would be the reason that people are expected to be able to report upon, but this reason 
may be completely unrelated to the true reason.  Indeed, the issue of accurate self-
access to higher cognitive processes was raised by Nisbett and Wilson (1977).  Nisbett 
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and Wilson argued that it was merely an assumption that people can accurately report 
on their own higher cognitive processes, since they can verbalise something that 
appears related to them.  In contrast, it would be thought absurd to assume that 
someone can accurately report on a low-level cognitive process, such as their use of 
ocular convergence when judging distances. 
Nisbett and Borgida (1975) demonstrated this point in a study where participants 
failed to make accurate predictions (i.e. in line with statistical information they were 
given) about the likelihood of their behaviour in a research study (bystander apathy or 
Milgram-style shock studies).  Even stronger evidence of this was provided by Balcetis 
and Dunning (2013) who found that students’ predictions of their peers’ behaviours 
differed from prediction of their own behaviours.  Their peers actually took part in the 
studies (on bystander helping and making charity donations) and students were 
reasonably good at predicting their peers’ actual behaviours based upon knowledge of 
the base-rate statistics.  However, students predicted their own behaviour would be 
different; specifically, that they would behave better, with more likelihood of helping 
or donating.  This kind of self-prediction can be thought of in terms of an a priori 
rationalisation rather than post-hoc. 
However, other studies discussed previously also included research on a phenomenon 
called choice-blindness (Hall et al., 2012; Johansson et al., 2006).  In this case 
participants appear to be blind to a choice that they made just seconds ago and they 
proceed to construct a reason for the choice post-hoc. This includes choices that are 
completely contradictory to their original choice and echoes findings from split-brain 
studies (e.g. Joseph, 1988; Puccetti, 2010).  In the split-brain situation the participant is a 
person who has undergone an extreme form of surgery for epilepsy, involving largely 
separating the two hemispheres of the brain.  Studies reveal that the left side of the 
brain will confabulate (i.e. rationalise post-hoc) the behaviours instigated by the right 
side of the brain, such as laughing at a picture or holding a glass of water.  This 
happens because the two halves of the brain have limited communication after the 
disconnection, but the left side goes right ahead and tries to explain what is going on; 
regardless of the facts, a story is constructed.  This is an extreme case, but it 
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demonstrates the potential for post-hoc rationalisation, and choice blindness offers 
evidence of the same process in normal healthy individuals. 
If Haidt (2001) is right, then self-reports of belief-basis might also be unreliable.  It may 
be that people do not really have access to their reasons for belief and they are 
constructing those reasons post-hoc.  Although the literature is generally consistent on 
the relationship between belief-basis, thinking styles, and belief in the paranormal the 
research is nevertheless typically correlational and the connection between belief-basis 
and belief formation can only be assumed.  Indeed, for practical reasons, real world 
intervention studies and most studies on paranormal beliefs in general must focus on 
correlations with existing beliefs and on the belief change point in the belief process.  
Given the reasons to be cautious about self-reports, the present study therefore aimed 
to manipulate belief formation directly so that self-reports of belief-basis were not 
required. 
The path-dependent model of belief change predicts that whether beliefs are formed 
for rational or intuitive reasons influences the likelihood of those beliefs changing later 
in response to disconfirming material.  Specifically, the prediction is that rationally 
formed beliefs will be most influenced by rational disconfirmation and intuitively 
formed beliefs will be most influenced by intuitive disconfirmation.  The aim of the 
present study was therefore to induce beliefs of each type and present disconfirming 
material of each type to induce belief reduction, giving a 2x2 design, forming four 
conditions, the prediction being that belief reduction would be greatest in the 
congruent conditions.  Induction of belief in the lab is unlikely to be as strong as beliefs 
in the real world, such as beliefs that the previous studies in the research programme 
have focused upon.  It was therefore not expected that there would be extreme swings 
in belief, but the aim was to produce and reduce belief at detectable levels. 
It was therefore proposed to present participants with different types of material to 
induce and reduce belief, the types either appealing to intuitive or rational cognition.  
It is, of course, impossible to directly know what thinking processes a person is 
actually using, but by presenting different types of materials the aim was to induce the 
use of the different processing styles.  Thus, given material devoid of rational evidence 
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or argument, it is unlikely that a person can form a rational belief in the phenomenon 
being advocated.  Similarly, if rational material is present then it allows for a rational 
belief-basis.  This means of induction is clearly not perfect, but the aim of the study was 
to detect relative differences, so to this end the means of induction is sufficient if it 
provides relative difference, which as described above, it should be capable of doing. 
Indeed, there is precedent for the use of differing types of material to influence thought 
processes.  For example, Raab and MacMahon (2015) looked at the hot hand belief in 
basketball, the belief that players who have made a run of shots are more likely to 
continue that run.  They found that depending upon how things were framed people 
made different decisions.   In fact, they were able to change people’s decisions from 
being hot-hand/cold-hand related simply by changing the camera angle from which 
people were viewing the basketball plays.  Similarly, Reber and Greifeneder (2016) 
found that the way people feel about the material they encounter influences whether 
they evaluate it positively or not.  Specifically, they found that when fluency was 
reduced, such as the material being printed in a harder to read font, people evaluated 
the material less positively.  On a related note, Inbar et al. (2010), discussed earlier, 
argue that both intuitive and rational processing require cueing.  That is to say, that the 
situational context cues which type of thinking to use and in the present context the 
type of material could be seen as forming part of the situational context.  
In order to induce belief formation and change it was proposed that a made-up 
phenomenon should be used.  This was to ensure, as far as possible, that the study was 
not measuring prior beliefs which, as observed by Benassi et al. (1980),  can have a 
significant influence on interpretation of new information.  Precedent for the use of 
faked materials can be found in the literature, including literature specifically related to 
paranormal belief.  In Benassi et al.’s (1980) study, for example, they used a specially 
commissioned psychic demonstration (i.e. a trick) in their study.  In that case, the 
demonstration was presented as either a trick or not a trick.  The demonstration 
consisted of a mentalist trick, but this can also seem like the performer has psychic 
abilities.  Much as a magician materialising a deck of cards out of thin air is really just a 
sleight-of-hand, mentalists could be said to use ‘sleight-of-mind’ to achieve their 
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illusions (e.g. D. Brown, 2007; Rowland, 2002).  In the condition where the 
demonstration is not presented as being a trick the material is therefore a fake 
demonstration of psychic abilities. 
In a vein more similar to the present study, however, Nyhan and Reifler (2010) used 
mock news articles to test how likely people were to change their mind about an issue 
when a correction was given regarding a misleading claim.  The material successfully 
induced belief in the misleading claim, although unfortunately for knowledge deficit 
advocates, they found that correction of the misleading claim did not alter belief in the 
original misleading statement if the correction was contrary to the political ideology of 
the participant (see also: Tappin, van der Leer, & McKay, 2017).  Another study, 
discussed earlier, by Green and Donahue (2011), also used fake material; in this case 
fabricated stories that were either initially stated to be truth or fiction.  Participants 
made judgments about the elements of the stories, such as the characters in them, and 
then were later told that there were inaccuracies in the story they had read (similarly to 
the corrective information in Nyhan and Reifler’s study).  They were also told either 
that the author had introduced the inaccuracy deliberately or by mistake.  Regardless 
of the condition the participants were in, they did not change their original judgements 
made about the fake material, however. 
It was therefore decided that an online laboratory-controlled intervention study using 
faked news report excerpts would be used.  This would be presented online to gather a 
larger sample and bringing the added advantage of not being over-reliant upon 
student samples (McNemar, 1946; Smart, 1966).  Taking this study into laboratory 
conditions (albeit online ones) was necessary in order to control the variables being 
studied.  In doing so one must be mindful of the issue of over-generalisation that 
Mitchell (2012) raised about generalising from the laboratory to the real world.  
However, in this instance the move is a considered decision to move from the real 
world into the laboratory (the reverse direction to Mitchell’s concern), specifically in 
order to increase control. 
The present study therefore aimed to induce and reduce belief in a fabricated, 
anomalous (i.e. paranormal-like) phenomenon via manipulation of the types of 
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materials presented to participants at the points of belief formation and change.  The 
aim was to avoid the potential unreliability of self-reports with respect to belief-basis 
and to fully test the predictions of the path-dependency model regarding the 
congruence of disconfirming material at the point of belief change.  CRT5 as a measure 
of inhibition was also included as one of the factors feeding into the predictions of the 
model.  Due to the need to control key variables the study was to be conducted as an 
online laboratory experiment. 
Hypotheses 
H1 – Participants’ belief in the phenomenon will increase after the pro-phenomenon 
material is presented. 
H2 – Intuitive pro-phenomenon material will increase belief in the phenomenon more 
than rational pro-phenomenon material – this was predicted based upon the 
association between intuitive thinking and belief in anomalous types of phenomenon, 
such as ESP. 
H3 – Participants’ belief in the phenomenon should reduce after exposure to sceptical 
material. 
H4 – Participants’ belief will reduce more when the pro-phenomenon material and the 
sceptical material are of the same type (intuitive/intuitive, rational/rational) than when 
they are of different types (intuitive/rational, rational/intuitive). 
H5 – CRT5 scores will correlate negatively with increased belief after encountering 
intuitive pro-phenomenon material, but this will be less pronounced after 
encountering rational pro-phenomenon material – this is predicted via inhibition of 
intuitive thinking reducing the influence of intuitive material, but having less effect 
regarding rational material, since the latter scenario should already be inducing lower 
levels of intuitive thinking. 
H6 – It was predicted that higher CRT5 scores would correlate with belief reduction, 
but that this effect would be greater for rational sceptical material than intuitive 
sceptical material, due to increased application of rational thinking processes when 
intuitive thinking processes are inhibited. 
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H7 – It was predicted that higher CRT5 scores would correlate with belief reduction 
most for those participants where rational disconfirming material followed rational 
pro-phenomenon material. 
Method 
The experiment used a 2x2 mixed design.   IVs were material type (two levels: intuitive 
and rational) and timing (two levels: before and after disconfirming material).  
Participants varied in whether they encountered intuitive or rational material at each 
time point, but all participants experienced both time points.  DV was level of belief, 
measured via a 0-100 sliding self-report scale, from disbelief to belief.  This was 
measured at three points in the timeline: before pro-phenomenon material, after pro-
phenomenon material, and after sceptical material.  CRT5 was also included as a 
variable in the experiment and all participants encountered this measure after rating 
their belief the second time, but before encountering the sceptical material.  The CRT5 
validation items were also included (see previous studies) along with the loss aversion 
check.  A yes/no control question on knowledge of EVP (electronic voice phenomenon) 
was also included. 
Participants 
The sample consisted of a single cohort of participants recruited opportunistically via 
research participation groups on Facebook, via Facebook referrals to the study, and via 
bulk email invitations.  After removal of 22 participants due to missing data, a total of 
96 participants took part in the study: 19 male, 76 female and 1 declining to say, aged 
20 to 70 (mean 30.73, SD = 12.333). 
Materials 
The experiment was presented online using Qualtrix (https://www.qualtrics.com), hosted 
on their secure servers.  As in previous studies it was not expected that the mode of 
online presentation would cause a problem for the experiment (see the discussion in 
Study 2 regarding equivalence of online and offline modes). 
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A non-existent phenomenon was created for the study.  This had to meet the criteria of 
being potentially explainable in both paranormal and non-paranormal terms, and open 
to both rational and intuitive disconfirmation.  It also had to be sufficiently different 
from any existing phenomena so that pre-existing beliefs would not influence belief 
ratings.   The phenomenon proposed that was eventually fabricated was named DVP 
(delayed voice projection – see below for description).  Five news report excerpts were 
constructed relating to this phenomenon, the first of which was a general introduction 
to its possible existence, which all participants saw.  Care needed to be taken in 
language use in each of the excerpts in order to convey the right information and tone.  
In the introductory excerpt, it was important to keep things neutral, not biasing people 
towards belief or disbelief in the phenomenon.  It is included below in full, along with 
the lead-in provided to participants: 
The following is taken from the introduction to a news piece looking into claims 
about a new phenomenon known as DVP (Delayed Voice Projection).  Names have 
been changed to preserve anonymity – any similarity to real persons is unintended. 
“In a new phenomenon that’s being dubbed Delayed Voice Projection, or DVP, it’s 
being claimed that when an audio recording device, such as a digital voice recorder, 
or even a mobile phone, is left to record in a quiet room, it can record extremely 
faint traces of things people said the day before, and perhaps even further back than 
that.  If these claims about DVP are true then the applications for law-enforcement 
could be far-reaching.  While it wouldn’t allow police officers to see into the future, 
like in films such as Minority Report, it could perhaps help them solve crimes by 
hearing into the past.  Could DVP be the next big break-through in policing?  We 
sent our reporter, Dean Michaels, to do some investigating of his own.” 
 
An important part of the content in this introductory excerpt was to ensure that on the 
one hand the phenomenon has real potential to be taken seriously, but on the other 
hand, that more investigation is needed.  The balance in constructing such an excerpt is 
always going to be a difficult one, but the aim was to at least attain some degree of 
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neutrality in contrast to the other excerpts.  As can be seen in the intuitive pro-
phenomenon excerpt given below, the other excerpts were very much less neutral in 
contrast to the introduction, in order to induce or reduce belief as required in the 
study: 
The following is taken from the same news piece on DVP. 
“Reporter: I spoke to some people who’ve had a go at DVP themselves, to see what 
they think of it.   
Interviewee: We did like they said and we put my friend’s mobile phone in the 
living room to record.  And then we went out to the kitchen for half an hour while 
we cooked dinner.  We weren’t really expecting much to be honest, it was just a 
laugh.  But, when we went back and listened to it we could hear this really faint 
recording of some of the things we remembered saying the day before.  It was really 
spooky.” 
Similar excerpts were created for the other three conditions: rational pro-phenomenon, 
intuitive sceptical, and rational sceptical.  These involved advocating or disconfirming 
the phenomenon in terms of physics in the rational conditions, and in terms of the 
experiences of real people in the intuitive conditions, such as the one quoted above.  A 
question on knowledge of EVP was also included at the end of the experiment as this is 
the paranormal phenomenon closest to the fabricated one used in the study.  In EVP it 
is believed that the voices of deceased people can be heard when a recording device is 
left switched on in an unoccupied room.  It is therefore possible that some people 
would be aware of this phenomenon and it might influence their evaluation of DVP. 
The CRT5 and associated validation questions, used in other studies in this series, were 
used as filler tasks before participants encountered the sceptical material.  This was to 
try to ensure that immediate memory of the preceding material was not a factor.  But it 
also acted as a way to include a measure of inhibition in the study and additional data 
points for validation relating to the CRT5.  Finally, belief was measured on a 100-point 
sliding scale to increase sensitivity to changes, since the study was not expected to 
generate large changes in belief (for all items in the experiment see Appendix 6). 
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Scoring 
 
Belief in DVP at each time point was taken as the raw rating reported by participants.  
This ranged from 0 to 100, with 0 being no belief in DVP and 100 being complete belief 
in DVP.  
CRT5 was measured as detailed in Study 4. 
CRT validation measure was not analysed in the present chapter.  Analysis and 
scoring of this measure are covered in Study 4. 
Procedure 
Pilot 
The study was piloted online by five people (three women and two men).  All were 
personal acquaintances of the researcher.  Only minor spelling or word changes were 
suggested after the pilot. 
Main Study 
The time sequence of the study is illustrated in Figure 35.  Participants took part in 
their own time at a location of their choice.  BPS ethical guidelines were followed (BPS, 
2018) and the study was approved by the ethics committee at Goldsmiths College, 
University of London.  Participants were presented with a briefing and consent form 
before being able to take part in the study, and in accordance with BPS internet 
research guidelines they were required to confirm that they were 16 years of age or 
older – if they said no to this then they were not given the chance to participate (BPS, 
2017).  Participation in the study was anonymous and participants could quit the study 
at any time up until the final confirmation of consent was given.  This latter consent 
was given right at the end of the study to confirm that they were happy for their data 
to be used.  This was necessary since it is possible to quit an online study at any point, 
even after all data has been entered, so participants needed a way to communicate that 
they did intend their data to be used.  Participants were given the debrief page 
regardless of whether they answered yes or no to their data being used.  The study was 
available online for a period of approximately 2 months.  Participants were made 
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aware of the study as described in the Participants section above and followed a link to 
the online experiment. 
During the experiment itself, participants first filled in demographic information on 
gender and age.  Gender included an option not to specify and age was banded so as to 
make participants feel more comfortable giving this information.  They were then 
presented with the introductory news excerpt on DVP.  This was followed by an initial 
belief rating recorded on 0-100 sliding scale.  They were then presented with pro-
phenomenon material.  Participants were randomly assigned by the software to see 
either intuitive or rational material.  They then once again rated their belief/disbelief in 
DVP on the 0-100 sliding scale.  CRT5 and associated validation tasks were then 
presented, acting as both filler and data collection activities.  After this, participants 
saw sceptical material on DVP.  They were randomly assigned by the software to see 
intuitive or rational material.  They were then asked to rate their belief in DVP again.  
Finally, they were asked control questions relating to potential knowledge of related 
topics.  This included asking if they knew of the EVP phenomenon. 
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Figure 35 - Time sequence and measures for Study 6 
a Belief in DVP at each time point was rated on a 0-100 sliding scale, from no belief in 
DVP to complete belief in DVP.
b CRT5 – one point for each correct answer, added together for a range of 0-5 (low to 
high tendency to inhibit default responding). Two validation items, on delayed reward, 
providing a range of 0-2 (low to high preference to accept a delay for a greater reward).
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Results 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that pro-phenomenon material would induce belief formation 
relative to baseline.  A Wilcoxon test was conducted on belief level before and after the 
pro-phenomenon material was encountered.  There was a significant increase (+3.00) in 
belief in DVP: Z = -.374, p = .001, a small but clearly detectable effect. 
Figure 36 - Boxplots of belief in DVP before and after pro-phenomenon material 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that there would be a difference in belief formation due to type 
of material (intuitive/rational).  This was tested with a Mann-Whitney U test (an 
independent-measures equivalent to the Wilcoxon test) on belief change, comparing 
belief change for participants who encountered intuitive material and those who 
encountered rational material.  The difference (2.63) between the two conditions was 
significant: Z = -2.628 p = .008.   However, it was not in the predicted direction.  
Encountering rational pro-phenomenon material was more likely to increase belief in 
DVP than encountering intuitive pro-phenomenon material. 
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Figure 37 - Boxplots of belief in DVP before and after intuitive or rational pro-phenomenon 
material 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that belief would reduce after encountering disconfirming 
material.  A Wilcoxon test was conducted on belief before and after sceptical material 
was presented.    The difference (-4.87) was significant: Z= -4.319, p < .0005, in the 
predicted direction. 
Figure 38 - Boxplots of belief in DVP before and after pro-phenomenon material 
 
Hypothesis 4 was tested with a 2x2 independent-samples ANCOVA on belief level 
after the presentation of sceptical material.  The two factors were the material type 
(intuitive/rational) and the time point of the rating (after pro-phenomenon 
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material/after sceptical material).  The covariate was belief level before presentation of 
sceptical material.  There were no significant main effects or interactions. 
Figure 39 - Belief change after sceptical material 
 
 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that CRT5 scores would correlate negatively with belief 
formation after encountering intuitive pro-phenomenon material, but that this effect 
would be reduced for rational pro-phenomenon material.  Partial correlations were 
therefore conducted between belief change and CRT5 scores on each of the two types 
of pro-phenomenon material, controlling for belief level before presentation of the pro-
phenomenon material.  A negative correlation indicates that a greater tendency to 
inhibit default responding reduces the effectiveness of material to induce belief.  As 
predicted there was a significant negative correlation for intuitive material (r = -.301, p 
= .039) while there was no correlation with rational material (r = .086, p = .566). 
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Figure 40 - Scatterplots of belief change vs inhibition after exposure to intuitive or rational 
pro-phenomenon material (prior belief level has been partialled out) 
  
Hypothesis 6 predicted similarly to hypothesis 5, but at the point of belief reduction 
rather than belief formation.  Partial correlations were therefore conducted between 
belief change and CRT5 scores on each of the two types of sceptical material, 
controlling for belief level before presentation of the sceptical material.  In this case, a 
negative correlation would indicate that a greater tendency to inhibit default 
responding limits the effectiveness of material to reduce belief in DVP.  Contrary to the 
prediction, there were no significant correlations.  For intuitive material: r = -.133, p = 
.362.  And for rational material: r = -.088, p = .564. 
Hypothesis 7 also predicted similarly to hypothesis 5, but that the effect would be 
enhanced for those participants who encountered rational disconfirming material after 
rational pro-phenomenon material.  Partial correlation analysis was conducted 
between CRT5 scores and belief change on each of the four conditions 
(intuitive/intuitive, intuitive/rational, rational/intuitive, rational/rational), controlling 
for belief level before presentation of sceptical material.  A positive correlation in one 
of the four conditions would indicate that belief reduction is facilitated by the 
particular combination of material types presented at the belief formation and belief 
change time points.  The focal condition for hypothesis testing was rational/rational, 
where a positive correlation would indicate that participants were more likely to 
reduce their belief in response to rational material if they had formed their belief based 
upon rational material.  However, there were no significant correlations.  For the 
hypothesis’ focal condition – rational/rational – r = -.287, p = .195. 
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Exploratory (EVP knowers removed) – Exploratory analyses were conducted with 
EVP-knowers removed (reducing the sample to 62).  That is, participants who 
responded ‘yes’ to the EVP knowledge question were removed and the full set of 
analyses were rerun.  No differences were found in this reanalysis and it was therefore 
concluded that having knowledge of EVP did not influence evaluations of DVP.  These 
analyses, with EVP-knowers removed, were also conducted with the alternative, 
inhibition-only scoring of the CRT5.   This did not appreciably change the results, 
however, beyond the type of noisy variations expected in multiple exploratory 
analyses. 
Discussion 
The study succeeded in its aims to induce and reduce belief change in an experimental 
laboratory situation.  Detectable levels of belief increase and reduction were found 
after exposure to pro-phenomenon and sceptical material, respectively.  However, 
initial belief increase (belief ‘formation’) occurred to a greater degree in participants 
who encountered rational pro-phenomenon material, contrary to the prediction that 
this effect would be demonstrated with intuitive material.  Similarly, the hypothesis 
that belief would reduce more in congruent conditions was also not supported.  
However, hypothesis 5 was supported, finding that inhibition correlated inversely 
with initial belief formation, but only for intuitive material. Rational material showed 
no association with inhibition at all.  Finally, the association between inhibition and 
belief change was not found at the point of belief reduction. 
The present study took the research programme from the real world into the (online) 
laboratory to conduct an experiment, with the variables of interest under greater 
control.  The hope was that this might allow detection of a path-dependency in belief 
formation and change.  However, this was not the case.  The present study supported 
the failure of the previous study in the series to detect path-dependency at the point of 
belief change.  In itself this is no bad thing, since it makes the conclusions regarding the 
model very clear at this point in the research programme.  Indeed, a number of 
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potential criticisms of the naturalistic studies are addressed in the present one.  One 
such criticism, already raised in the background section to this chapter, is that the 
naturalistic studies relied upon a self-report measure of belief-basis, which has the 
potential to suffer from reporting biases or inaccuracies.  However, in the present 
study the materials presented at each point were controlled and thus no self-reports of 
belief-basis were required.  Another criticism that could be levelled at previous studies 
is that there was no balancing within the samples to account for the natural tendency 
for greater intuitive thinking to be associated with greater paranormal belief.  This 
means that the split between belief-basis is never even, potentially skewing statistical 
analyses if the difference is too great.  However, in the present study participants were 
randomly assigned to the intuitive and rational conditions, yet the predicted path-
dependency effect was still absent in the data.  Therefore, while the findings of the 
present study may be disappointing in terms of the success of the model being tested, 
they do offer greater confidence in the absence of the predicted effects. 
Unlike previous studies in the series, however, the association between belief in 
anomalistic phenomena and a more intuitive belief-basis was not found – it was 
actually rational material that induced the greatest initial belief in DVP.  This is a 
striking observation considering how robust this effect has been in the present research 
programme and across the wider literature.  It is unclear whether this was due to 
situational cueing effects (Inbar et al., 2010), since such cueing would likely be absent 
in real paranormal belief formation scenarios, or whether it is due to something else.  
For example, was it the case that the intuitive material was simply wholly 
unconvincing?   Certainly it can be argued that reading a text-based transcript of a 
news item is not as viscerally engaging as a psychic demonstration (Benassi et al., 1980) 
or videos of failed paranormal claims (Happs, 1991). 
However, although the material itself may not have been ideal or factors such as 
situational cueing may have been in play, the study did support the robust finding 
from the literature that thinking style is associated with greater belief in anomalous 
phenomena – a finding that also has support from the present study programme with 
respect to ESP (although not from Study 4, which did not find this association).  
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Thinking style, in this case, was proxied by the CRT5 measure of tendency to inhibit 
intuitive thinking and the results were exactly as predicted at belief formation.  A 
greater tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking was associated with a reduced tendency 
to believe in DVP, but only for those participants exposed to the intuitive pro-
phenomena material.  The present study therefore provides strong evidence to add to 
the existing body of literature associating thinking style with belief in anomalous 
phenomena, such as the paranormal.  
This may also help to explain the reduced effect of belief formation for those exposed 
to intuitive material.  It would make sense if inhibition was reducing the effect of 
intuitive material, but having no mitigating role in the processing of rational material.  
The original rationale for the inhibition association at belief formation was based upon 
the assumption that intuitive material would cause a greater general increase in belief 
formation.  But, if the two types of material are more equal in their belief formation 
effects then it would make sense that intuitive material would have a smaller effect if 
inhibition can be brought into play, but that this would not affect the influence of 
rational material.  It may be as Inbar et al. (2010) suggest, that thinking style is cued by 
the situation (the material in this instance) and it is simply the case that in the real 
world paranormal beliefs are generally formed by encountering intuitive types of 
material, as opposed to the formation of belief in evolution, for example, which is likely 
to form via encountering rational types of material.  However, a tendency to inhibit 
intuitive thinking could still have an influence, to some extent countering the 
situational cueing in a paranormal belief formation scenario, thereby producing the 
associations observed in the literature, and the present study series, between 
paranormal belief and thinking style, and between paranormal belief and belief-basis.  
In this sense, the present study could be considered too artificial in relation to 
paranormal belief and thus falling foul of laboratory to real world cross-over 
difficulties that often affect psychological research (Mitchell, 2012).  Care needs to be 
taken when generalising from the present findings. 
Indeed, while the association between inhibition and intuitive material at the point of 
belief formation is an interesting one, it must not be ignored that the study failed to 
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find such an association at the point of belief change (i.e. belief reduction).  The 
association at this point in the belief process remained stubbornly absent as it has done 
throughout the study programme.  This is particularly intriguing given the low levels 
of belief change in the present study; this was not a study that was investigating 
changes in long held real world beliefs, it was a study inducing small, but detectable 
changes in belief.  Yet, inhibition was not equally influential at the points of belief 
formation and change.  This strongly suggests that initial exposure to material and 
later exposure to other material are not independent of one another in relation to 
intuitive and rational thinking. 
One possible explanation for this is that, prior to the sceptical material, rational 
thinking was cued by the CRT5 filler task, and that the intuitive sceptical material was 
insufficient to reverse this effect.  For example, Alter et al. (2007) found that disfluent 
fonts cue greater application of rational thinking.  They found that people made fewer 
incorrect answers when reading material in the disfluent font (only 35% errors 
compared to 90% in the fluent font condition).  It may be that the use of the CRT5 as a 
filler task confounded the second half of the experiment, by cueing rational thinking.  
This would, of course, have to be a strong enough effect to override the more 
immediate situational cueing of the material that Inbar et al. (2010) argue for.  Indeed, 
while this kind of explanation may be plausible when considered in light of the present 
study alone, it is harder for it to explain why other studies in the series did not find an 
association between inhibition and belief change, unless anomalistic psychology 
lectures and courses have an especial propensity for cueing long-term rational thinking 
that can override later situational cueing.  While this latter point may be an appealing 
conclusion for sceptics of the paranormal it does seem an unlikely one, given that this 
would require rational thinking to then remain continuously active, contrary to the 
evidence from numerous studies indicating that the application of rational thinking is 
easily subverted, and the argument from evolution, and most people’s personal 
experience, that it would be too draining on resources to be sustained.  That such 
interventions may ‘install’ mindware, however, is plausible, but is a different 
suggestion than one regarding cueing due to CRT5 questions.  The mindware option 
will be discussed in more detail in the general discussion. 
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This combination of a lack of an association between thinking style or belief-basis and 
belief change, and a clear association at belief formation, is challenging for many 
accounts of belief, not least the rational actor account.  Rational actor theorists would, 
of course, be entirely unsurprised to see the findings of the present study at the point 
of belief formation.  Naturally, the rational material would have a greater effect, 
because people are, after all, rational actors at heart.  However, it is hard to write off 
the association between belief and thinking style at belief formation as merely due to 
trick questions misleading people (McFadden, 1999), when the same effect is absent at 
the point of belief reduction. 
On the other hand, the present findings might be welcomed by exceptionalists, who 
argue that belief reduction is due to a knowledge deficit.  In this case the study not 
only found that rational material influenced belief formation the most, but that rational 
material also influenced belief reduction the most, albeit only for those basing their 
original belief on the intuitive material.  While not entirely in-line with a purist 
knowledge deficit approach, it would nevertheless be seen as encouraging, particularly 
in paranormal sceptic circles (e.g. Alcock, 2018; Losh, Tavani, Njoroge, Wilke, & 
McAuley, 2003; Sagan, 1997), where a lack of rational thinking is often seen to be the 
root problem; if rational disconfirmation changes intuitively based beliefs more readily 
than any other kind, then that is unlikely to be viewed as a bad thing.  Naturally, 
however, given the exploratory nature of the finding, replication would be warranted 
before celebration. 
Indeed, inoculationists would argue that knowledge on its own is not enough and that 
the aim must be to prevent belief formation in the first place (e.g. Alcock, 2018; 
Lilienfeld et al., 2012; Lilienfeld et al., 2009).  The asymmetry of the inhibition findings 
in the present study provide some direct support for this idea.  Tendency to inhibit 
intuitive thinking did appear to ‘inoculate’ participants against forming a belief based 
only upon intuitive information.  However, once beliefs were formed inhibition was no 
longer useful, its inoculating power having been used it was ineffective against 
intuitive material at a later date.  Instead of limiting the influence of intuitive 
disconfirming material it had no association at all.  Conceptually this is a good fit with 
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the idea of inoculation; if the inoculation is bypassed or ineffective at the time of 
infection then it will not have any effect later on either. 
With regard to the methodology employed in the present study there were a number of 
successes.  The approach of using a fake phenomenon has proven to be a useful one 
and the results were not affected by participant’s knowledge of a potentially closely 
related phenomenon (EVP).  Moreover, the study demonstrated that detectable belief 
formation and change is possible with a highly artificial setting with materials that 
were relatively uncompelling in terms of their presentation: simply text on a screen.  
The present paradigm can therefore be recommended for future belief change studies 
as an alternative to relying upon self-reported predictions of belief change, in addition 
to avoiding any potential issues of self-reports of belief-basis or thinking style.  As 
Mitchell (2012) warns, however, one must be careful when generalising from this study 
back to the real world.  Future research could focus on trying to implement a similar 
paradigm more naturalistically, perhaps with the use of video materials or live 
demonstrations (Benassi et al., 1980; Happs, 1991), which are both likely to be more 
ecologically valid than written vignettes. 
In conclusion then, the study was successful in its aims to induce and reduce belief.  It 
also demonstrated the successful use of fake material in relation to belief formation and 
change.  However, the unexpected effect of the material at the belief formation stage in 
combination with the lack of an effect at belief change and the generally asymmetric 
inhibition findings, poses challenges for explaining the findings with existing theories.  
The next chapter will therefore present a more detailed general discussion, taking 
account of the findings across the research programme. 
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General Discussion 
Path-Dependency and Dual-Process Theories 
The current research programme was motivated by the need to explain belief 
formation and change in relation to emerging research indicating that a dual-process 
account was required.  This included taking into account the apparent evolved 
primacy of intuitive thinking processes, as evidenced by observations such as the 
dissociation of thinking skills from the application of those skills.  Additionally, the 
motivation took into account the variations in reasons for belief found in the literature 
and it was theorized this variation would be associated with differences in belief 
change.  To this end a path-dependent model of belief formation and change was 
proposed.  The core assumption of this model was that beliefs would be formed 
differently via the two processes that dual-process theories propose: intuitive and 
rational.  And that this underlying difference in the beliefs would be encoded in some 
way, such as associations with specific types of processing system and/or knowledge, 
memories, and so on, in the brain.  Thus, intuitive beliefs would be encoded with 
associations to intuitive experience and knowledge, and rational beliefs would be 
encoded with associations to rational types of knowledge, for example. 
In this simple form the model resembled a similar model proposed by Griffin and 
Ohlsson (2001) whose research showed some support for the idea.  However, the path-
dependency model was further enhanced with the addition of people’s tendency to 
inhibit their intuitive thinking processes.  This addition to the model acknowledged the 
evolved primacy of intuitive thinking and thus the need to inhibit it in order for 
rational thinking to be applied.   The basic prediction of the model was therefore that 
beliefs formed via one mode of thinking would be more likely to change in response to 
disconfirming material of similar kind (intuitive or rational).  But, the model also 
proposed that to engage with rational disconfirming material at the point of belief 
change required inhibiting intuitive thinking processes. 
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Taken as a whole the results of the current research programme do not support the 
proposed model however.  In fact, the clearest interpretation of the finding across the 
whole series was a lack of any path-dependent effect.  This was the case in both 
naturalistic and laboratory settings.  The only exception to this was in the online 
replication of Griffin and Ohlsson’s original study, which replicated the original effect 
– greater rational belief-basis was associated with a greater self-predicted likelihood of 
belief change.  Mitchell (2012) warned that psychology often faces difficulties 
replicating outside of the laboratory and this is indeed what was found in this instance.  
Once self-prediction of belief change was swapped for actual belief change in the real 
world, the purported path-dependency of belief formation and change became more 
tenuous, and in later studies it disappeared altogether.  As found by Nisbett and 
Borgida (1975), people’s ability to predict their own future behaviours or to access the 
factors involved in their higher order cognitive processes cannot always be relied upon 
to be accurate. 
Griffin and Ohlsson (2001) based their own model upon an earlier three-stage model of 
belief change, which took a rational actor approach, but they modified it to include 
acknowledgment of beliefs being held for intuitive as well as rational reasons.  The 
original three-stage model holds that people must detect conflicting information, 
understand the information, and then assimilate it (replacing existing information if 
the new information is better).  Griffin and Ohlsson proposed that if the new 
information is rational and the original information is intuitive then the new 
information cannot be easily assimilated even if it is detected as conflicting and 
understood.  The results from the present programme therefore support the earlier 
three-stage model in so far as belief reduction was indeed produced, both inside and 
outside of the laboratory.  However, as was the case with the path-dependent model, 
the results do not support Griffin and Ohlsson’s modification of that model.  It must 
therefore be concluded on the basis of the current findings, that if path-dependence in 
belief formation and change does exist, then it does not follow a ‘like-cures-like’ path. 
However, some elements of the model were supported in the present programme.  
Strong support was provided throughout the series of studies regarding the association 
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of thinking style and belief-basis with particular topics.  For example, belief in the 
theory of evolution correlated with greater rational belief-basis and a greater rational 
thinking style, as measured by greater tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking, whereas 
topics, such as ESP and creationism, consistently correlated with intuitive belief-basis 
and thinking style.  These findings were consistent inside and outside of the 
laboratory, and are consistent with similar associations between these types of topics 
and belief-basis and thinking style that are found in the wider literature (e.g. Aarnio & 
Lindeman, 2005; Clarke, 1995; Epstein et al., 1996; Irwin & Young, 2002; King et al., 
2007; Wolfradt et al., 1999).  The findings therefore support the model’s premise that 
beliefs are formed via different processes resulting in different belief-basis, the first 
step in the path-dependent model. 
However, combined with the lack of an effect at the point of belief change, the findings 
of the present research programme collectively present strong support for the existence 
of an asymmetry in the process of belief formation and change.  This presents a clear 
refutation of the proposed path-dependency model and that of Griffin and Ohlsson 
(2001), but it also poses a substantial explanatory challenge to other theories, as will be 
seen throughout the rest of this chapter.  For example, Sperber (1997) proposed a 
sequential dual-process theory. As a sequential process, belief formation and change 
maps approximately onto Sperber’s process: beliefs are first formed and then reflected 
upon and potentially changed.  Sperber specifically saw this as a relatively low-level 
process, with beliefs always initially formed for intuitive reasons and then later 
reflected upon and rational belief formed (or the intuitive belief discarded).  However, 
there is no specific deadline on when the rational reflection must occur and the 
interaction found in Study 6 indicated that this reflection might occur sometime later – 
specifically beliefs formed from intuitive material and then disconfirmed by rational 
material showed the largest reduction in belief.  On the other hand, this particular 
interaction was an exploratory finding with a number of caveats.  For example, it is 
unclear why this effect was not detected in the intervention studies, which presented 
rational disconfirming material on ESP to participants who had a general tendency to 
believe in ESP for intuitive reasons. This should have shown a detectable effect if 
rational information is indeed the best way to reduce intuitively formed beliefs.  
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Therefore applying Sperber’s account to a longer-term, higher-level process of belief 
formation and change, may be overstretching its domain of usefulness within the dual-
process sphere. 
However, a dual-process account that has been successfully used in relation to 
thinking styles and belief, such as belief in the paranormal, is CEST (Cognitive 
Experiential-Self Theory - Epstein, 1994; Epstein, Denes-Raj, & Pacini, 2016; Epstein et 
al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999).  CEST provides the Rational Experiential Inventory as 
a measure of rational and intuitive thinking styles.  This is a questionnaire measure 
relying upon self-reports about thinking style preferences.  Nevertheless, it does seem 
to do well in predicting susceptibility to thinking errors, which dissociate from actual 
thinking ability, and therefore appears to present a valid measure of thinking style.  
Interestingly, however, the findings from the measure are that the two styles are 
independent; a person can be high or low in both.  Belief in paranormal phenomena 
specifically correlates with higher scoring on intuitive thinking style and not with 
lower scoring on rational thinking style.  This is a different approach than many 
theories, which tend to assume a continuum from intuitive to rational.  In terms of the 
present research programme CEST has no problem explaining the findings at the point 
of belief formation.  From the perspective of CEST, greater belief in ESP would be 
associated with both intuitive belief-basis and thinking style, as demonstrated in 
previous research with the REI in relation to paranormal belief.  However, the lack of a 
similar differential effect of material at the point of belief change (Study 6) is more 
difficult for CEST to explain. 
With respect to CEST, and more generally, thinking styles are generally considered to 
be traits that would be stable upon retest, certainly over a relatively short period such 
as a few weeks or months, let alone the few minutes that can be assumed to have 
elapsed in Study 6.  Due to the independence of the two types of thinking style that 
CEST proposes (people can be high or low in either), there is the potential for 
shoehorning many different explanations for any given set of findings.  However, since 
CEST focuses on consistent thinking style preferences the prediction it makes is that 
processing at the point of belief change will follow the same thinking style preferences 
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as at the point of belief formation.   For example, even if existing belief is taken into 
account, it would be processed via the same thinking styles; a person who believes in 
ESP for intuitive reasons is likely to have formed that belief due to a preference for 
intuitive thinking style.  Therefore when encountering rational disconfirmation they 
would be evaluating their present belief information (intuitive basis) against the 
disconfirming information (rational basis), which would give preference to the 
existing, intuitive information.  Indeed, a study by Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) 
demonstrated the power of intuitive thinking processes over rational information 
when people failed to make the optimal choice in a jellybean selection task.  Despite 
fully understanding that the odds were against them, they still felt that they had more 
chance with the suboptimal (larger jar of jellybeans), and went ahead and followed 
their intuition rather than the rational base-rate information, that the smaller jar of 
beans had a higher percentage of ‘winning’ beans.  If people are liable to such biases in 
the extremely tame task of picking jellybeans from a jar, then it would be surprising if 
the effect were not present when they evaluate more deeply rooted intuitive beliefs 
against rational disconfirming material, if beliefs are indeed reevaluated in the way 
suggested above for the CEST account. 
A different approach is provided by Lieberman’s X/C Systems (Lieberman, 2007; 
Lieberman et al., 2004; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006).  Neuroscientific evidence suggests 
that intuitive and rational processing may actually take place in different parts of the 
brain, with some evidence that rational processing is generally only present in 
evolutionarily more recent parts of the brain (see the General Background chapter on 
this point).  This particular account therefore aligns with the path-dependent model of 
belief change, since the implication is that beliefs processed by different thinking 
processes are physically processed by different parts of the brain.  Therefore such 
beliefs are highly likely to have greater likelihood of being encoded in those parts of 
the brain or have stronger associations to them.  This is very similar to the assumption 
of the path-dependent model, but in a more concrete physical form.  However, as 
already noted, the present study programme did not support the path-dependent 
model, which fared well at explaining the findings at belief formation, but failed 
entirely to explain the findings at belief change.  Unfortunately, being a further 
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restricted specialisation of the assumptions of the path-dependent model, the X/C 
Systems model is also unable to explain the asymmetry between belief formation and 
change that was found in the current research programme. 
Kahneman (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1974, 2002) also presents a 
systems-based theory.  Although the theory does not specify a particular underlying 
physical incarnation, it still suffers from the same explanatory challenge as 
Lieberman’s X/C Systems, however.  In contrast, Stanovich and West (2008b) present a 
systems-agnostic, types-based approach, based upon the observation that the brain 
may not be as clearly demarcated into ‘systems’ as might be supposed from 
neuroscience studies.  This aside, however, the theory is largely similar to other dual-
process theories, apart from the key concept of ‘mindware’.  Stanovich argues that 
when people form beliefs in things like paranormal phenomena, they do so because of 
mindware gaps.  This is especially so if the belief is formed for intuitive reasons.  The 
rationale being that if people have the appropriate mindware then their beliefs will be 
more normatively aligned.  Stanovich’s mindware concept includes thinking skills, but 
it is less clear whether it is possible to acquire mindware that works to activate those 
skills.  Certainly based upon the present findings this would need to be the case, since 
tendency to inhibit intuitive processing was associated with lower belief in ESP, 
creationism, and afterlife, but with higher belief in the theory of evolution.  Since 
thinking skills per se are known to dissociate from their application then part of the 
missing mindware must include one or more Type-2 activation ‘apps’ (i.e. activation of 
rational thinking; whereas Type-1 equates to intuitive thinking). 
One explanation for the overall lack of a path-dependent effect then, is that participants 
in the current study programme lacked the Type-2 activation mindware to activate 
critical thinking to prevent forming intuitive beliefs in ESP.  However, when presented 
with rational disconfirming material they did not need the Type-2 activation mindware 
and therefore there was no difference in belief change regardless of belief-basis. In 
other words, a greater tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking (thanks to Type-2 
activation mindware) leads to lower levels of intuitive beliefs, but has no impact upon 
processing of rational disconfirming material as the Type-2 activation mindware is not 
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required in that scenario.  However, this explanation falls short of explaining why 
Study 6 found no differential effect of material type at belief change.  The theory of 
mindware gaps predicts that possessing mindware that avoids intuitive thinking 
pitfalls should lead to less influence from intuitive material regardless of whether it is 
presented at the belief formation or change stages of the belief process.  However, 
while Study 6 demonstrated a mindware effect at belief formation, no such effect was 
found at belief change. 
An important factor included in the present study programme was inhibition and in 
the above discussion this was incarnated the guise of one of Stanovich’s mindware 
apps, the Type-2 activation app.  However, this is not the only kind of cueing proposed 
in dual-process accounts.  Another type is external cueing of the type of processing to 
use.  In this case, the cueing can be said to be embedded within the environment or 
situation.  Indeed, Järvilehto (2015) goes as far as to suggest referring to the 
environment as System-3 in an extension of Kahneman’s systems theory.  Direct 
evidence for the task cueing hypothesis was provided in a study by Inbar et al. (2010), 
which found that situational factors, in this case features of the task, cued either 
rational or intuitive processing in choice tasks.  They found that when the task was 
presented with precision or as part of a sequence (as described below), that this 
triggered rational thinking on tasks that normally yield thinking errors due to reliance 
upon intuitive thinking.  These tasks were based upon the ratio-bias phenomenon, 
already mentioned in relation to jellybean selection, but also in relation to ambiguity-
avoidance.  The latter is similar to the jellybean selection task, but where one of the 
bowls is covered.  Although the hidden bowl is described such that participants can 
always tell it has higher odds of winning, participants tend to choose the visible bowl 
because of an intuitive preference to avoid the ambiguity of the covered bowl.  
However, describing the contents of the bowls using precise language, instead of less 
precise language, reversed the effect and participants tended to pick from the hidden 
bowl.  Similarly, the normal effect was reversed when the ratio-bias task was presented 
as the first in a sequence of tasks towards winning a prize, rather than as the one and 
only step.  Findings such as these suggest that people may be externally cued to use 
rational or intuitive thinking. 
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External cueing would therefore be expected to work in combination with the internal 
cueing demonstrated in the present study programme.  External task cueing from the 
rational material presented in the interventions would put all participants in the 
intervention studies on an even footing in terms of applying critical thinking skills.   
Additional internal tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking would be unlikely to have 
much additional effect in this scenario, thus explaining the robust absence of a 
differential effect at belief change in the intervention studies in the research 
programme: participants would be processing the rational material in the same way 
regardless of the basis for their belief in ESP or their thinking style. 
This raises the possibility that Griffin and Ohlsson’s (2001) original findings of a 
correlation between self-predicted belief change and belief-basis were in fact valid.  
This would be the case if self-reports of belief change were accessing self-knowledge of 
thinking style preferences (as are self-reported in the REI, for example - Epstein, 1994; 
Epstein et al., 1996), but were understandably not taking situational cueing into 
account – without the situational cueing then perhaps participants would have 
behaved in line with Griffin and Ohlsson’s original findings.   This idea has face 
validity and would mean a complete turnaround of the previous advice given in this 
thesis on the use of self-predicted belief change in research studies.  Therefore an 
exploratory analysis was conducted on the data from Study 2, which included both the 
CRT5 and the self-prediction question. However, results of a bivariate correlation 
analysis did not provide a convincing correlation between inhibition and self-predicted 
of belief-change.  The correlations varied widely from rho = -.074 for ESP to .221 for 
evolution.  P-values ranged from .489 for ESP to .038 for evolution (for opposites p = 
.049).  Considering the exploratory nature of the analyses, the associated family-wise 
error-rate (not taken into account in the above), and the sheer inconsistency of the 
results across the topics, the results do not present a case for self-predicted belief 
change tapping into self-knowledge of thinking style preferences.  
Returning to the task cueing hypothesis then, it has been demonstrated, in Study 6 of 
the present research programme, that belief formation can occur due to different types 
of materials.  Logically then, in the real world if a particular type of material tends to 
General Discussion      220 
be present at the formation of belief in particular topics, such as ESP or evolutionary 
theory, then that material acts as a cue for people to use a particular type of thinking, 
which will in turn lead to the observed correlations with belief-basis in the literature.  
For example, evolutionary theory is most likely encountered via rational material, such 
as textbooks or educational classes, and is therefore likely to be associated with a 
rational belief-basis, whereas belief in ESP is more likely to form due to personal 
experience or hearing a story of someone else’s experience (Clarke, 1995). However, in 
the case of ESP belief, when task cueing fails to cue rational thinking people will still 
have access to an internal tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking, which varies from 
person to person.  In this situation, thinking style will be observed to correlate with 
beliefs that tend to be formed intuitively, such as belief in ESP, or paranormal 
phenomena more generally.  This is indeed what is found in the literature and in the 
present research programme.  It also explains the finding in Study 6 that at belief 
formation rational material had a greater effect than intuitive material, contrary to 
predictions.  Combining internal inhibition tendencies and external cueing, the rational 
material would be processed equally rationally by everyone, but the intuitive material 
would only be processed rationally by those with a greater internal tendency to inhibit 
intuitive thinking, thus reducing the effect of the intuitive material, but having no 
impact upon the rational material. 
However, while this combination of inhibition and cueing provides an elegant 
explanation for many of the findings, it leaves open the question of why there was no 
differential influence of material type at the point of belief change.  Indeed, regardless 
of the theories examined, so far this is a finding that has been challenging to explain.  
The idea that material is processed differently or has different degrees of effect is not a 
difficult one to support from the present study or wider literature.  However, the 
inhibition and cueing accounts do not predict the observed asymmetry in belief 
formation and change that was found in Study 6.  If internal tendency to inhibit 
intuitive thinking reduces the persuasiveness of intuitive material then this effect 
should be seen wherever such material is encountered, including at the point of belief 
change.  Therefore the account predicts that when exposed to intuitive disconfirming 
material participants should have shown a lesser belief reduction effect in comparison 
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to exposure to rational disconfirming material.  However, there was no difference 
observed between the two types of material at belief change and nor was there any 
correlation of belief change with inhibition for either type of material.  Once again, the 
findings resolutely decline to provide any individual differences relating to belief 
change, while simultaneously providing robust differences in relation to belief 
formation.  These findings bear replication, of course, as this particular asymmetry 
comes from a single study.  But, assuming that it is valid, this finding from Study 6 
presents a critical implication for explaining belief formation and change.  The 
implication is that it is not possible to explain belief formation and change by only 
looking at the factors external to the belief itself.  That is to say, in order to explain the 
asymmetry the internal nature of the belief itself, its encoding within the brain, needs 
to be taken into account. 
In essence the results present an order effect.  Before belief or disbelief in a topic is 
formed, the persuasiveness of intuitive material will be reduced by an internal 
tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking.  Yet, after this initial exposure, a later exposure 
to similar material will not have its persuasiveness reduced by a tendency to inhibit 
intuitive thinking.  This cannot be explained unless the initial exposure to pro-
phenomenon material has an influence on the processing of the disconfirming material 
encountered later on.  In real world scenarios the only plausible mechanism for this is 
via encoding of the belief itself, which influences how later information can affect it. 
However, for Study 6, which was lab-based there is an alternative possibility, which is 
that the order effect is memory-based.   It may be that the filler task was not sufficiently 
distracting or long enough to prevent in-memory comparisons of the previous 
material.   Indeed, although filler tasks are a common feature in many psychology 
studies, in order to disrupt recall, sometimes the timescales need to be much longer, 
such as the days or weeks used in eyewitness memory research (e.g. Wells et al., 2000).  
Clearly this particular issue would require further study in order to determine if this 
explains the present findings. 
However, invalidation of the filler time-gap in Study 6, would not completely nullify 
the programme-wide conclusion that taking account of internal encoding of beliefs is 
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required to explain belief formation and change.  The wider literature also supports 
this idea.  For example, Edwards (1990) found that affect-based beliefs were more 
readily changed by affect-based disconfirmation.  This requires that there is something 
encoded or associated with the belief itself that led to the beliefs being more 
changeable when exposed to affect-based disconfirmation later on.  Of course, the 
encoding itself may differ in affect-based beliefs from those in the present study and 
the interaction between encoding and material may differ, but the core point remains.  
While the specific incarnation of the path-dependent model tested in this thesis may 
not be valid, the basic motivating premise of the path-dependency model appears to 
hold true: beliefs are stored differently depending upon how they are formed and this 
affects later belief change. 
Considering Other Accounts of Belief Formation and Change 
The main alternatives to dual-process accounts of belief formation come from the 
rational actor perspective.  There is a large body of such literature demonstrating that, 
to all intents and purposes, people are essentially rational actors, making normative 
judgments in so far as ability and information quality allow.  Indeed, Study 6 in the 
present programme found a general effect of rational pro-phenomenon material 
having a greater influence on belief than intuitive material did, thus indicating that 
people have a general tendency to thinking rationally, the lesser influence of intuitive 
material being explainable, in purely rational actor terms, as due to it not providing as 
much rational information that could be processed and thus not being as informative 
for making a judgment.  Similarly, the rational actor account can explain why there 
were no individual differences at belief change in the intervention studies: everyone 
was processing rational material equally.  In fact, this is also the conclusion that the 
combined inhibition and cueing account provided earlier in this chapter, except that 
under that account rational thinking is not always active and requires cueing.  This is 
an important difference between the two accounts, which greatly limits the application 
of the rational actor explanation to the findings of the research programme.  Research 
on beliefs from the rational actor perspective typically presents participants with 
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rational material on the basis of which to form and modify beliefs and then finds that 
participants tend to think rationally. 
According to the inhibition and cueing account this is a case of finding what one is 
looking for by being careful to look in the place where it can most certainly be found.  
The inhibition and cueing account predicts that if people encounter only rational 
material then they will always apply rational thinking processes due to situational 
cueing, as was seen in Study 6 at belief formation, and in the intervention studies at 
belief change.  However, when one looks in other places, where other types of 
information can be found, people become less rational.  Therefore, at the point of belief 
formation the rational actor account can explain why different types of material would 
result in differences in belief levels, but it cannot account for the differences in belief-
basis, nor the association with thinking style, the latter being an oxymoron in terms of 
the rational actor perspective, since people are all deemed to have a rational thinking 
style, only differing in ability and quality of information.  Furthermore, at the point of 
belief change the lack of a differential effect from material type, once again poses a 
theoretical challenge.  The general rational actor account does not explain why 
processing of the same type of information would change from one time point to the 
next.  Again, this explanatory challenge comes from the order effect present in the 
current findings in addition to the belief-basis and thinking style effects.  The present 
research therefore adds weight to existing literature on the limitations of the rational 
actor programme, at least with respect to belief formation and change. 
However, the rational actor literature is diverse and there are models that propose 
ways of taking into account things like order effects.  For example, the type of 
information used to form a belief may influence the type of information that is more 
likely to change it.  For example, Paik et al. (2009) found that beliefs formed via 
category-level information were more likely to change in response to category-level 
disconfirmation.  This requires that the beliefs are encoded with association to 
category-level information and the theory is that this then means information 
encountered later needs to be of a similar kind in order to best disrupt and modify the 
existing associations.  Otherwise new associations, such as individual-level 
General Discussion      224 
information, are only being added alongside the existing category-level associations, or 
even being dismissed without integration; either way leading to a reduced amount of 
belief change. 
However, while this type of model takes order effects into account, it is nevertheless 
unable to explain the present body of findings.  Firstly, the differential effect of 
material at belief formation must be taken as an indication that there is some kind of 
difference in the information being presented (the exact difference need not be 
specified) and therefore some difference in the encoding of beliefs.  Furthermore, 
according to rational actor models, degree of belief should be dependent upon the 
quality of the information rather than the surface presentation of it.  However, if it is 
assumed that the lower quality information (the intuitive material) actually acts as a 
proxy for a different type of information, then a path-dependent effect would be 
predicted, similar to the one predicted by the dual-process path-dependency model.  
However, this was not found to be the case when the type of material at belief change 
was varied.  Similar limitations also hold true for Bleile’s (2014) prior experiences 
account of belief change.  Bleile argues that in the real world there is an incredible 
amount of information and that this therefore needs filtering, and the way this is done 
is via prior experiences directing current focus on available information.  However, it is 
unclear why there would be no differences at the point of belief change when 
evaluation of material at this point would be shaped by the previous experience at the 
point of belief formation.  Moreover, as with all rational actor models, there is the 
difficulty explaining associations of beliefs with thinking style. 
Moving on from a purely rational actor approach, a popular class of explanations for 
belief formation and change are the deficits models.  These accounts take the view that 
non-normative beliefs are held due to deficits in knowledge and/or thinking skill – i.e. 
deficits of rationality (Ahteensuu, 2011; Alcock, 2018; Ko, 2016; Lilienfeld et al., 2012; 
Lilienfeld et al., 2009; Simis et al., 2016).  Both exceptionalist and inoculationist 
accounts gain some support from the present programme.  In the exceptionalist 
account differences in beliefs are thought to be due to differences in knowledge.  
Experts believe one thing and the public believes another because the public has a 
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knowledge deficit in comparison to the experts, who have exceptional knowledge in 
the topics of relevance.  This account received some robust support from the 
intervention studies in the present research programme.  At no point were there any 
individual differences found at belief change and the material presented was very 
much knowledge-based, as is typically the case in such university lectures and courses.  
As argued in Study 5 there is also potential evidence for a dose-response effect, as 
predicted by a knowledge-deficit hypothesis – a longer intervention should impart 
more knowledge, closing the knowledge gap further than a shorter intervention, and 
thereby reducing belief by a greater amount as well.  Technically, of course, the 
exceptionalist account does not concern itself with how a belief was formed.  The focus 
is on belief change and it is assumed that beliefs are of like kind once formed (Alcock, 
2018).  However, this does mean that this model on its own is an insufficient 
explanation of the asymmetry found in the present programme.  Pairing it with its 
counterpart, the inoculationist view, may therefore prove beneficial. 
Indeed the inoculationist account, that belief formation can be inoculated against in the 
first place (e.g. Alcock, 2018; Lilienfeld et al., 2012; Lilienfeld et al., 2009), also finds 
support from the present research programme.  Consistently across the study series 
belief in ESP was associated with a more intuitive belief-basis, which was taken as a 
proxy for the mechanism of belief formation.  Similar association was also found 
between thinking style and belief in ESP (apart from Study 4).  And in Study 6, a more 
rational thinking style was found to help avoid forming beliefs based upon intuitive 
material.  All of this suggests that non-normative belief formation can be inoculated 
against if people can acquire relevant thinking skills and tendencies.  Taking a pure 
inoculationist view one can agree that the account would explain the differences at 
belief formation.  After this, once inoculation has had its effect, there is no further effect 
to be had when encountering additional material; if inoculation fails at belief formation 
then the same level of inoculation will fail later as well.  Besides, beyond this point it 
would no longer be inoculation and the exceptionalist account must be drawn upon.  
Indeed, this combination works well as an explanatory account across most of the 
study series, but once again the thorn in the side of this combined account is the lack of 
a differential effect of material at the point of belief change.  Neither inoculationism nor 
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exceptionalism specify underlying mechanisms and in that sense they are immune to 
the issue, but at the same time this also means they fail to fully explain the results.  It 
may be that the combined account is true, but there are important explanatory details 
missing regarding why one account applies at belief formation and the other at belief 
change.  And moreover, why this should be so even after a very short time period, 
which is clearly not enough to deeply encode a belief. 
Once again, then, the order effect presents a problem for theories that suppose that 
beliefs are all encoded equally.  These types of theories explain the findings of the 
intervention studies, with just one kind of disconfirming material, but are not able to 
explain the findings when multiple types of disconfirming material are used.  Non-
rational actor accounts that deny underlying differences between types of belief once 
formed include Alcock (2018) and Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011).  While Alcock 
very directly acknowledges that beliefs may be formed via exposure to different 
materials, he states equally clearly that beliefs are all formed in the same way and 
therefore they are the same thing at their core.  In this light, while people may report 
different belief-basis scores or score differently on measures of thinking style, the 
beliefs that are actually formed are nevertheless of the same kind beneath their surface 
features.  This applies as much to belief in evolution as it does to belief in ESP.  
However, the asymmetry in belief formation and change is harder to explain in this 
way.  By treating beliefs as encoded in the same way regardless of the route to their 
creation, Alcock’s account is unable to reconcile the non-effect of material type at belief 
change with the differential effect of material and thinking style at belief formation. 
Similarly, Kruglanski and Gigerenzer’s (2011) theoretical paper focuses upon the 
processing of information in different ways, but their focus is only on single judgments 
rather than sequential ones.  In line with Gigerenzer’s idea of ‘bounded rationality’, 
heuristics used during intuitive thinking are in fact a form of highly optimal, 
condensed learning, providing ‘rational’ responses in suitable situations, thanks to 
being ‘learned’ over a lengthy evolutionary period.  They go further in this instance, 
however, arguing that ultimately intuitive and rational thinking are, in fact, subject to 
the same underlying rules.  By extension, this means that beliefs formed via either 
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intuitive or rational thinking will be of the same kind.  However, as with Alcock’s 
account, and others discussed in this chapter, this means that the asymmetry found in 
the present research programme cannot be explained. 
One alternative type of explanation that does take account of the encoding of beliefs is 
the existence of defence mechanisms.  The type of backfire effect this engenders (e.g. 
Betsch & Sachse, 2013) can be compared to the kind of defence that one would make to 
a physical attack.  When one’s deeply held beliefs are attacked, the instinct is to protect 
them.  The stronger the attack, the stronger the defence, potentially even causing the 
attack to backfire and beliefs to strengthen in the face of disconfirming evidence.  This 
kind of effect is found after the failure of end-of-world predictions made by cults, for 
example (Russell & Jones, 1980).  Their adherents commonly believe the teachings of 
the cult even more strongly than before.  This type of explanation can also fit alongside 
other accounts, such as exceptionalism, to help explain anomalous results in response 
to disconfirming material. 
However, the problem that defence-based theories face in explaining the present 
findings is that they focus on explaining resistance to change from deeply rooted and 
strongly held beliefs.  These theories could be applied to outlying cases in the 
intervention studies, since there the beliefs were naturalistically formed, and therefore 
potentially deeply rooted and strongly held.  However, this type of theory clearly does 
not apply to the findings of Study 6, in which absolute belief levels were actually very 
low (around 20 on the 100-point scale), therefore arguably not what would count as 
‘belief’ that needed defending.  Yet, the same asymmetry in belief formation and 
change was found as was found in the intervention studies.  It is difficult for defence-
based theories to reconcile the similarity in results between minimal changes to low 
levels of belief and similar changes to real world, potentially, deeply rooted and long 
held beliefs.  At best such theories must be considered outside of their sphere of 
relevance in relation to the findings of the present research programme. 
In summary then, there are a number of potential explanations for belief formation and 
change in the literature.  While some do a good job of explaining elements of the 
present findings they all fail to explain the body of findings as a whole.  This is true 
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even when theoretical accounts are combined, such as inoculationism and 
exceptionalism, or in the previous section the combination of inhibition and cueing.  
Typically, these explanatory failures are due to the need to take encoding of beliefs into 
account, or failing to account for the encoding in a way that explains the observed 
results.  This challenging data comes in large part from Study 6, which was a single 
study within a single research programme, and therefore bears replication.  However, 
pending failure to replicate, theoretical accounts of belief formation and change 
arguably need to take encoding into account in order to fully explain the belief process.  
The present chapter will now turn to discussion of the findings in relation to thinking 
style and belief-basis more generally, before applying the findings and theoretical ideas 
to paranormal belief. 
Thinking Style & Belief-Basis 
The general background chapter to this thesis began with a discussion of what belief is 
and the need to operationalise it for the purpose of research.  The conclusion was that 
belief is a person’s assertion about the state of the world or some part of it and that this 
assertion may vary in the degree of confidence with which it is held.  Indeed, the 
present research has upheld the notion that beliefs are a matter of degree rather than 
all or nothing.  Participants’ belief ratings tended to spread across the whole of the 
rating scales being used.  Furthermore, belief change recorded was very much a shift in 
belief rather than a wholesale change of sign, from belief to disbelief or vice versa.  This 
was perhaps best highlighted in Study 6, which used a 100-point sliding scale from 
disbelief to belief.  Observed changes in belief were small, but nonetheless detectable.  
Belief ratings were at the low end of the scale (at around 20) and there were no 
sweeping changes to the opposite end of the scale after pro-phenomenon material.  
And after sceptical material the belief reduction was of similar magnitude to initial 
belief formation increase from baseline.  This adds empirical weight to what is already 
assumed in most of the literature on belief formation and change and in some case 
specifically stated by researchers (Hample, 1979; Politzer & Carles, 2001). 
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The possibility of a dose response effect was also cautiously suggested in Study 5, 
supporting Ghose et al.’s (2004) contention that belief change is a step-wise process, 
since over the course of a longer intervention a greater number of belief change steps 
could occur.  Indeed, the step-wise nature of belief change is particularly well 
demonstrated in Study 6 due to the fine-grained measure that was used.  It was not 
expected that strong belief would be induced by vignettes and it was anticipated that 
changes in belief would also be small, so a 100-point scale was used to provide a more 
sensitive measure.  A striking finding was that even though these belief ratings were 
below the threshold of what might be considered belief in a topic (50 would be neutral 
and the mean rating was around 20), the relative changes in belief followed the same 
patterns as seen in the naturalistic studies.  Therefore, not only did the small changes 
illustrate step-wise belief change, but they also demonstrated that belief/disbelief is a 
continuum along which the cognitive processes involved are consistent; the types of 
processing applied do not switch kind when crossing between belief and disbelief.  Of 
course, the beliefs were not generally at the extremes so it may well be that at some 
point something similar to the backfire effect would be observed (e.g. Betsch & Sachse, 
2013). 
Another key aspect of belief raised in the general background chapter was type of 
belief.  The research programme provided strong evidence for this notion also, in line 
with Griffin and Ohlsson’s (Griffin, 2008; Griffin & Ohlsson, 2001) original findings.  
Beliefs in different topics tended to show a belief profile, with reasons for belief being 
more rationally or intuitively based.  While the topic of ‘opposites attract’ showed 
some variability across the studies, this is not a major problem for the notion of belief-
basis, since it should be expected that belief-basis ranges along the continuum and 
some topics may fall in the middle, thus showing no clear intuitive/rational basis, 
perhaps switching sign readily between different sample groups.  However, most 
salient to the present research programme, it was consistently found that belief in ESP 
and afterlife were associated with a more intuitive belief-basis, which agrees with the 
literature on belief-basis for paranormal beliefs in general  (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; 
Boden et al., 2012; Clarke, 1995; Irwin & Young, 2002; Wolfradt et al., 1999). 
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Finally, in relation to belief, one of the underlying assumptions of the study was that 
there are different mechanisms involved in the formation of different beliefs.  Indeed, 
this assumption underpinned the theoretical predictions about belief-basis in the path-
dependency model.  For the most part belief-basis was therefore used as a proxy for 
the underlying mechanism of belief formation.  However, correlation between thinking 
style (tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking) and belief, and thinking style and belief-
basis in the intervention studies, helped to provide a less circular rationale for the 
proxy use of belief-basis.  Nevertheless, Study 6 did away with the use of self-reported 
belief-basis entirely and investigated the point of belief formation directly.  In doing so 
it was demonstrated that thinking style did have the expected effect on the processing 
of intuitive material: a tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking made the intuitive 
material less persuasive.  The unexpected finding was that rational material was more 
influential on belief formation.  Nevertheless, the findings demonstrate that the 
mechanisms involved in belief are indeed important to study.  
The asymmetry in relation to belief change presents a different kind of theoretical 
challenge, of course, and is discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter.  Indeed, 
the asymmetry was robust across the study series, with belief-basis correlations at 
belief formation being as robust as the lack of an association at belief change.  There is 
always the risk, however, that self-reports are inaccurate.  As noted, this was controlled 
for in Study 6 by directly manipulating the material via which belief was formed.  
However, this is not practical in naturalistic studies, such as the intervention studies in 
the present programme.  It would therefore be useful to test the hypothesis that belief-
basis is accurately self-reported.  For example, using the Affect Misattribution 
Procedure (Payne et al., 2005) demonstrated a dissociation between self-reported racial 
attitudes and implicitly measured racial attitudes, for participants who were motivated 
to express positive views even if their real views might differ (as measured by the 
Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale).  This or a similar test, such as the 
Semantic Misattribution Procedure (Imhoff, Schmidt, Bernhardt, Dierksmeier, & Banse, 
2011), which extends the IAT, could be used to evaluate the reliability of self-reported 
belief-basis.  The SMP, for example, works on the principle that participants 
misattribute associations triggered by a prime stimulus (typically a picture), projecting 
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them on to a neutral target (such as a Chinese ideograph), which they are asked to 
make a semantic judgment about.  In short, the priming stimulus colours participants’ 
evaluation of the neutral target and depending upon the association that a participant 
makes with the stimulus their evaluation of the target varies similarly (see also: A. G. 
Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Anthony G. Greenwald, Uhlmann, 
Poehlman, & Banaji, 2009; Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 
2002; Payne et al., 2005).  A similar approach could even be taken when measuring 
belief in a topic if the time is available to do so. 
In terms of critical thinking skills, a common finding in the literature relating to non-
normative beliefs and thinking errors is the dissociation between having critical 
thinking skills and applying them (e.g. Blackmore, 1997; Dagnall et al., 2007; Ferreira et 
al., 2006; Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005; Royalty, 1995; Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008b).  
Instead, thinking style has been found to be a better predictor of beliefs such as belief 
in ESP, and of susceptibility to thinking errors, such as the conjunction fallacy (Epstein 
et al., 2016; Tversky & Kahneman, 2002).  This is particularly interesting as it suggests 
that simply learning to think critically is not enough and that one must also learn to 
apply critical thinking.  The findings of the present study add further support to this 
area of literature via the association found between inhibition and belief in ESP, 
amongst other topics.  Apart from Study 4, the programme as a whole found that a 
greater tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking was associated with lower levels of belief 
in ESP.  Moreover, Study 6 showed that greater tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking 
reduced the persuasiveness of intuitive material, while doing nothing to enhance 
persuasiveness of rational material.  This therefore offers a more direct demonstration: 
within the same sample people processed rational material the same way, arguably 
using rational thinking skills, but processed intuitive material differently depending 
upon individual differences in thinking style.  The implication is that people’s thinking 
skills did not vary, but their style of thinking did. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter this also explains the belief-basis observations in 
this area of the literature, and adds weight to the use of belief-basis as a proxy for belief 
formation mechanism in the present study programme.  Indeed, this particular finding, 
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from Study 6, also provides support for the area of literature associating the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) with inhibition of intuitive thinking (measured in the 
present programme by the CRT5 – see Study 4).  The finding can be interpreted as 
relatively direct evidence that people were inhibiting the intuitive processing cued by 
the intuitive pro-phenomenon material, since it did not have an enhancement effect on 
rational material.   This is particularly notable in light of the failure of any of the 
studies to validate the CRT5 (or original CRT) against carefully selected validation 
items, relating to delay of financial gain.  The Study 6 finding therefore adds an 
important element of construct validity to the CRT5 within the context of the present 
research programme, adding to its existing, strong face validity.  The fact that the 
original CRT itself failed to validate is also of interest, since it has been validated by a 
number of other researchers (e.g. Frederick, 2005; Oechssler et al., 2009).  The reasons 
behind the failure to validate CRT in the present studies would therefore need further 
investigation. 
Something not investigated in the present study, however, is the possibility of 
differences within the concept of intuitive belief-basis itself.  The programme treated 
belief-basis as a continuum and those on each side of the intuitive/rational divide as 
members of homogenous groups.  However, this may be an incorrect assumption.  
Firstly, Sappington (1990) demonstrated, across 6 studies that intellectual and 
emotional beliefs could be independently induced.  This included ‘warm forming’ (or 
spoon bending), an alleged psychokinetic phenomenon, where people believe they are 
bending metal objects with their minds.  It was found that the beliefs even influenced 
participants’ ratings of how likely they would be to take part in a warm forming party.  
As the present study showed, self-predictions of future behaviour may be unreliable.  
Nevertheless, Sappington’s studies demonstrated very clearly that affect-based beliefs 
can be induced.  In this sense, this is replicating the robust finding of the present study, 
as ESP was consistently rated as a more intuitively-based belief. 
However, Edwards (1990) took this further.  Similarly to Study 6 in the present 
programme he looked at both points in the belief process: formation and change.  
However, the focus was specifically on affect-based beliefs.  The result was a path-
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dependent effect for affect-based beliefs, but not for intellectually based beliefs.  
Obviously, the intervention studies in the present programme only presented rational 
disconfirming material, so could not test Edwards’ claims.  However, Study 6 did 
provide different types of material at belief change and the findings were contrary to 
Edwards’.  This raises the question of whether affect-based beliefs are different from 
intuitive-based beliefs more generally.  Edwards induced affect-based beliefs 
subliminally with a priming and association task using Chinese ideographs.  This 
meant that the induced affect was relatively subtle.  Similarly, the present study did 
not use high valence material, suggesting that a difference in valence does not explain 
the differences in the findings.  Edwards does not mention any use of filler tasks, 
although the emotional priming element acted as filler between the textual material 
(fabricated expert views on a Chinese ideograph drawing).  Timescales were similar to 
Study 6, however, and therefore there is apparently no substantial difference in this 
respect between the two studies.  This leads to the conclusion that future research on 
belief-basis should be precise about what type of intuitive belief-basis is being studied 
so that the appropriate comparisons with existing findings and theory can be made. 
Of course, such a difference raises theoretical challenges as well.  The obvious answer 
to this would be that affect is encoded differently from other intuitive processing.  The 
present research programme specifically did not rely upon affect being present in 
intuitive material or belief-basis, nor did Griffin and Ohlsson (Griffin, 2008; Griffin & 
Ohlsson, 2001).  However, it may be that this operationalisation of intuitive thinking is 
too broad and that ‘intuitive’ should not include ‘affect’, or that subtypes should be 
separated out.  Replication of the Study 6 findings would be required before this 
suggestion can be followed up seriously.  However, even if the two types were to 
separate then the implications for the findings of the present programme would seem 
likely to still hold true.  There would need to be some modification to the belief-basis 
measure to avoid confounding the two types of belief-basis, but Study 6 obtained 
similar findings at belief formation, without any affect-based confounds.  This indicates 
that the intervention study findings would also be likely to remain as they currently 
are. 
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Finally, Morley and Walker (1987) touch upon a combination of factors not addressed 
in the present research programme, but likely to be incidentally present in it.  This is 
potentially important for future research and replications (Brandt et al., 2014).  Morley 
and Walker presented participants with excerpts from a fictitious trial transcript where 
a police officer was giving evidence in a road traffic accident case involving two 
people.  Initially they read information about one of the participants, that he had either 
been drinking or speeding, and then rated how likely they thought it was that he was 
at fault in the accident.  They then read some testimony from the police officer, which 
was manipulated in terms of importance, plausibility, and novelty.  They then rated 
again how likely they thought it was that the person was responsible for the accident.  
Despite this giving a complex 2x2x2x2 design, the results were remarkably clear that 
belief change only occurred when all three factors were high: information that was 
high in importance, plausibility, and novelty led to belief change, but information low 
in one of these areas did not lead to belief change. 
With respect to the present research programme belief change was certainly evident, 
other than in Study 3.  The implication is therefore that importance, novelty, and 
plausibility were all high.  Arguably, for first year undergraduates much of the 
anomalistic psychology lecture material would be novel, and one would assume 
plausible due to its rational nature.  Final year students might not find the information 
so novel, however, reducing the effect (although see Study 5 for discussion of possible 
dose-response effect).  The importance of such intervention material for participants is 
harder to judge, however, but as it was delivered in an educational setting it might be 
seen as being important.  Study 6, also arguably fulfils the novelty and plausibility 
factors (the latter being an explicit requirement for the vignettes).  Meanwhile, 
importance was indicated at the start with the reference to the potential use in police 
work, so Study 6 would provide a good fit with Morley and Walker’s belief change 
requirements.  It may be that the present programme, and others in the literature, 
incidentally meet these criteria for belief change, while other research does not. Success 
in research on beliefs may therefore need to ensure control of some variables additional 
to those that are the main focus of study.  Variations on Study 6, such as varying 
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importance, novelty, and even plausibility, could be used to determine if this 
requirement is a necessary one. 
In summary, the present research programme adds support to a number of more 
general areas in the literature, including belief-basis, thinking styles, and CRT as a 
measure of inhibition of intuitive thinking.  It also found support for the 
operationalised assumptions about belief used in the programme and implicit in much 
of the literature. However, future research and replication studies should take care to 
consider necessary variables for belief change, and be cautious in assuming rational or 
intuitive beliefs to be two homogenous categories of belief. 
 
Believing and Unbelieving in the Paranormal 
The present research programme has demonstrated that beliefs vary in being held for 
rational or intuitive reasons, and that this difference emerges at the belief formation 
stage due to the nature of the material encountered and the person’s cognitive 
processing style.  However, neither the nature of the material nor the person’s 
cognitive processing style influences belief change.  Belief in paranormal phenomena is 
generally considered to be non-normative due to the lack of credible evidence for the 
reality of such phenomena, and the availability of convincing non-paranormal 
explanations (French, 2014) – although see Cardena (2018) for an example of rational 
type of material that some people may base their belief on.  However, paranormal 
beliefs are widespread (Castro et al., 2014; Goritz & Schumacher, 2000; Haraldsson, 
1985; Rice, 2003) and, despite some evidence of reduced belief in people educated to a 
higher level (e.g. Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005), thinking skills per se are not good 
predictors of belief in this area.  Indeed, this can be likened to the dissociation between 
thinking skills and thinking errors discussed at the start of this thesis, and it is also 
argued that such thinking errors, in fact, underlie formation of a number of paranormal 
beliefs, if not all of them (e.g. Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007).  The idea of widespread 
beliefs that are based upon thinking errors and run counter to the best scientific 
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knowledge, is obviously concerning, due to the fact that people act in the world based 
upon their beliefs about it.  While there is some truth in Kruglanski and Gigerenzer’s 
(2011) argument that non-intuitive thinking processes do not necessarily produce 
inaccurate results, there is clearly a problem when such thinking processes produce 
results that are in contradiction to the body of science.  Since people act on their beliefs 
in the world, it is important that the knowledge gained about belief formation and 
change has some applicability to the real world.  The present section in this chapter 
will therefore relate the understanding gained in the present study to the 
understanding of paranormal belief formation and change more generally. 
The findings from the research programme produced an interesting pattern of results 
that support an inhibition and cueing account of belief formation, which in turn 
explains the results of a broad body of literature on the psychology of paranormal 
belief.  The inhibition and cueing account proposes that the type of material people 
encounter cues people to process it differently, while individual differences in thinking 
style interact with this.  Encountering rational material cues rational thinking and 
encountering intuitive material cues intuitive thinking, but the latter may be modified 
by a person’s tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking.  Overall, due to reduced influence 
from intuitive material, this leads to an averaged tendency for rational material to be 
more persuasive, when the material is encountered on its own (i.e. not in competition 
with intuitive material). 
Initially, this does not appear to explain findings from the literature on paranormal 
belief.  Aside from Schouten (2010), the consistent observation in the literature is that 
paranormal beliefs are associated with intuitive reasons for belief (e.g. Clarke, 1995; 
Griffin, 2008; Griffin & Ohlsson, 2001; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007).  However, imagine 
the kind of scenario in which paranormal beliefs are formed.  According to Clarke 
(1995), the most common reason for belief is personal experience and second to that is 
recounting of an experience by a third party.  A person may experience a hallucination, 
for example, or a case of waking sleep paralysis in which they feel they are being 
attacked by a supernatural being (French, 2014). 
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Waking sleep paralysis is a particularly good example, since it is amenable to 
investigation in sleep laboratories under controlled conditions, including video 
recordings, thus ruling out that the experience was of something real.  In brief, waking 
sleep paralysis is the opposite of sleep walking: in sleep walking the body wakes up 
while the brain stays asleep, whereas in waking sleep paralysis the brain wakes up, but 
the body remains asleep (i.e. unable to move).  This is possible because the mechanisms 
for preventing the body moving during sleep and for the brain actually sleeping are 
different, so on some occasions they can happen independently.  For sufferers of 
waking sleep paralysis, this can be a frightening experience, since the brain tries to 
make sense of the situation in which it finds itself.  In particular, the experiencer may 
feel that there is a heavy weight bearing down on their chest, since during sleep 
breathing is controlled automatically and any conscious attempt to breathe deliberately 
will have no effect.  Experiencers may also experience floating sensations and other 
anomalous feelings unlike those from their day to day life.  The brain, of course, fills in 
the gaps and comes up with a dream-like interpretation of what is happening, except 
that the experience itself feels very real indeed, and not at all like a dream.  After all, 
the person is effectively awake not sleeping.  In this situation, and other situations 
involving anomalous experiences, the person is encountering a wholly intuitive type of 
material.  In this scenario they will therefore be cued to think intuitively and this will 
therefore lead to intuitive reasons for belief rather than rational ones.  Similarly, third 
party accounts of anomalous experiences are also intuitive in nature and will cue 
people to thinking intuitively about them.  Indeed, third party accounts of experience 
were used as the intuitive material in Study 6.  If the kinds of scenarios where 
paranormal beliefs might be formed are scenarios where only intuitive material is 
encountered then people will be situationally cued to think intuitively and thus form 
intuitively-based beliefs.  This explains why the literature on paranormal belief finds 
such a robust association with intuitive belief-basis: rational reasons would require the 
cueing of rational thinking, which in turn would require a scenario in which rational 
material is encountered, which is generally not the case. 
Study 6 also showed something else, however.  It showed that a person’s thinking style 
influences how persuasive the intuitive material is.  So while people might be cued to 
General Discussion      238 
think rationally by a chemistry textbook or other rational material, some people have a 
tendency within themselves to inhibit intuitive thinking even when external, 
situational cueing is absent.  According to the findings of Study 6, this means that the 
persuasiveness of the intuitive material will be reduced and those people with a less 
intuitive thinking style will be less likely to form a belief.  If paranormal belief 
formation is likely to be situated in scenarios that cue intuitive thinking, this individual 
difference in thinking style should show up as an inverse correlation in the research 
literature.  In contrast, intellect and thinking skills would have no bearing on the 
likelihood of belief formation in such a scenario and should be found to dissociate from 
paranormal belief.  These are, indeed, exactly the findings from the body of literature 
on psychology of paranormal beliefs: beliefs tend to be held for intuitive reasons and 
intuitive thinking style is associated with greater levels of belief, while critical thinking 
ability is not. 
In relation to real world interventions that might be applied to reduction of 
paranormal beliefs, one of the key strengths of the present research programme was 
the use of naturalistic intervention studies to reduce paranormal belief (specifically 
belief in ESP).  This involved lectures and courses on anomalistic psychology, 
mirroring similar intervention studies found in the literature (Banziger & College, 
1983; Happs, 1991; Harrington, 2013; Jones & Zusne, 1981; McLean & Miller, 2010; 
Morier & Keeports, 1994).  The proposal was that belief change would be path-
dependent, meaning that beliefs held for rational reasons would be more likely to get 
reduced in response to encountering the rational material presented in university 
lectures and textbooks (e.g. French, 2014).  Although there was nascent support for the 
model from earlier findings (Griffin & Ohlsson, 2001), those findings were not real-
world ones and the findings of the present programme did not support the predictions 
of the model.  Nevertheless, the intervention studies mirrored those in the existing 
literature, with a tendency to reduced belief.  Study 3 was the exception to this, but it 
may be due to the length of the intervention being short and initial belief levels of the 
participants being lower to begin with; Study 5 presented a course-length intervention 
and significant reduction in belief was found even though initial belief levels were 
lower than those in Study 3. 
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This, of course, raises the question of why such interventions are effective.  In the 
existing literature on interventions to reduce paranormal belief, the directly stated or 
implied reason is addressing a knowledge deficit, sometimes in combination with a 
thinking skills deficit.  In other words, the exceptionalist view that differences in belief 
are due to a knowledge gap and that closing that gap reduces non-normative belief, 
such as belief in the paranormal.  According to research and general theoretical 
opinion, however, deficits models are not a useful approach to take.  In general, it is 
argued that a deficits approach to belief change is, at best, suboptimal for changing 
people’s beliefs (Ahteensuu, 2011; Ko, 2016; Simis et al., 2016; Wright & Nerlich, 2016).  
Indeed, it is suggested that the one of the main reasons such approaches are still used 
are that scientists have a persistent bias towards thinking that lay people will process 
the evidence in the same way that scientists do.  Furthermore, it is argued that 
educational policy is easier to produce based upon a simple deficits framework than 
something more nuanced. 
However, anomalistic psychology courses and lectures seem to work quite well at 
reducing belief, albeit that the belief reduction is not wholesale.  This is as expected, 
since belief change is a step-wise affair rather than an all or nothing binary change 
(Ghose et al., 2004; Hample, 1979).  The present research and the existing literature 
therefore suggest that addressing knowledge deficits is effective in reducing 
paranormal beliefs.  Taking into account the earlier discussion on inhibition and 
cueing, it can be seen that the material presented in such interventions is largely of a 
rational nature (e.g. French, 2014) and therefore is, according to findings from Study 6, 
liable to cue all of the participants to think in a rational way.  This in turn should lead 
to some degree of persuasion if the material is deemed sufficiently important, novel, 
and plausible (Morley & Walker, 1987).  This helps to explain why such material may 
be effective in changing beliefs, despite the arguments that a deficits approach is 
suboptimal. 
Indeed, Sturgis and Allum (2004), for example, present a more nuanced account of the 
influence of knowledge.  They found that knowledge was a key factor in predicting 
attitudes towards science, but they also looked at political views and found that 
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contextual factors modified the influence of knowledge.  More broadly speaking, 
contextual factors such as the trust people have in the authority delivering the 
information and how the information aligns with existing group affiliations (see also 
Kahan & Stanovich, 2016) will influence the degree to which knowledge influences 
people’s views. In the context of anomalistic psychology courses, the authority is 
generally a trusted academic expert, and topics such as ESP are less likely to have 
powerful group affiliations opposing disbelief in the phenomenon.  In contrast, such 
group affiliations might be found regarding topics such as creationism or afterlife.  
Notably the latter is usually classed as a paranormal belief (Tobacyk, 2004; Tobacyk & 
Milford, 1983) but did not show consistent belief reduction in the present research 
programme, particularly in the longer intervention used in Study 5.  Arguably the 
material in the intervention covered the topic of afterlife by means of various topics, 
including ghosts, communication with the dead, and memories of previous lives 
(French, 2014).  The fact that this particular belief showed no significant reduction may 
be due to group membership, such as religious belief in the existence of an afterlife. 
Overall then, anomalistic psychology interventions can be effective, and knowledge 
appears to be an important part of this. However, contrary to many rational actor 
models of belief, access to good quality knowledge is not a panacea for belief change.  
This raises the question of how anomalistic psychology interventions can be improved.  
The explanation presented earlier for findings in the literature on paranormal belief, 
favoured the inhibition and cueing account.  On the face of it, this implies that the 
material presented in such interventions is already highly suitable, due to being of a 
rational nature.  However, the earlier account of the ratio-bias phenomenon, involving 
jellybean selection, highlighted the point that intuitive information can be more 
persuasive than rational information.  In that particular study participants went with 
their intuitive feelings despite knowing that they were making an objectively 
suboptimal choice.  That is to say, people may be persuaded more by intuitive material 
than rational material when the two are placed in competition with each other. 
In a similar vein, horoscopes printed in magazines and newspapers present a situation 
where people encounter rational information alongside intuitive information.  
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Rationally speaking, the horoscopes say very similar things, even within the same 
edition.  Yet people tend to read only their own horoscope, ignoring the rest of the 
information – they rely entirely upon their subjective interpretation of how just one 
horoscope explains their life, instead of testing how convincing their horoscope is 
against the others that are in front of them.  In practical terms, all of the rational 
evaluative information that they need is there, but there is a tendency to rely upon the 
intuitive information instead.  The present research programme demonstrated the 
persuasiveness of rational material in the absence of competition from intuitive 
material, but the implication is that anomalistic psychology interventions should take 
care not to present rational disconfirmation directly alongside competing intuitive 
material as this may reduce or nullify the effectiveness of the intervention.  It is likely 
that those higher in a tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking would favour the rational 
information, but in order to attain the most effective communication of the rational 
material it should be communicated on its own, so that rational thinking is cued for 
everyone. 
However, rational material is not the only kind of material, and intuitive disconfirming 
material can also be persuasive.  In Study 6, it was found to be equally as persuasive at 
the point of belief change, for example.  And other research has also had success using 
intuitive material, such as videos of failed dowsing attempts, or non-psychic psychic 
demonstrations (Benassi et al., 1980; Happs, 1991).  In fact, it may even be the case that 
in some instances intuitive disconfirmation may be more effective than rational 
disconfirmation (Edwards, 1990).  This latter point is similar to the kind of prediction 
made by the path-dependent model proposed at the start of the present research 
programme.  Indeed, a key conclusion from the programme is that differential 
encoding of beliefs is necessary to fully explain the findings.  Currently this is 
something that requires further research, but should such understanding be produced 
then this may also bear on how interventions can be improved. 
Finally, with respect to improving anomalistic psychology interventions, a leaf might 
be taken from other research on the relevance of importance, novelty and plausibility 
(Morley & Walker, 1987).  It was argued previously that such interventions often meet 
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these three criteria. However, this is largely incidental, and the design and presentation 
of material on the topic of anomalistic psychology should take particular care to make 
sure that the importance of the material is conveyed, as well as making sure that it can 
be understood and thus be plausible.  Arguably, novelty is less of an issue in this topic 
area.  However, some phenomena have similarities that mean similar explanations are 
drawn upon (e.g. dowsing and Ouija boards – French & Stone, 2014), and in these cases 
emphasizing novelty or differences between them might be useful. 
Belief change interventions, such as anomalistic psychology courses or lectures, may 
also play another role in belief, however.  They may also take on the role of reducing 
the likelihood of new paranormal beliefs forming at a later time.  In the present thesis 
this approach has been referred to as inoculationism, after the terminology used by 
proponents, such as Lilienfeld (Lilienfeld et al., 2012; Lilienfeld et al., 2009).  The basic 
premise is that by acquiring new thinking skills people can avoid falling foul of 
thinking errors.  In terms of Stanovich’s (2008b) dual-process account, this is equivalent 
to installing new ‘mindware’.  Or in other words, rather than a knowledge gap, there is 
a mindware gap; a deficit in thinking skills.  Anomalistic psychology lectures and 
courses do tend to teach such mindware alongside the knowledge conveyed.  This is a 
necessary part of the teaching, since evaluation of anomalous experiences involves 
thinking critically about them, in order to arrive at the alternative non-paranormal 
explanations.  For example, thinking about how horoscopes rely upon thinking errors, 
such as confirmation bias and the ability of the human brain to make connections 
between things even where none really exists (French, 2014).   In this sense, such 
interventions should be installing mindware that prevents future non-normative 
beliefs from forming. 
However, as already discussed, one of the most robust findings in the literature is that 
critical thinking skills and thinking errors tend to dissociate, as do critical thinking 
skills and paranormal belief.  Therefore, in order to inoculate against future 
paranormal belief, anomalistic psychology interventions need to provide something 
more than this.  The present research programme and the wider literature show that in 
contrast to thinking ability, thinking style is associated with paranormal belief.  This 
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implies that it is mindware for thinking style that is required; a Type-2 Activation 
‘App’, so to speak, which can be ‘installed’, leading to greater tendency to inhibit 
intuitive thinking/activate rational thinking.  Previous studies have found long-term 
belief change (Banziger & College, 1983; Happs, 1991), but to what extent this was 
simply the continuing reduction of the previous beliefs or an additional inoculation 
against new ones is unclear.  Nevertheless, it seems that anomalistic psychology 
courses should try to teach thinking style and not just thinking skills.  This is not a 
well-researched area, however; it is not clear whether such mindware can in fact be 
installed or to what extent it relies upon innate tendencies. 
Further research is therefore clearly needed in a number of areas.  However, the use of 
paranormal beliefs as a research tool in the present study was largely successful.  The 
use of paranormal beliefs was highly successful in providing a good spread of belief 
levels and a good spread of belief-basis, while also providing a clear association with 
intuitive belief-basis and thinking style.  The choice of ESP as the phenomenon to focus 
on was a key part in this success.  For example, had Afterlife been chosen then the 
results would have been very different.  This illustrates the need to take care when 
using paranormal belief as a research tool, since paranormal beliefs are not a 
homogenous set.  Care should be taken to pick a belief that will allow investigation of 
the factors that the researcher wants to look at.  If group membership is a factor of 
interest then Afterlife might be a useful phenomenon, for example.  But, if group 
membership is not the research focus, then it may hide the factors that are of interest 
(Kahan & Stanovich, 2016).  One alternative to this is to use an omnibus scale, such as 
the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), but this may 
lead to the effects of various factors cancelling each other out, and is also less useful 
when the intervention is more topic-specific. 
Overall then, the use of paranormal belief as a research tool was largely successful and 
can be recommended for future research into belief formation and change.  Moreover, 
the findings of the present research programme offer sound support for key findings in 
the literature on the psychology of paranormal belief, as well as suggesting coherent 
theoretical explanations for those findings.  Ultimately, there remains a need to explain 
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how encoding of beliefs differs, in order to fully explain the findings.  However, the 
findings of the programme can still be usefully applied in explaining why anomalistic 
psychology lectures and courses lead to reductions in paranormal belief, via 
knowledge-gap reduction and cueing rational thinking, while also being able to 
provide suggestions and cautionary notes to help maintain and improve the 
effectiveness of such interventions, such as taking care to avoid competition between 
different types of materials. 
Concluding Summary & Reflections 
The present research programme was motivated by the idea that there is a connection 
between how beliefs are formed and how they change.  The aim of the programme was 
therefore to look beyond simple associations with belief and infer something of the 
underlying mechanism involved in the process.  Specifically, based upon dual-process 
accounts of cognition, it was proposed that belief would be path-dependent, with belief 
change being more likely when disconfirming material was of the same type as led to 
the original belief.  However, since people not only hold beliefs, but also act on them, 
another key aim was to ensure, as far as possible, that the findings would generalise.  
With this in mind, a number of different samples were used in the studies, from 
student samples to general public, and special interest groups, and research focused 
mostly on naturalistic interventions.  Arguably the research programme was successful 
in achieving most of its stated aims, although with respect to the link between belief 
formation and change it was not able to elucidate the exact mechanism.  However, 
pending replication, it did succeed in establishing that a relationship between belief 
formation and change exists, and that this must be due to differential encoding of types 
of belief. 
Considering the importance of beliefs, an important goal of the study was that the 
findings would generalise to a useful extent.  Indeed, one of the motivations for 
understanding mechanisms of belief, rather than just making associations, was because 
of the importance of beliefs in shaping the world via people’s behaviours in it.  The 
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introduction to the thesis illustrated this with a number of topics and scenarios, such as 
climate change denial, the use of scientifically unsupported traditional medicines, and 
belief in magic (Associated Press, 2018; Liu et al., 2014; Snow & Snow, 2015).  However, 
for practical reasons, the research programme itself could only focus on a limited 
scope.  To this end, the focus was paranormal beliefs and specifically belief in ESP.  
Other beliefs were included alongside this: creationism, evolution, afterlife, and the 
idea that opposites attract in romantic relationships.  These were intended to act as a 
check on whether the interventions were selectively influencing belief in ESP and to 
provide a broader range of data for pre-intervention analyses, such as the correlation 
between belief-basis and belief.  Of course, paranormal beliefs are not necessarily the 
same as other types of belief, but it is also true that there is a very broad spectrum of 
belief in general and a focus needs to be chosen.  Paranormal beliefs successfully 
provided the programme with a type of belief that is relatively widespread, ranges 
widely in levels of belief, and ranges in reasons for belief, although with a general 
association with intuitive belief.  Much of the research on belief already focuses on 
rational beliefs.  It was therefore hoped that by focusing on a belief typically associated 
with a more intuitive belief-basis, the findings would be more informative and thus 
have wider application, since intuitive reasons for belief are not uncommon in the real 
world. 
In this regard the research programme was successful in its aim.  Indeed, a whole 
section of the present chapter was given over to generalising the findings to 
paranormal beliefs beyond ESP.  However, the theoretical implications have a wider 
reach than this.  The findings offer good support for a combined inhibition and cueing 
account that has applicability beyond the original belief in ESP that was studied in the 
interventions or the fabricated anomalous phenomenon used in Study 6.  This general 
account was applied to the specific topic of paranormal belief in the present chapter, 
but generalises to belief change interventions more generally.  This claim may require 
modification in future, however, once the link between belief formation and change 
has been fathomed, since paranormal beliefs have a specific type of belief-basis 
generally associated with them, due to inhibition and situational cueing.  On the other 
hand, it may be that non-normative beliefs in general have a similar association and 
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that therefore the mechanisms elucidated by research on paranormal beliefs will 
generalise to other non-normative beliefs, such as flat-earth theory and climate change 
denial. 
In terms of generalisation it was also important to try to use naturalistic studies where 
possible.  This was greatly helped by access to anomalistic psychology lectures and 
courses running at Goldsmiths College, University of London.  The initial replication 
study deliberately avoided providing a naturalistic test in order to provide a better 
replication.  This proved its worth when comparing findings with later naturalistic 
studies.  Had the research programme only used self-predicted belief change then this 
difference between real world and self-predicted behaviour would not have been 
known, and generalising of the present findings would have been undermined. 
It was therefore not without a sense of irony that in the final research study in the 
programme the reverse process was undertaken: generalising from the real world back 
into the laboratory.  Important lessons about belief change had been learnt in the 
naturalistic setting, however, and the laboratory experiment measured actual belief 
change, rather than self-predictions or intentions (e.g. Sappington, 1990).  It was with a 
further twist of irony therefore, that the move to the laboratory occurred, in part, due 
to concerns over the reliability of self-predicted belief-basis, which was the only 
measure available in the naturalistic studies.  The laboratory study therefore aimed to 
induce and reduce belief under controlled conditions.  Reassuringly the laboratory 
experiment replicated key findings from the naturalistic intervention studies: the lack 
of a differential effect of rational material at belief change regardless of belief-basis, and 
the association between thinking style and belief.  Although the experiment requires 
replication, the additional information from laboratory study can be interpreted with 
greater confidence than if there had been no naturalistic studies. 
In the effort to provide greater confidence in generalising any findings of the 
programme, the step was also taken to recruit beyond the usual student samples 
(McNemar, 1946; Smart, 1966).  A special interest group relating to anomalistic 
psychology and the paranormal was recruited in the initial replication study to provide 
a stronger replication, while the final laboratory study recruited from the general 
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public.  Non-student samples were, unfortunately, not a possibility in the naturalistic 
intervention studies due to the interventions being university lectures and courses.  
Nevertheless, key findings appear to be robust across the groups, giving greater 
confidence in generalising the findings to the wider population. 
It was also argued that in order to understand belief formation and change it is 
necessary to understand the mechanisms involved and not merely the associations of 
belief with factors, such as belief-basis.  The primary aim of the research programme 
was therefore to investigate the connection between belief formation and belief change.  
The idea that the two are linked is plausible if one takes heed of dual-process accounts 
of cognition.  If there are two ‘systems’ in the brain operating independently then 
beliefs formed by one system may be encoded differently than those formed by the 
other system.  This, in turn, implies that different types of material will be more or less 
likely to influence those beliefs, since different types of materials would be processed 
by the different systems – see for example, Edward’s (1990) finding that affect-based 
disconfirmation was better at changing affect-based beliefs than intellectual 
disconfirmation was.  In this sense, differential encoding of beliefs provides a 
mechanism linking the two points in the belief process.  Therefore, to investigate 
mechanisms of belief, the present programme tested a path-dependent model of belief 
change. 
In respect of the specific model that was proposed the programme was, unfortunately, 
unsuccessful in its aims.  The proposed link between belief-formation and change was 
disproved across the studies series as a whole, particularly in the later studies.  
However, the programme was successful with regard to its core aim, to investigate 
mechanisms of belief.  Although the programme was not able to elucidate the exact 
mechanism, it was able to establish that explanations of the belief process need to take 
encoding of belief into account.  And in this sense it was successful in shining a light on 
that area of the belief process.  It achieved this, in part, via the consistent lack of 
individual differences in response to the intervention material.  Furthermore, there was 
a correlation between thinking style and belief.  But, this on its own was insufficient to 
establish the point, since it might simply be that beliefs are all encoded the same way 
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and all kinds of evidence are equally influential on belief change.   Indeed, there was 
no presentation of intuitive disconfirming material and differences in formation of 
beliefs was inferred via self-report belief-basis.  It was therefore the laboratory study 
(Study 6) that presented the key evidence.  This study provided direct evidence that 
thinking style modifies how different types of material are processed.  This led to the 
surprising finding that rational material induced more belief formation than intuitive 
material.  However, upon further inspection, this was due to reduced effect of intuitive 
material on those participants with a greater tendency to inhibit intuitive thinking (as 
measured on the CRT5).  This individual difference had no effect on the persuasiveness 
of rational material, however, allowing it to show a greater general effect. 
With the association between thinking style and processing of types of materials firmly 
established at the point of belief formation, it was therefore unexpected that this 
association would be completely missing at the point of belief change.  This latter point 
replicated the findings of the intervention studies, but with the additional information 
that there is no differential effect of intuitive disconfirming evidence either.  The only 
way to explain why the same factors (material type and thinking style) have different 
effects at belief formation and change is either a memory effect, due to a 
methodological flaw in the study, or differential encoding of different types of beliefs.  
Therefore, assuming that the findings replicate and a memory effect is controlled for 
(e.g. a longer time gap, as in eyewitness memory studies – Wells et al., 2000), the 
present programme managed to establish that there is a connection between belief 
formation and change and that explaining it requires explaining how the beliefs are 
encoded at belief formation, which in turn influences how they are processed at the 
point of belief change.  Therefore, while no specific belief mechanism has been 
elucidated by the present research programme, a little more light may have been shone 
on where to look for it. 
As Ioannidis (2005) observes, null findings are important.  The null findings of the 
present programme – lack of predicted results at belief change – were actually critical 
to the overall understanding that has been drawn from findings.  Indeed, far from 
being a failing, they are simply part of the bigger picture.  With this point in mind, the 
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present research programme provided more and more chances for the model to prove 
itself valid.  Inhibition was added as a variable, intervention length was increased, and 
an experiment carried out in the laboratory. Having collected null results on the model 
from across this range of studies, it is possible to have greater confidence that this 
particular model does not provide the right explanation.  Indeed, as noted by Kluger 
and Tikochinsky (2001), one must be careful not to overgeneralise from null findings, 
since small changes may mean the original ideas turn out to be true. Indeed, this was 
noted earlier in relation to choice of phenomenon when using paranormal belief as a 
research tool – afterlife may not be as suitable as ESP due to associated religiosity.  The 
present research programme therefore offers replication of null findings with respect to 
predictions about belief change. This very much echoes Ioannidis’ (2005) observation 
that a biased focus on positive findings can actually mislead scientific understanding; if 
null results are ignored then the true picture is never seen. 
Nevertheless, the programme did also provide consistent positive findings as well, 
echoing the importance of replication of positive findings and not over-generalising 
from those either.  Indeed, in relation to future research following from the present 
study programme, the biggest requirement is replication – particularly Study 6, which 
unlike the other studies, has not yet been replicated due to time constraints on the 
programme preventing this.  At the same time, however, the potential memory effect 
in that study also needs to be addressed.  A paradigm more similar to that used in 
eyewitness memory studies may therefore be appropriate.  Also stemming from the 
present research programme is the critical need to measure actual belief change in 
research on belief and not to trust the validity of self-report measures of this.  Beyond 
the specifics of the individual research studies, however, the biggest focus of future 
research should be on investigating why there is a differential effect of material type 
and thinking style at belief change in comparison to belief formation.  If the findings 
from the present research programme are valid then the encoding problem needs to be 
solved if psychologists are to properly understand the belief process.  Finally, with 
respect to belief change the present research has demonstrated that thinking style is the 
best way to inoculate against beliefs being formed based upon intuitive information.  
However, it is not yet clear whether such thinking style can be taught, whereas there 
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has already been a large amount of research demonstrating that thinking skills can be 
taught.  It is already known that thinking processes can be cued, as demonstrated in 
the present programme, for example.  The question is whether this tendency can be 
nurtured to become a trait instead of a state. 
In conclusion, the research programme has shown that beliefs vary in being held for 
rational or intuitive reasons, and that this difference emerges at the belief formation 
stage due to the nature of the material encountered and the person’s cognitive 
processing style.  However, neither the nature of the material nor the person’s 
cognitive processing style influences belief change/reduction.  Explanations of belief 
formation and change need to explain this asymmetry, which requires addressing 
differential encoding of different types of beliefs within the brain in order to explain 
the mechanism that links the two points in the belief process.  Overall therefore, the 
present research programme achieved its core aims, although with mixed success 
regarding the specific hypotheses under test.  Therefore, while the findings offer 
substantial support to a combined inhibition and cueing account, the same findings 
indicate that the most important goal for future research is to solve the encoding 
problem. 
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Appendix 1 – Study 1: Questionnaire 
 
The following questionnaire was presented online.  As such, the actual presentation is not 
included, but is indicated by implementation instructions in places. 
 
Briefing and Instructions 
We all have our own individual beliefs about a wide variety of topics.  But, why do 
people hold their particular beliefs?  This study is looking at some of the reasons 
people might hold their beliefs on a selection of common topics. 
You’ll be asked to answer some very quick questions on each topic: whether you 
believe in it, why you believe or disbelieve in it, and whether you might change your 
mind about it.  The topics are: creationism, evolution, extrasensory perception (ESP), 
‘opposites attract’, and the existence of an afterlife. 
The topics will be presented one at a time.  Please read the clarifying definition at the 
start of each topic and then answer the questions that follow it. 
Taking part in this study is optional and you can quit the study at any time even if 
you’ve already started filling in the questionnaire.   If you’re not comfortable 
answering questions on a particular topic then please feel free to skip that topic or any 
individual question on that topic, although your responses are much more useful to us 
if you do answer all the questions.  All data will be treated with full confidentiality 
and, if published, it will not be identifiable as yours. 
This data is being collected by Duncan Colvin (d.colvin@gold.ac.uk) as part of his 
postgraduate research at Goldsmiths under the supervision of Prof Chris French 
(c.french@gold.ac.uk). If you have any queries about the research, feel free to contact 
either of them. 





In order to comply with BPS ethical guidelines on collecting data online, we will also 
need to have participants confirm they are aged 16 years or over. 
 
  




Presented as a series of age ranges to help people feel more comfortable giving this personal 
information: 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65, 66+, and ‘I do not wish to record my age’. 
Gender 
Male/Female, and a third option of ‘I do not wish to record my gender’ 
 
  
Appendix 1 – Study 1: Questionnaire      266 
Creationism 
Definition: 
For the purpose of this study Creationism is defined as the belief that the Bible gives a 
literally true account of the creation of the Earth and all life upon it. 
 
To what extent do you believe in Creationism? 
completely disbelieve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely believe 
 
 
What are the top 3 reasons for your belief in Creationism? 
1. [text entry field] 
2. [text entry field] 
3. [text entry field] 
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For each potential reason below indicate whether that reason is why you personally hold 
your belief about Creationism: 
1) My belief about Creationism makes me feel good or is comforting. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
2) My belief about Creationism is a result of examining all of the evidence I'm aware of and 
choosing the most convincing explanation. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
3) When it comes to issues like Creationism, I trust my 'heart', not my 'head' to tell me the 
truth. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
4) I don't need proof, I have faith that my belief about Creationism is correct. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
5) My belief about Creationism is supported by current scientific knowledge. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
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Now imagine that you were presented with strong evidence that contradicted your belief.  
How likely would you be to change your belief? 




The remaining four topics are presented in the same way and with the same data being 








For the purpose of this study Evolution is defined as the development of all the species of 
animals on earth from earlier forms (for example, land animals evolved from early forms of 
fish). 
 
To what extent do you believe in Evolution? 
completely disbelieve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely believe 
 
 
What are the top 3 reasons for your belief in Evolution? 
1. [text entry field] 
2. [text entry field] 
3. [text entry field] 
 
Appendix 1 – Study 1: Questionnaire      270 
For each potential reason below indicate whether that reason is why you personally hold 
your belief about Evolution: 
1) My belief about Evolution makes me feel good or is comforting. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
2) My belief about Evolution is a result of examining all of the evidence I'm aware of and 
choosing the most convincing explanation. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
3) When it comes to issues like Evolution, I trust my 'heart', not my 'head' to tell me the truth. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
4) I don't need proof, I have faith that my belief about Evolution is correct. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
5) My belief about Evolution is supported by current scientific knowledge. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
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Now imagine that you were presented with strong evidence that contradicted your belief.  
How likely would you be to change your belief? 
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Extrasensory Perception (ESP) 
 
Definition: 
For the purpose of this study Extrasensory Perception (ESP) is defined as the direct 
perception of information by the mind without using any normal way to find the information 
out. 
 
To what extent do you believe in ESP? 
completely disbelieve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely believe 
 
 
What are the top 3 reasons for your belief in ESP? 
1. [text entry field] 
2. [text entry field] 
3. [text entry field] 
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For each potential reason below indicate whether that reason is why you personally hold 
your belief about ESP: 
1) My belief about ESP makes me feel good or is comforting. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
2) My belief about ESP is a result of examining all of the evidence I'm aware of and choosing 
the most convincing explanation. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
3) When it comes to issues like ESP, I trust my 'heart', not my 'head' to tell me the truth. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
4) I don't need proof, I have faith that my belief about ESP is correct. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
5) My belief about ESP is supported by current scientific knowledge. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
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Now imagine that you were presented with strong evidence that contradicted your belief.  
How likely would you be to change your belief? 








For the purpose of this study the idea that Opposites Attract is defined as people being 
attracted to partners who are the opposite of themselves in significant ways (such as in their 
personality or in the hobbies that they like, and so on). 
 
To what extent do you believe in the idea that Opposites Attract? 
completely disbelieve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely believe 
 
 
What are the top 3 reasons for your belief in the idea that Opposites Attract? 
1. [text entry field] 
2. [text entry field] 
3. [text entry field] 
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For each potential reason below indicate whether that reason is why you personally hold 
your belief about the idea that Opposites Attract: 
1) My belief about the idea that Opposites Attract makes me feel good or is comforting. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
2) My belief about the idea that Opposites Attract is a result of examining all of the evidence 
I'm aware of and choosing the most convincing explanation. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
3) When it comes to issues like the idea that Opposites Attract, I trust my 'heart', not my 'head' 
to tell me the truth. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
4) I don't need proof, I have faith that my belief about the idea that Opposites Attract is 
correct. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
5) My belief about the idea that Opposites Attract is supported by current scientific 
knowledge. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
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Now imagine that you were presented with strong evidence that contradicted your belief.  
How likely would you be to change your belief? 








For the purpose of this study Afterlife is defined as a place, or state, in which people 
continue to exist after their mortal bodies have died. 
 
To what extent do you believe in the existence of an Afterlife? 
completely disbelieve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely believe 
 
 
What are the top 3 reasons for your belief in the existence of an Afterlife? 
1. [text entry field] 
2. [text entry field] 
3. [text entry field] 
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For each potential reason below indicate whether that reason is why you personally hold 
your belief about the existence of an Afterlife: 
1) My belief about the existence of an Afterlife makes me feel good or is comforting. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
2) My belief about the existence of an Afterlife is a result of examining all of the evidence I'm 
aware of and choosing the most convincing explanation. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
3) When it comes to issues like the existence of an Afterlife, I trust my 'heart', not my 'head' to 
tell me the truth. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
4) I don't need proof, I have faith that my belief about the existence of an Afterlife is correct. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
 
5) My belief about the existence of an Afterlife is supported by current scientific knowledge. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
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Now imagine that you were presented with strong evidence that contradicted your belief.  
How likely would you be to change your belief? 
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Thankyou 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study.  Research studies like this one cannot take place 
without volunteers such as yourself and we greatly appreciate your taking the time to fill out 
this questionnaire! 
Once the overall study has been completed we would like to give you a more detailed 
debriefing on the study’s aims and the overall findings that result from the study.  To receive 
this short debriefing simply enter your email address below (this will not affect the anonymity 
of your data). 
Email Address: [text entry field] 
If you have any concerns or queries about the research study that you have just taken part in 
please feel free to contact either Duncan Colvin (d.colvin@gold.ac.uk) or Prof Chris French 
(c.french@gold.ac.uk). 





You previously took part in a research study asking about your reasons for believing in 
a number of topics (creationism, evolution, opposites attract, ESP, and afterlife).  You 
also requested additional debrief information when the study had been completed.  
The requested debrief is presented below: 
The aim of the research study was to replicate previous research which found that 
people’s reasons for belief in various topics can be broadly categorised as 
intuitive/emotional or rational/knowledge based (heart versus head, so to speak).  In 
the previous research people were more likely to believe in creationism, ESP, afterlife, 
and opposites attract, for intuitive rather than rational reasons, whereas the opposite 
was true for evolution.  This pattern of belief-basis was confirmed in the study that you 
took part in.  You were also asked about how likely you would be to change your belief 
if faced with strong contradictory evidence.  Previous research found that people who 
reported a greater rational component to their belief (or disbelief) also rated themselves 
as more likely to change their mind if faced with contradictory evidence.  The study 
that you took part in confirmed that this was the case for most of the topics.  However, 
the association did not hold for the topic of ESP.  People's openness to changing their 
belief in ESP was not related to the reason that they believed in it.  This is an interesting 
finding because members of the APRU emailing list have a special interest in topics 
such as ESP, and may also have a greater than average knowledge and experience of 
the topic as a result.  Of course, at this point we can only speculate on the reasons for 
there being no association between belief-basis and the likelihood of belief change, but 
the results of the study do suggest that it may be important to take into account 
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whether people have a special interest in a topic when asking them about their reasons 
for belief or disbelief in it. 




Anomalistic Psychology Research Unit 
Goldsmiths, University of London 
www.gold.ac.uk/apru 
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Appendix 2 – Study 2: Briefing and Debriefing 
 
The questionnaire used for Study 2 was the same as used in Study 1, but presented in pencil 
and paper format, and subject to the exclusions specified in the Study 2 Materials section of this 
thesis.  Therefore only the briefing and debriefings are given below, as these differed due to the 
sample and presentation method in Study 2.  A separate standard research consent form 
provided by the university was used in this study. 
The debriefing is a combined debriefing with another study that ran at the same time under the 
same research supervisor and was sufficiently related that it was felt that the two debriefs could 
be presented together. 
 
Briefing and Instructions 
 
We all have our own individual beliefs about a wide variety of topics.  But, why do people hold 
their particular beliefs?  This study is looking at some of the reasons people might hold their 
beliefs on a selection of common topics. 
You’ll be asked to answer some very quick questions on each topic: whether you believe in it 
and why you believe or disbelieve in it.  The topics are: creationism, evolution, extra sensory 
perception (ESP), ‘opposites attract’, and the existence of an afterlife.   For clarity there is one 
topic per page.   
Please read the clarifying definition at the top of each page.  Circle the numbers in the Likert 
scales to indicate your views on each topic. 
Taking part in this study is optional and you can quit the study at any time even if you’ve 
already started filling in the questionnaire.   If you’re not comfortable answering questions on 
a particular topic then please feel free to skip that topic. 
 
Debriefing 
Two of the scales you completed today relate to projects supervised by Prof Chris French 
(c.french@gold.ac.uk). This debrief sheet will supply you with more information regarding the 
hypotheses being tested in these studies. 
The first study, carried out by Duncan Colvin (psp01cdb@gold.ac.uk) as part of his postgraduate 
research, is an investigation into factors that might possibly be involved in belief maintenance 
and change. Previous research suggests that people may have different reasons for holding the 
beliefs that they do. Some beliefs are held for knowledge-based reasons; that is, the person 
professing the belief believes that it is supported by the available empirical evidence. Some 
beliefs are held for intuitive or emotional reasons; that is, the beliefs in question simply make us 
feel good. Previous research by Griffin and Ohlsson (2001) showed that people who said they 
held their beliefs for knowledge-based reasons reported that they would be willing to modify 
their beliefs if presented with evidence that appeared to undermine them. Those who held their 
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beliefs for emotional/intuitive reasons reported that they would not be willing to modify their 
beliefs under such circumstances. However, the study was entirely based upon self-report, i.e., 
what respondents thought they would do. 
This study attempts to test what respondents actually do. Two weeks ago and again today, you 
filled in a questionnaire asking you about your beliefs on various topics and your reasons for 
holding those beliefs. One week ago, you heard a fairly sceptical lecture by Prof Chris French in 
which he pointed out the lack of reliable evidence for extrasensory perception (ESP). Thus the 
hypothesis we’re testing in this study is that those of you who said you believed in ESP for 
knowledge-based reasons (i.e., you thought that scientific evidence supported such a belief) 
may well have reduced your level of belief but that those of you who said you believed in ESP 
largely for emotional reasons will not have done so. 
The second study, carried out by Snayt Malaki (ps901sm@gold.ac.uk) as her final year 
undergraduate project, investigated factors associated with paranormal belief/experience and 
susceptibility to false memories. Previous research has suggested that a number of 
psychological variables that correlate with susceptibility to false memories, such as 
dissociativity and fantasy proneness, also correlate with paranormal belief and tendency to 
report ostensibly paranormal experiences (French, 2003). This raises the possibility that some 
reports of experiences of paranormal occurrences might be based upon on false memories. Two 
weeks ago, you completed scales measuring these personality variables along with your level of 
paranormal belief and experience. 
This week, we hoped to measure your susceptibility to false memories by using the so-called 
‘crashing memories’ paradigm. This paradigm is so named because early research by Crombag, 
Wagenaar, and van Koppen (1996) showed that 55% of their participants reported, when asked, 
that they had seen news footage of a plane crashing into an apartment block in Amsterdam. 
Although the accident really had occurred, it was not caught on camera. Therefore these reports 
must be based upon false memories. Using this paradigm, Wilson and French (2006) showed 
that participants who reported this type of false memory scored higher on measures of 
paranormal belief/experience. The current study probes memories for classic British TV clips, 
one if which was a non-existent paranormal clip in which Uri Geller appears to levitate a match 
box in by the power of mind alone and a fictitious non-paranormal clip in which Margaret 
Thatcher appears to be crying whilst visiting the victims of a terrorist attack. You were asked 
for details of the nature of the footage, the content of the clips and to provide descriptions of the 
sequence of events showed in the footage. Although these TV clips do not exist, previous 
research suggests that a few of you will think that you have actually seen them. Our hypothesis 
is that those participants who falsely report having seen these non-existent clips will score 
higher on paranormal belief/experience, dissociativity, and fantasy proneness. Furthermore, 
this will be more pronounced for the paranormal event.  
References: 
French, C. C. (2003). Fantastic memories: The relevance of research into eyewitness testimony and false 
memories for reports of anomalous experiences. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, 153-174.  
Wilson, K., & French, C. C. (2006). The relationship between susceptibility to false memories, 
dissociativity, and paranormal belief and experience. Personality and individual differences, 41, 1493-
1502. 
Griffin, T. D., & Ohlsson, S. (2001). Beliefs Versus Knowledge : A Necessary Distinction for Explaining 
, Predicting , and Assessing Conceptual Change. In L. R. Gleitman & A. K. Joshi (Eds.), Proceedings of 
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the Twenty-Third Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
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Appendix 3 – Study 1: Free-Text Responses 
 
Free-text responses given for reasons for belief and non-belief in the five topics, in Study 5.  




1. Becuase science hasn't yet answers every question 
2. no evidence for it 
3. I do NOT believe in creationism. 
4. have a total dis-belief in the possible existence of the single omnipotent and 
omniscient being usually called GOD. 
5. If there was/is no GOD, there could not be any act of creation. 
6. There is ample evidence of evolution 
7. science 
8. Because there is absolutely no empirical evidence which supports creationism, 
and all the evidence points to natural selection with extreme strength 
9. The Bible is just a story 
10. This question is badly phrased since I do not believe in creationism. It should be 
3 reasons for belief/disbelief. In my case there is one - theory of evolution is 
extremely very supported by the evidence. No other reason is necessary. 
11. The big bang theory remains inconclusive 
12. Creationism does obviously and indisputably exist, as in fact it is the 
idea/ideology according to which God created the world in the way the bible 
describes. This idea seems to have many followers, the creationists, one could 
say. I do thus not hold a ""believe about"" creationism, I simply observe a socio-
historical phenomenon" 
13. It is incompatible with the physical evidence as we know it today. 
14. I believe there must be an intelligence behind the formation and evolution of 
the cosmos.  This is not a belief in deity as such - and certainly not an 
anthropomorphic god - but neither is it a acceptance of the idea that the laws of 
physics and other natural phenomena came about of themselves, by blind 
chance.  The great ancient civilizations - if we are not too proud to think that 
they knew nothing! - had the notion of a universal consciousness, which 
preceded matter, and indeed brought it into being.  This is the common belief in 
Hinduism, Buddhism and all the esoteric traditions of the Rosicrucians etc.  but 
in the  West it was lost due to the destructive schisms early Christianity had on 
the Pagan world view. 
15. No evidence 
16. It is totally contrary to scientific evidence. 
17. Science and religion have a same universal theory, nature of the universe as a 
hole from the smallest to the biggest particle.  0=infinite ...oneness. 
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18. Existence of evidence to the contrary 
19. I am a christian 
20. I don't believE in it - it is a mythological account from within a particular 
religious tradition 
21. Creationism is not based in scientific fact. 
22. Although the other belief is that the universe was created by the big bang, it 
doesn't stand to reason as to how life came to this planet 
23. The Bible is a historical text written over hundreds of years by unreliable 
sources. 
24. Trust in "science" and its aesthetics 
25. Science 
26. Scientific evidence 
27. As the scientific version is backed by evidence, it seems more plausible. 
28. All of the physical evidence flatly contradicts the biblical creation story. 
29. there are no reasons I just believe that there was a kind of metaphisic force 
involved in the creation of the world. I do not believe that the Bible gives a 
literally true account. 
30. Science 
31. No scientific evidence whatsoever 
32. Between evolution and creationism, the latter is much more unlikely. 
33. You mean disbelief.  I do not believe in a creator. 
34. I am a Christian, and so believe that it has some truth to it, but the conventions 
of the narrative clearly require it to be placed in the genre of poetic folktale; 
thus it should not be taken literally. And this is confirmed by a longstanding 
tradition of interpretation that includes, e.g., St. Augustine and St. Jerome. 
35. Culture 
36. The description in the bible is not consistent with geological, chemical, 
biological, physical or cosmological evidence in the world around us. 
37. Lack of evidence for creationism. 
38. Not practical from a scientific perspective 
39. I do not believe in God. 
40. GOD exists 
41. I don´t believe in creationism! 
42. It is preposterous. 
43. There is not one shred of evidence that a magic man poofed us into existence 
using magic words. Nor is their evidence for the magic man, or the efficacy of 
magic words. 
44. some truth in it such as the order of things from tohuwabohu to creation of man 
but literally it has not happened in seven days 
45. I am practising christian. 
46. It's childish 
47. Fossil evidence 
48. It comes from a discredited book 
49. by looking around myself I can easily infer that There must be somebody who 
created this universe which includes everything as well as humankind. 
50. Evolution gives a much more reasonable explanation for the origins of the earth 
and its inhabitants 
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51. Atheist 
52. I dont believe in the bible 
53. The Bible is a religious book not a scientific document. 
54. Evolution 
55. no evidence 
56. Don't believe in Creationism at all 
57. The bible was written long after what it states to be fact. 
58. being brought up in the Christian faith 
59. Evidences of evolutionist theory 
60. Evolution. 
61. We cannot exist merely because of the big bang 
62. What the Bible claims to be true is not supported by scientific evidence e.g. big 
bang, evolution 
63. Life itself is a miracle, the way the mind works and the whole solar system. 
There must be something greater out there which has created this. 
64. lots of evidence supporting evolution 
65. The Bible account of the creation is incompatible with historical and scientific 
understanding of the pre-Christian period of time, for example, the age of the 
earth as scientifically calculated. 
66. No evidence for creationism 
67. science 
68. Because all creationism (and religion in general) does is invents a simple cover-
all, non-testable excuse of an answer which blindly stops all questioning and 
investigation and perpetuates lies to block out evidence which is to the contrary 
69. Consciousness is not physics dependent 
70. the creationists are not the only people who take what is written in a holy book 
for the truth. One example: Those people in Isreal (and the occupied territories) 
who ""believe"" Palestine was given by God to the jewish people and thus non-
jewish people can be driven out.  
71. Religions create cosmologies, taking such cosmologies literal is either very 
unenlightened or politically motivated. 
72. It was clearly just made up in an era when there were no other explanations. 
73. Goes against natural laws 
74. Just because some intelligent and interesting people came up with a good story 
a few thousand years ago, is no reason to believe the story. 
75. Intuition have to come from electromagnetism that compose the universe 
>>how travel informations. 
76. I do not believe  that the world was created in a big bang 
77. All relevant scientific evidence demonstrates that the biblical description of 
creation is untrue 
78. I'm not sure of other reasons, sorry 
79. Creationism is contradicted by strongly supported scientific theories. 
80. Evolution "more convincing" 
81. Archeology 
82. Bible origins 
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83. My exposure to religion was very intermittent (going to C of E churches at 
Easter/Christmas), and my father is very interested in science, so I was never 
taught creationism as being true. 
84. If I wanted to believe in a religious creation story, the biblical account is no 
more likely than any of a hundred other creation myths. 
85. Politics - the obvious way in which senior religious people manipulate their 
faith for their own gain and their church's political ends. 
86. I don't believe in God. 
87. I am an atheist 
88. Evolutionary science suggests both different orders and different timescales for 
the formation of general kinds of life. 
89. Religious belief 
90. The bible is a human endeavour, writen and selected for transmission by 
humans for human purposes. It has no relation to the actual beginnings of the 
world/universe. 
91. Strong evidence for natural origins of complexity in life (even if not for where 
life began). 
92. Religion as we know it is man made, origianally a way for the few to control the 
many 
93. Scientific data on the formation of planets, data about evolution, etc. 
94. Bible is not Just a Book 
95. It doesn't make sense. 
96. Genesis is almost certainly a hodge-podged three way edit of a range of 
conflicting Sumarian, Caananite and proto-Jewish beliefs that internal conflict. 
97. time in the bible is understood differently today, like pople vein 300 years old. 
same is true for creation in seven days. tim win the bible is not literally as 
understood today. 
98. I believe it is ignorant to believe we were not created by a divine being. 
99. I find it insidious 
100. The Bible is just part of a series of different writings by different people 
from a time when knowledge about the universe and about science was even 
more primative than today 
101. It's not internally consistent 
102. Reasonable, logical Explenations and miracles of Quran 
103. I don't believe in a divine being and therefore the world cannot be 
created by them 
104. evolution 
105. The bible isnt scientifically proven 
106. I don't believe in God. 
107. the bible being lost in translation over the thousands of years 
108. evolution 
109. Don't believe in Creationism at all 
110. I do not believe in God. 
111. Strong doubt about the existence of any kind of deity 
112. I am also not a religious person, at any level, and I especially do not care 
for the archaic, manipulative, contradicting, and hypocritical texts of organised 
religion. 
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113. I believe in God and God's words 
114. Bible written by human beings who use it to justify the status quo e.g. 
all disciples male, womans fault there is sin (Eve) etc 
115. I believe in creationism as it gives me a nice way to think about the 
world in a better light which makes more sense to me.  It gives life a meaning. 
116. I don't believe in God, so believing in Creationism would be a little 
tricky 
117. Life biologically can be demonstratively shown to have evolved in the 
past and to continue to do so in the present. We creatures are capable of 
biological change and adaptation; we are not as supposedly created. 
118. I'm not religious 
119. science 
120. Because it is completely nonsensical and frankly retarded, and the 
believers are generally highly uneducated and obnoxious, bigoted people who 
use their deluded beliefs to try and feel superior to other groups and thus 
perpetuate hate 
121. Creation is an interactive process that is neither dependent on 
creationism or physicalism 
122. Metaphor is very important and reveiling or obscuring. It is usually 
greed for land power and money that makes people read a metaphor in the 
wrong way. 
123. Other things in the Bible are clearly implausible 
124. nonsense 
125. The bible stories of creation have internal contradictions. 
126. Research of truth ...We are all creators, multidimensional individuals. 
127. >>> Creativity manifeste reality." 
128. Creationists' arguments are not logically persuasive. 
129. Cursory knowledge og Biblical critisism 
130. The Bible is an interesting hand-me-down story book 
131. Lack of evidence for any divine being 
132. Creationism neglects some phenomena (e.g. evolution) which have later 
been found and (as far as is possible) proven. 
133. The biblical version of creation, and especially the concept of original 
sin, presents a God that is immoral and cruel.  Which isn't impossible, I guess 
but I'd prefer to think he doesn't exist. 
134. Philosophy 
135. It is prima facie implausible that a precise and literal account of the 
origination of all life would be necessary for the overall point of the Bible, 
which is the interaction of God and mankind. 
136. Brought up with this belief 
137. Origins of the Bible likely to have come from man, not God. 
138. The bible as we know it today is a manipulation and only part of the 
origianl text, therefore cannot be considered to be a true account on which 
anyone can make a rational, objective decision. 
139. I don't believe the Earth is more special than any other life-bearing 
planet in the universe.  An Earth-centric view of the universe cannot be correct. 
140. Its faith 
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141. It's a closed belief system. 
142. im not sure whether it is right to have a hierarchy of beings where 
humans are the crown of creation. 
143. This idea has been instilled in me from a young age 
144. Rigidy never works 
145. It is principally used as a political attack 
146. The life and miracles of Prophet Muhammad according to authentic 
narratives. 
147. There is no evidence to believe in Creationism 
148. bible gives two different accounts of creation. 
149. It has too many holes in the theory 
150. The Bible is even internally inconsistent. There are two creation stories 
in Genesis that contradict each other. 
151. Rational thinking 
152. not a Christian 
153. Don't believe in Creationism at all 
154. Evolution and science disagrees with many things in the bible 
155. Poor to no evidence of creationist theory 
156. The fact that people have killed, are killing, and will probably continue 
to kill for their religion, firstly disgusts me to the core, and secondly makes me 
fear for the future, or inevitable doom of the human species. 
157. Us humans are evidence of creation 
158. Don't believe any religion should be treated as complete truth, but be 
judged on how useful it is to believe these things e.g. how does it lead you to 
behave towards other people, or feel about yourself 
 
Evolution 
159. becuase I think it makes some sense to believe that thinks have changed 
and involved over the years. 
160. good theory, with plenty of supporting evidence (though 
incontrovertible) 
161. Lots of evidence to support it 
162. Plausibility of Darwin's 'Descent by Modification' argument 
163. Seems logical 
164. It is scientifically demonstrable 
165. Fossil record 
166. Fossil evidence 
167. scientific evidence 
168. Because all evidence strongly suggests it (it is more strongly supported 
as a theory than gravity). 
169. Is supported by wide ranging evidence, which seemingly gets stronger. 
170. It is extremely well supported by the evidence. 
171. Darwin 
172. Darwin's argument has scientific validity 
173. "Strange misconcept about ""believe"".  
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174. Why would I ""believe"" in evolution- I can read a science book. Of 
course, the results of scientific research do not represent the absolute truth but 
rather a level of insight. But I should hope that scientist can refrain from 
""believing"" in such results and thus be open to a challenge." 
175. It makes logical sense 
176. "Evolution is a fine model and works well to show how the adaptation 
of species comes about in response to changes in local conditions.  
177. How far it goes to explain the origin of the original root types that make 
up a new species I believe is still an open question and is subject to ongoing 
research. 
178. The best scientists are through who keep an open mind about the nature 
of matter and the origin of consciousness; it's quite well noted that a wholly 
materialistic mindset does much to preclude such an open-minded 
investigation." 
179. Scientific evidence 
180. Evidence of unity of all life-forms known (same DNA coding). 
181. Evidence backing up the theory, such as fossil records and genetic 
lineage. 
182. Logic 
183. Necessity, given reproduction with variation and selection. 
184. Existence of evidence in support 
185. Some animals might have changed certain features to adapt to the 
current climate, but I do not believe that humans were evolved from apes. 
186. Research  show  that evolution is one good scientific theory 
187. Scientific evidence 
188. The theory of evoloution is currently the most scientificly convincing 
theory about our existence on the planet. 
189. Through research it seems more plausable 
190. Reconstructions from the fossil record appear to provide a substantially 
complete model. 
191. Seems convincing 
192. evidence from several scientific disciplines has reached similar 
conclusions 
193. Science 
194. Scientific evidence 
195. Scientific and archaeological (is that the right -ology-) evidence appears 
to support it, and leading scientists and scientific organisations seem to believe 
it. 
196. All of the physical evidence supports it. 
197. Scientific evidence 
198. science 
199. Science 
200. Scientific evidence supporting the theory 
201. Fossil evidence 
202. strong scientific evidence. 
203. There is evidence theory is convincing  but it also has an open end 
204. It is logical 
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205. Scientific evidence 
206. While some of the details are outdated, the general argument of 
Darwin's Origin of Species is well-constructed, persuasive, and thorough. 
207. Scientific knowledge 
208. The biological evidence in the world around us. 
209. Scientific evidence for it. 
210. Evidence from fossils etc 
211. Science 
212. Makes sense given what we know about mutation.  Over millenia, 
mutation can give rise to entirely new species. 
213. It makes sense for me. 
214. Strong scientific evidence from things such as fossils 
215. Scientific Evidence. 
216. The overwhelming scientific evidence, from dozens of diverse fields and 
tens of thousands of peer reviews and repeated papers. 
217. scientific evidence 
218. The strength of the evidence for evolution 
219. Fossil evidence 
220. I am intimately familiar with the scientific evidence at ALL levels. 
221. evolution became a more than science, it may be seen as one of the 
dogmatic, blind eye religions like ... 
222. It is logical and is supported by a wide range of evidence such as via 
examining fossils 
223. evidence 
224. Its provable scientifically 
225. It is supported by current scientific knowledge 
226. I find the evidence for it overwhelmingly convincing. 
227. Fossils showing stages of evolution 
228. evidence 
229. scientific evidence 
230. Scientific evidence 
231. scientific proof 
232. Strong evidence supporting this theory 
233. the evidence. 
234. unlike creationism, evolution is a process that can be seen in action, 
rather than some ridiculous "unseen phenomenon" created long ago by the 
deity of whatever culture you were born into worships. 
235. God is the creator of all living things 
236. Supported by a lot of evidence 
237. I dont think this contradicts too much with my belief in creationism 
238. not just god theory but also intuitively appealing and can be observed 
(e.g., in embryos) 
239. It seems to be a logical theory 
240. Plausibility of evidence from fossils, geological evidence for the age of 
the earth 
241. Some scientific evidence 
242. Historical research supports the theory 
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243. Evidence from DNA & Genetics 
244. DNA/genetic evidence 
245. coherence and predictive qualities of evolutionary theory 
246. Because it is posed scientifically - if we discovered something earth 
shattering which changed everything, we would embrace it, rather than stick 
our heads in the sand and pretend it were not so as creationists do 
247. Is backed by experts that I revere 
248. However, Darwin' theory does not include, but should include the 
evolution of consciousness 
249. Most ground braking scientific research goes back to a "hunch" or 
inspiration. That is not the same as "belief", which seeks not the truth, but trust 
in some higher force. 
250. It is supported by the evidence 
251. People I trust feel the same way 
252. Genes transferred from one species to another will still operate and 
produce the specified protein (even with creatures from different kingdoms). 
253. Disbelief in deities. 
254. Experience 
255. The fossil record 
256. Arqueology facts 
257. Scientific evidence is the only reason 
258. I believe the species is always changing and constantly develoing for 
survival 
259. Evolution is visible in the breeding of new plants, dog breeds, etc. 
260. Seem to have the support of experts in biology and genetics etc. 
261. the evidence is convincing 
262. Biology 
263. Reason 
264. It seems very logical and plausible. 
265. There is no credible alternative theory. 
266. Scientific evidence 
267. Mathematics 
268. Biological mechanisms for natural selection 
269. makes sense. 
270. It is backed up with loads of evidence 
271. Big bang theory 
272. The consensus of biologists supports such a view as overwhelmingly 
indicated by the evidence. 
273. History 
274. Scientists continue to flesh out the theory, always filling in gaps in our 
knowledge. The evidence is not only solid, but growing. 
275. Support by scientific community. 
276. critical evaluation of that evidence 
277. Logical reasoning 
278. Goes hand-in-hand with "survival of the fittest," which makes ecological 
sense. 
279. There are many scientific studies validating the Evolution belief. 
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280. Scientific evidence from physics which tells us about the big bang etc. 
which disproves creationism 
281. That evolution has been observed hundreds of times both in the  lab and 
in the field in micro, macro, cellular and complex levels. 
282. makes sense- everything must come form something 
283. The age of the universe 
284. Logic 
285. It cannot be false, because evolution is the same as the process by which 
we have produced the increased variety of dogs in the past 400 years. 
286. although there is very very simple and small possibility for it , as lots of 
scientists believe in it , many ordinary people also believe in evolution without 
investigating whether there is enough evidence or not 
287. There has been no fundamental criticisms that completely undermine 
evolution to a convincing effect 
288. evidence 
289. It makes sense 
290. It is supported by my own observation 
291. It makes philosophical sense to me. 
292. The most rational explanation 
293. fossil record 
294. makes sense to me 
295. seems the most reasonable explanation 
296. Lacks in theory as part of the normal scientific method 
297. I furthermore do not care for the way that all forms of organised religion 
have manipulated the human race, in terms of the racist, sexist, and often 
abusive attitudes it has encouraged. 
298. Who created the first animal - 
299. Dominant theory taught in schools/universities 
300. Becuase there is evidence of things evolving.. 
301. I have had the experience under powerful psychedelics of extending 
back through my own phylogenic history as far back as primordial soup, so it is 
also experiential - I think this is just as important as the other two, in concert 
with them, and makes my belief stronger (though not absolute) 
302. I like being related to chimpanzees (also I think it is way better if we 
have evolved over millions of years to get to where the Universe is able to be 
conscious of itself 
303. Computer models of evolution show how proliferation of species can 
occur 
304. No reason to make it up 
305. Evolution is a viable reasoned alternative to a belief based entirely upon 
faith. 
306. Observation of evolation of short lived life forms, e.g. fruit flies and 
bacteria and Glaswegians 
307. Lack of viable alternatives 
308. lack of contradictory evidence 
309. Because it is logical, and the more you study it the more amazing it is 
and the more everything makes sense and fits together. The opposite is true 
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with religion and creationism  - the more you think about creationism the more 
absurd it becomes 
310. Is the best theory I know of to explain and predict evolution of the 
species 
311. I hope this questionnaire improves as I go on. 
312. It comes from a scientific evaluation of knowledgeg 
313. Instinct 
314. Once you have reproduction of almost (but not exact) copies of the 
parents, evolution is a (logical) necessity. 
315. Disbelief in other explanations. 
316. Intuition 
317. Cristian religion is one ideology founded by superstitions ideas. 
318. Evolution withstands scientific scrutiny. 
319. My own cursory run-through of the evidence convinves me 
320. the explanation is simple but elegant 
321. Archeology 
322. Obvious lack of intelligent design 
323. Probably my having been exposed to the theory of evolution and taught 
it as being true from an early age has had an impact on me. 
324. Scientific evidence 
325. Philosophy 
326. Observation of evolution in action at present 
327. Everything changes and adapts over time 
328. While details have changed, positions of this general sort have been a 
common feature of the history of the subject; and thus the position should at 
least be taken seriously as one of the plausible hypotheses. And as it seems to 
be a hypothesis that has resulted in good research results, this makes it a 
reasonable hypothesis to accept in the absence of definitive contrary argument. 
329. Musems 
330. No reasonable alternative that stands up to scrutiny has been proposed. 
331. Extent to which it fits in with other areas of science; it slots in to existing 
knowledge and helps other things make sense (unlike creationism). 
332. fits the theories as regards functional adaptation to environment 
333. Have not seen any strong evidence contradicting evolution. 
334. For me, generally, science is more impartial then the bible. 
335. It just makes a lot more sense than what can be read in the bible.  I've 
never understood why human beings can believe that Eve could be made from 
Adams rib when human beings are made through gestation/pregnancy/birth 
and then through human development.  It just doesn't make sense to me that 
someone would believe that. 
336. The simple fact that without evolution, billion dollar industries in 
pharma, biotechnology, genetics etc. would simply not be able to make money 
as all their research is based upon it. 
337. i doubt the details of it and there are many problems in ordering the 
development of species. I'm not sure whether evolution is always to the better 
or just means change 
338. experimental evidence, eg Mendel 
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339. Did I mention that I've deciphered the genetic codes of plants to see the 
things that caused evolution- 
340. Evolution is believed in order to produce a contraargument to support 
the atheist movements. Its a kind of philosopy. It can not be said a pure science. 
For instance althouh it is just a theory, you did not mention the term"theory". 
you also may believe in it without investigation 
341. There is no alternative that is as satisfying 
342. evidence 
343. We can see it in action on a daily basis 
344. It is believed to be true by most people 
345. There are no convincing alternatives. 
346. evidence and falsification. 
347. workable theory 
348. The idea that we all come from almost the same few forms of life is quite 
"comforting" and makes me think of human being not as the best living 
creature, but just as part of the nature of this planet 
349. there's too many other reasons to list, to be honest, but another one from 
the top of my hungover head would be that creationism does not explain 
phenomena such as dinosaurs, which, if the world WAS created by an 
intelligent designer, would not exist. 
350. I dont believe in it 
351. Explains lots of our own thinking/behaviours e.g. system 1 and 2 - 




352. I believe that some people are more in tuned- better at reading people in 
general. (body language- in tuned with someones emotions) 
353. I have studied it experimentally under very carefully controlled 
conditions and I am compelled by my own findings 
354. It seems very unlikely 
355. There are recorded instances of things that we, as yet, cannot rationally 
explain. 
356. Anecdotal evidence, whilst flawed, is strong 
357. No evidence 
358. anecdotal evidence 
359. lack of scientific evidence 
360. No evidence whatsoever in support of it which has not been found to be 
fraudulent 
361. There doesn't seem to be proper evidence - just unrefutable anecdotes. 
362. There is no evidence for it. 
363. Subjective experience 
364. There is no plausible evidence for it, despite rigorous attempts to find it 
365. "Proofs of ESP (an oxymoron perhaps, better to call it 'super sensory 
perception'-) come from two sources.  The first one is an inner proof such as 
thinking about the person 1 minute before they ring on the phone, or having a 
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dream which provides information that later turns out to be accurate. These are 
generally quite hard (but not impossible-) to substantiate scientifically to others.   
366. The second type are say from a vision that provides facts from past life 
events, which were impossible to know from ones experience in this life.   
367. This last type has been extensively documented in the painstaking 
research of the late Prof. Ian Stephenson of Virginia University, USA.   
368. It is important to remember that we know so little about the mind and 
states of consciousness that it is hard if not impossible to say what is the 
""normal way"" of using one's perceptions unless we restrict them solely to the 
waking conscious state." 
369. Personal experience 
370. There is no evidence for it in properly-controlled experiments. 
371. Some things cant be easily explained. Although not likely to be a 
'magical reason', some people are better at perceiving certain subtleties - such as 
in cold reading 
372. Intuition 
373. Personal experience 
374. Research  show  that ESP is one good scientific hypotheses. 
375. It's a muddy definition - I think there are ways (non-paranormal) that 
our minds perceive and receive data that we can't yet give a convincing 
scientific account of, such as emotional contagion. 
376. I do not believe in extra sensory perception. I do think it is possible that 
it could exist. There is no scientific evidence for it, but that doesn't mean that it 
doesn't exist. I think that some human beings have greater perception than 
others. 
377. Psychology lessons 
378. There is no convincing argument for how this might take place. 
However, I do not discount the possibility that one might some day be found 
through scientific study. 
379. Prolonged fieldwork among spiritualists have convinced me that the 
supposed evidence for ESP is invalid 
380. unconvincing 
381. Research 
382. Lack of evidence 
383. As far as I am aware, when tests have been conducted with people who 
claim to have ESP, the results have not shown any evidence of ESP. 
384. It has failed every well controlled test. 
385. There's no evidence for it 
386. empathy 
387. Science 
388. No supporting evidence to show it exists 
389. No evidence of the phenomenon 
390. I don't really believe in it, as there is no evidence that it exists, but i 
would like it to. 
391. I have never heard of any evidence that it exists 
392. Too many personal experiences to now disbelieve 
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393. Anecdotal evidence for the phenomenon is extremely common; 
however, that replication has been so elusive is highly worrisome. 
394. The better controlled the experiment, the smaller the effect size (leading 
to the strong possibility that factors other than ESP are creating the effect). 
Experiments are often unreproduceable when done by people who are not 
believers in ESP. 
395. Lack of evidence. 
396. Have had "ESP"-type experiences many times 
397. Experience 
398. Have not seen convincing proof of its existence. 
399. For me It can be possible. 
400. No proof so far, all studies "proving" are methodologically incorrect or 
have been doctored. 
401. There is, as yet, no evidence that such a phenomenon exists, however, 
enough witness testimony exists that it should not be discounted. 
402. i don't think it is extrasensory, i believe that science today has not 
discovered a. all the channels of perception and b. all the perceivable entities. 
403. It's bunkum for children 
404. Personal experience 
405. It fails occam's razor 
406. There is difficulty in ESP being proven in controlled experiments 
407. evidence 
408. Its possible - we know so little of the minds potential 
409. I don't know whether or not I believe in it. I'd like to believe in it and 
I've had personal experiences which support it. However, it's not been proven 
by science. 
410. I have never seen convincing evidence of it. 
411. Popov exposure 
412. I don't know enough about it to decide 
413. Experienced it myself 
414. Has not been proven by science. 
415. do not entirely believe but feel there may be the existence of it after 
further scientific exploration or after development of more advance scientific 
research 
416. Contrasting (mostly negative) scientific evidence supporting the 
phenomenon 
417. Not much evidence that this phenomenon exists, therefore, I am 
uncertain about it to the point of disbelief. 
418. There are many things we don't know about the human brain and 
potential, so I am open minded to the posibility that this ability could exist. 
419. The power of the mind is great 
420. I have read a lot of the scientific literature regarding ESP (for about 20 
years) and have weighed it fairly 
421. There is little convincing evidence for it 
422. While I have little belief in the existence of ESP, I* do like to retain an 
open mind. 
423. Often used as a reason to deceive people 
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424. evidence from parapsychology labs which suggests something may 
happen some time. 
425. lack of plausibility of evidence allegedly showing it exists 
426. Makes absolutely no sense and defies the laws of nature, and thus to 
defy everything which is so solidly and repeatedly supported, it would take 
monumental and replicable evidence to overturn hundreds of years of scientific 
study 
427. I would quite like magic to be true too, but I can't think of any 
psycho/physiological mechanism to support such a phenomena. 
428. It is inconsistent with our best current scientific theories. 
429. Overwhelming scientific evidence 
430. It is fair to think that other people's belief comes from their cognitive 
biases 
431. Experience 
432. Scholarly published research, eg SPR 
433. Laboratory investigation 
434. It all just looks fake and some of it is easy to figure out how they're 
doing it 
435. Arguments adduced in favour of extrasensory perception often fall 
when submitted to logical scrutiny. 
436. Have more convincing alternative theories -- psychological, sociological 
-- for the supposed "phenomena" 
437. no evidence 
438. Studies 
439. Physically impossible 
440. Quite often, it seems that what people believe to be ESP could be down 
to coincidence. 
441. There is no theory for how it could possibly work. 
442. Falsifiability of all claims so far 
443. No possible mechanism available 
444. It would seem very unlikely that it exists 
445. Evidence from those passed to spirit 
446. In at least most cases there is no known medium or force by which such 
information could be conveyed; this, however, while troublesome for any belief 
in ESP is not a conclusive refutation. 
447. Any effect sizes are very very small, and have been shown to be (most 
likely) artefacts of the way the data was processed. 
448. Large number of frauds falsely claiming ESP. 
449. I have the evidence of my own eyes and ears 
450. Reading accounts of research and other accounts 
451. Am not aware of any biological or physical mechanism in the human 
body/brain that would allow ESP. 
452. There are many cases that the ESP can be real. 
453. I don't believe things until I see proof of it. 
454. It seems to exist in some other species, why not in ours 
455. Every rigorous scientific study has strongly insinuated it's a lie 
456.  
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457. It doesn't seem possible, I am yet to hear a logical explanation for how 
this would occur 
458. evidence 
459. Some appear to have abilities even though i think theyre rather hit/miss 
460. I think there are much more interesting existing phenomena to be 
concerned about. 
461. individuals claim but nothing has actually been proven 
462. Some theories, like Sheldrake's, support my observations 
463. Many people are shown to have lied about their "abilities" 
464. Replication of the experiments led to no proof 
465. ESP has a heavy presence in religious beliefs, which I do not adhere to. 
466. I have had numerous ESP-like experiences which would be difficult to 
explain in ordinary terms, although I am very familiar with explanations such 
as poor probabilistic reasoning, confabulations of memory and perception, 
delusion, etc. I have studied my own experiences scientifically, and am left very 
compelled by them 
467. It appears incompatible with the laws of physics 
468. I do not personally believe in ESP, but I cannot totally disprove it, YET. 
469. that's it 
470. it is possible it might exist so I'm not 100% convinced it doesn't 
471. because those who believe in it are generally either simple or fantasists 
who have psychological problems, or "pretend" to believe in order to con 
vulnerable people (which is what most/all "psychics" do) 
472. The people associated with this phenomena have little credibility. 
473. Modern scientific studies is psi phenomena and consciousness studies 
474. Observation / Logic / Understanding of part of history 
475. The orthodox idea about physical world is not correct. 
476. The majority of people who claim to possess esp are found to be frauds 
477. Examples of ESP can be explained in other, more logical ways (e.g. 
subconscious perception). 
478. the accounts are based too much on personal experiences 
479. Personal experience 
480. Laws of physics leave no room for such phenomena 
481. I haven't read or heard anything which would lead me to believe in the 
existence of ESP. 
482. No need for it to explain anything 
483. If it existed, would be easily observable, but it isn't 
484. I would probably put people who believed in ESP in the same category 
as homeopathic doctors and psychics i.e. deluded or quacks 
485. My ability to ready psychically and get information correct 
486. Given the difficulty of eliminating all ambiguity and ruling out all 
alternatives, it seems that it is very difficult to rule out all possible alternatives. 
This favors, but does not rigorously prove, the no-ESP position as the simplest 
hypothesis. 
487. Despite decades of study, research into ESP and related phenomena has 
not advanced in the slightest. 
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488. No currently known or understood viable mechanism to allow ESP to 
exist. 
489. I hope I am a critical thinker who has ruled out other explanations! 
490. People who believe in ESP also tend to believe in other pseudoscientific 
phenomena like the healing power of magnets and reiki, which I don't believe 
in either.  If they have shown themselves to be illogical in other areas, it 
decreases their ethos with me. 
491. Some studies must be done yet to prove wheter ESP is true or not. 
492. Twin studies 
493. I haven't personally witnessed any experience of ESP in myself or others 
I know and trust 
494. evidence 
495. We rely so heavily on our 5 senses we forget about all the others we 
possess. 
496. Even it "proof" were presented, I think we would find a scientific 
rationale eventually for any such phenomena. 
497. I haven't experienced iy 
498. Ihave observed this phonomena in other people 
499. ...but we can't test every single moment of people's real lives, in the lab... 
500. Most people who claim to have, or claimed to have witnessed this 
phenomenon are...well...a bit loopy, I'm not gonna lie. 
 
Opposites Attract 
501. I think we often aspire to be like people we're not like at all. 
502. I don't really 'believe' it, as such, but I am open to the idea that it is more 
true than not.. clearly though it is not absolute, so I don't need to believe it. 
Consequently I did not place it at 1, because I don;t totally disbelieve it, I think 
it is probably a partial truth 
503. I have studied psychology; actually research has shown the more similar 
two people are the more likely they are to stay together 
504. true for some people! 
505. Generally speaking, they don't. Which is why vegetarian deer don't 
graze with carnivorous lions 
506. I've seen some couples who are different, not opposite, and they 
function ok. I've seen just as many couples with lots  in common work too. And 
how do we define 'opposite' anyway- 
507. We know that similarity predicts attraction quite strongly 
508. couples with a lot in common appear to have more stable relationships 
509. It may attract people in the short term, but in the long term in my 
experience, people get very annoyed by people they cant understand who make 
no sense to them and that they dont fit with. BUT i do not see this as evidence, 
it is an anecdote, hence I have not made a strong judgement here 
510. Its folklore but its embedded in my consiousness 
511. I believe that the evidence runs against this claim but I have not 
bothered to closely examine it. 
512. Complementarity 
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513. I do not have strong views on this 
514. By analogy, in physics positively and negatively charged particles will 
attract, as do the N and S poles of a magnet.  It may be a helpful psychologically 
in order to bring balance and harmony to relationships.  Biologically the male 
and female sexes attract (considered as positive and negative) and from whose 
combination of these opposites alone arises reproduction. 
515. I don't have any particular belief about this. 
516. I know of instances where, after initial attraction based on like-
mindedness, differences in political and religious views led to breakdown. 
517. Personal experience with certain character traits. Observing muself, and 
friends and aquaintences. 
518. Opposite or complement are needed to sharing what you have and 
receive what you do not have...to create a higher state of being in a relationship 
and become one. 
519. "Sometimes they do, and people notice. Mostly they don't and people 
dont notice. 
520. Sometimes similars attract, and people notice. Mostly they don't and 
people don't notice." 
521. No views at all 
522. I don’t know if have any scientific explanation. 
523. It is striking the extent to which people find or make connections with 
other people who - often unhelpfully - meet a need or fill a gap for them. This 
includes 'opposites attract'. 
524. I do not believe that opposites attract. That some people considered 
opposites attract is as likely as people who are similar attracting to eachother. 
525. Not everyone in the world has someone who matches them completely 
526. There are many examples of when people who might be described as 
'opposites' have long and happy relationships, but there are also many counter-
examples. 





531. I don't think it's true that people who share absolutely nothing in 
common could happily coexist  - some common ground is usually necessary for 
any sort of relationship to form. However, strong differences might not 
necessarily drive people apart. 
532. Purely anecdotal - I know people for whom it seems to be true, at least 
in some respects.  I know other people for whom it doesn't appear to be true at 
all. 
533. I don't have a belief on this. I'm unaware of evidence one way or the 
other. 
534. need of common grounds and shared values 
535. You see both cases in real life. 
536. Evidence suggests this is not the case. 
537. Personal experience 
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538. I think they do, but only in the same way that similar things attract and 
so on. 
539. relief from boredom 
540. I have never thought about it.  Something to do with genetics and 
pheromones maybe 
541. complement each other 
542. Clearly they often do; the only question, then, is how this compares with 
like attracting like, which also seems often to happen. 
543. People tend to find partners who are of very similar background to 
them (socio-economic, education, etc.). They therefore tend to have many 
things in common. 
544. Research seems to be against this (2005 study from University of Iowa 
found that Personality was especially important to be similar). 
545. Too general a statement!  There must be many occasions where 
opposites do not attract 
546. They can and they cannot - dependent on a persons experience whilst 
growings up, their beleifs and bout the world and themselves and relationships 
etc 
547. My boyfriend and I are opposites in some ways, and it seems to work 
well. 
548. I don´t believe in the idea of opposites attract. 
549. I think this is sometimes the case, sometimes not, and cannot be fitted 
into a box. 
550. psychology studies show you stay together longer if you are similar in 
you values, beliefs and needs. 
551. Again it is childish bunkum for immature people 
552. My personal experience has been otherwise 
553. I have seen counterexamples 
554. This is by no means the case for everyone, in my own experience I have 
observed many long-term couples that are similar or at least not opposite to one 
another 
555.  
556. I believe that opposites can sometimes be complementary but this will 
be very individual and different for each couple 
557. Ive been attracted and attracted interest from people my opposite 
558. It isn't supported by current scientific knowledge 
559. Scientific evidence suggests that people are attracted to people who are 
similar to themselves. 
560. My girlfriend is very different to me in what hobbies she has 
561. most couples seem similar in fundamental beliefs e.g. politics / religion - 
depends what opposites you mean! 
562. Personal experience 
563. most relationships i have viewed where partners are opposite tend to 
not last as long as those who are equally matched 
564. No scientific evidence of this idea 
565. too simplistic a concept. 
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566. while you can't really generalize that opposites attract, I have witnessed 
the existence of this, when 2 of my friends started dating each other 
567. There is some evidence that opposites attract, but actually more often it 
seems the case that people are attracted to people that are similar to them, not 
different to them. 
568. We see it as mysterious.. as we may not fully understand that person 
569. It does not hold up when considering people I know 
570. not true for other people! 
571. One can see examples of symbiotic co-operation in nature. 
572. initial attraction of difference may later turn into conflict 
573. I dont have overly fixed views, I think in some instances opposites may 
attract, while other people prefer those like themselves. I prefer people like me. 
I could not abide someone who had different values or attitudes for more than 
a minute. Again, this is not evidence either way so I have not given a strong 
decision 
574. I know of no scientific findings to suggest its true/false: I haven't really 
critically thought about it before actually 
575. What I know of psychology of relationships appears to contradict it, 
also. 
576. Positive and negative balancing for equilibrium 
577. It does not seem to be supported by the relationships I see around me 
578. It seems unlikely, a priori, that people who have widely different views 
and tastes would be able to live together happily for long. 
579. I've also felt the opposite to be true. 
580. "Observation. 
581.  Be attract by similitude is an easy way to interact , feeling apart to a 
group, but disturb the way an observer could perceive the others ""group"" and  
then create a danger for the harmony in the community." 
582. Make no sense from psychology and social point of view, because 
peoples are strongly different between them. 
583. Personal experiences show that opposites attract 
584. I think it more likely that people are attracted to those who are similar to 
themselves. This is indicated by the examples of siblings who have met only in 
later life and are attracted to one another. 
585. its a subjective notion that cannot be proven 
586. Understanding of the Laws of Attraction 
587. Relationships differ from person to person, so I think that in some cases, 
'opposites' probably do attract, but in other cases they don't. 
588. I would add that while opposites may attract, they are probably less 
likely to stay together long - term. 
589. It's sociology/anthropology, so not a science but soft and vague, so I 
have no strong belief either way. 
590. Similarity between husband and self 
591. Contra-indicated on an evolutionary basis 
592. personal experience. probably know more couples who have lots of 
things in common than not. 
593. novelty 
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594. ying and yang 
595. It's entirely possible that Opposites Attract is true for some attributes 
and not for others. 
596. People are very complicated and can't be reduced to just a personality 
type or hobby. Even if some of these features are seen to be opposite they will 
only be a small part of what makes up each partner. 
597. Evidence not nearly as solid as creationism/evolution/ESP, so ranked as 
3, not 1. 
598. Even where people are attracted to others who are the opposite of them 
in significant ways, this cannot be generalised from. 
599. From what I have seen in other people's relationships, it can work well 
to have a calm person in the relationship to calm down the energetic one, and 
an energetic person to provide the impetus to get stuff done. 
600. My personal experience suggests this is rarely the case. Almost all the 
long and short term relationships I have been in or have even heard about 
involve similar couples 
601. i have longer, and closer relationships with people who are like me 
602. My experience of other peoples' relationships has been otherwise 
603. I have seen examples 
604. There is a general consensus that this can be  a common occurrence, 
however is not a general rule. 
605. actually I think people are more often attracted to someone who 
resembles them in values and attitudes 
606. Could be pheremonal and biochemical for reproductive requirements 
607. My own observations of couples suggest that opposites do not attract. 
608. I think generally girls will have different hobbies to boys. Or different 
personalities in same sex couples will attract 
609. Philosophy Schopenhauer 
610. Personal experiences (my parents, my friends, my last relationships). 
Though this wouldn't be considered a scientific evidence... 
611. However, that was one relationship out of the many relationships I've 
seen, therefore it IS an unlikely phenomenon 
612. Our personalities maybe be oppsite but together make the perfect team 
613. I do not believe it to be true 
614. I don't have a strong opinion either way 
615. In biology, opposites attract when there is some mutual benefit to be 
had.  In Psychology 9and politics), opposites can frequently detract rather than 
attract. 
616. there is some truth in it as it's good to have complementary 
characteristics in a relationship but not too many differences 
617. Seeing as we are genetically very similar to each other (bearing in mind 
virtually none of our DNA is free to vary) and our environment is very similar, 
we live in the same era, we are all generally extremely similar to each other in 
most respects, our differences seem big to us, but in the bigger picture our 
differences are trivial compared to our similarities. Therefore by logical 
expansion, if we were attracted to opposites you would see cross-species, 
human/plant partnerships, human/mineral partnerships etc, whereas generally 
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people go for people! Therefore with us being so incredibly similar in most 
respects it only makes sense for like to attract like (which in the middle ages 
was the principle of thaumaturgy LOL) 
618. From my personal experience I'd say maybe its true for some people 
some of the timeCertainly my personal experience contradicts it. 
619. Observation 
620. "This is a comment about Afterlife where no boxes are offered. 
621. Which kind of afterlife are we talking about- This is clearely a religious 
concept and in this case I assume you are thinking of the Christian afterlife. I 
am not Christian" 
622. However, it is possible that the novelty of someone with different views 
would be attractive and exciting - for a short while. 
623. Natural law of interconnectivity , only exist in relation of each other. 
624. This idea can be a product of mass Medias curiosity only. 
625. Science and metaphysics 
626. "I think that really, ""opposites attract"" is just a meaningless phrase, and 
relationships are a lot more dependent on individual circumstances. 
627. Meh. 
628. Data suggests the opposite 
629. things like that  suffer from observation bias, if you focus on opposites 
attracting that's what you will find, because that's what you set out  to find. 
630. makes the relationship interesting 
631. won't get bored 
632. If specified further, accepting it tentatively might lead to interesting 
results in further research. 
633. Partners can often have complementary features (e.g. one who plans 
very carefully for the future - to the point of stress, while the other is more 
easygoing). These complementary  aspects can lead to a very successful 
relationship in which a middle ground is sought. In this sense opposites can 
make a good team (though I wouldn't say that it is the reason for the attraction). 
And I maintain that partners tend to be more similar than dissimilar. 
634. Whereas the previous questions were either is true / is not true, this 
question is likely to have a large number of exceptions. Some people won't 
follow the rule. 
635. It sounds more like an old wives' tale than scientific finding :~) 
636. Haven't seen strong evidence to the contrary. 
637. eHarmony would be out of business. 
638. people that are very different might be interesting but you cannot be too 
close to them 
639. It's just a saying 
640. I don't really care. 
641. It depends on the individual and personal preference, I don't think there 
is any particular generalisation to made here 
642. attraction has so many facets it is hard to reduce it to a simple 
dimension 
643. would you really want to live with yourself or someone so like you- i 
wouldnt - it would do my head in. 
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644. I am not sure what is meant by "opposites". Opposites in what sense- 
645. There are so many other factors that are involved in a relationship 
working isolating one variable is very difficult 
646. Observation of others 




648. Becuase I cant imagine all this thought mind a life ever just stopping.. 
649. Persistant universal belief in spirits and afterlife in folklore in every 
culture, no matter how culturally or geographically separated. 
650. Science 
651. scary to think there is nothing 
652. I know of know evidence to support the theory of life after death. 
653. No evidence 
654. lack of scientific evidence 
655. No evidence whatsoever, and it makes no sense. Also, noting that 
people with brain injuries often have dramatic personality changes and people 
with alzheimers lose their memories, personality and memory are the two 
fundamental things which make us who we are. I have just demonstrated that 
both of these are biological within the brain, so upon brain death you would 
not remember anything or be the person you feel you are. So if there were 
anything after, what exactly would it be- It is a nonsensical deluded idea. We 
like to think we are more than electrochemical impulses and storage of data in 
an organic machine, but all the evidence pretty conclusively shows that is all 
you are! 
656. I can't imagine how it would be sustained/work 
657. There is no evidence. 
658. Subjective experience 
659. Sorry, there was a box after all, but only after I had conceded defeat by 
ticking an option under an assumption (Christian afterlife) which may or may 
not have been permissible 
660. It seems to have been made up to satisfy psychological needs 
661. The survival of consciousness after death has been studied by many and 
is being supported as more evidence emerges, including from past the life 
studies by Stephenson et al and from NDEs. 
662. I am very aware of wanting it to be true rather than believing it to be 
true. 
663. No convincing evidence. 
664. Not being able to fully comprehend not existing as a thinking being. 
665. Electromagnetic law of energy, energy do not die but mutate. 
666. Personal experience, accepting various explanations. 
667. Some scientific explanation can be done. 
668. 3 indicates agnosticism. It seems unlikely, but I can't rule it out. 
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669. There is no scientific evidence for the existence of an afterlife. I am open 
minded about there either being an afterlife or not. The truth is, that we do not 
know what happens to us when we die, aside from that our bodies cease to live. 
670. The typical image of the Afterlife/Heaven appears to be mere wishful 
thinking. There is little scientific evidence in support of it. 
671. As in belief in ESP 
672. no convincing evidence 
673. Just too much anecdotal data to ignore 
674. No evidence exists to support it 
675. I find the idea of death frightening - I like the idea that my mind would 
exist in some form after death. 
676. No credible evidence exists to support it. 




680. No evidence to show there is such a thing 
681. No evidence 
682. i don't believe in the soul as something that is separate from the body. 
683. I think it is a concept invented by people unable to accept the finitism of 
life 
684. Been given evidence in the form of messages 
685. Religious authority, both Scriptural and in the testimony of saints. 
686. there is no reason in dwelling about this question. We are going to die 
and find out anyway. Afterlife cannot be tested scientifically, at leat to the best 
of my knowledge, for this reason any evidence supporting afterlife is as good as 
evidence contrasting it. 
687. Religious belief 
688. It goes against the second law of thermodynamics. 
689. Lack of evidence. 
690. No objective proof that such a place exists! 
691. Experience 
692. No scientific explanation. 
693. There are many eveidences that science must study yet. 
694. There must be something more, what a waste otherwise 
695. No way of proving such a thing. 
696. There is no evidence whatever that such an afterlife exists, nor is their 
any way of finding evidence. 
697. you might live on in your ancestors 
698. Come on- 
699. It's comforting 
700. It fails Occam's Razor 
701. quran has good explanations. If we can see the miracles and authenticity 
of Quran(that means if we can see that its the word of God) we can easily 
understand The creator of the universe can easily create the afterlife 
702. There is no scientific proof 
703. atheist 
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704. Just because i dont know for sure that it exists doesnt mean that it cant 
705. I find it hard to believe that I could just stop existing. 
706. I think that the Afterlife is a convenient fiction. I think it stems from the 
concept of a just God. Evil people clearly often prosper in this life and good 
people suffer. If God is just, how can He allow this- There must be an afterlife in 
which we get our just deserts. 
707. I just don't believe life occurs after death. It's impossible to prove. 
708. no evidence 
709. I don't believe in a personal, individual afterlife 
710. No scientific evidence 
711. being brought up in a religious background 
712. Almost negative scientific evidence supporting this idea 
713. no evidence! 
714. No evidence. 
715. Again, there is a lot we don't know about human potential, and I open 
minded to the possibility of an afterlife. 
716. I believe life continues and this is just the first test to get to heaven 
717. We have not as yet understood everything, so must remain open to the 
possibility of things like an afterlife, if they do not contradict our basic data 
about the universe 
718. No way for a person to retain their essential qualia after death due to 
brain stopping working 
719. helps when thinking about loved ones who have died 
720. If there was an afterlife, current life would have no purpose to exist. 
721. Religious superstition to make people happy with the fact that they will 
eventually die 
722. the current evidence for its existence is unconvincing 
723. It is a hideous horrible idea to think that for eternity you would be 
stuck, bored out of your mind, doing nothing much... ugh!!!! If you study 
physics you see the universe will end too at some point, and for the last few 
trillion years there will be practically no light left even, so there would be 
nothing much to watch... imagine how horrifically bored you would be 
724. THere is no evidence, reason to believe so 
725. Contradicts science. 
726. Overwhelming scientific evidence 
727. see previous box for comment on afterlife 
728. It is tied up with the idea of a God who interferes in the running of the 
universe, for which there is no evidence 
729. It's also a philosophical necessity in order to form the basis  of of ideas 
such that impersonal justice exists in nature, on reaps what one sews, the old 
idea of Karma that exists almost universally in all the world's belief systems. 
730. The idea goes against science in many if not all ways. 
731. Intuition 
732. Scholarly research eg SPR, Resuscitation Jnl 
733. Field investigation present one point of view that can´t be neglected 
734. I am not convinced that human consciousness could survive the death 
of the brain. 
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735. Seems to me there's a strong case for the claim that mind is dependent 
on physiological processes in the brain. 
736. accounts are based on personal experiences 
737. Laws of physics 
738. No evidence has been found to prove the existence of ghosts/an afterlife, 
and I'm not sure how it could exist. 
739. What evidence there is (none of it credible) is also contradictory.  
Reincarnation-  Ghosts- Heaven- Purgatory- Pick one! 
740. Philosophy 
741. Impossible to disprove 
742. we are animals, we live  we die, we make the most out of it. 
743. Can see energy forms 
744. Traditional philosophical arguments for the likelihood. 
745. Brought up to believe 
746. I am a materialist. I think that dualism is deeply flawed (though I 
recognize that there is a lot we don't yet understand about consciousness) 
747. Lack of currently understood viable mechanism to allow this to exist. 
748. Can't think of an objective and dispassionate reason for its existence 
749. Reading of others experiences 
750. I am not religious, so I have no basis to believe that an afterlife or 
reincarnation would exist.  If I had been taught about an afterlife since I was 
small, I might be more inclined to believe; but as that never happened, I don't 
even have a "nurture" component to this belief. 
751. It provides hope that there was a point to a life 
752. I find it hard to reconcile a continuation of the self after the life after the 
destruction of the brain, especially when destruction of the self can take place 
through damage to brains that survive trauma. 
753. or the things you have moved and changed in the world 
754. It is a widely held belief throughout history and in many cultures 
755. It doesn't seem to affect the behavior or those who attest belief in it 
756. without accepting gods existence believing in afterlife is nothing. After 
understanding logically the existence of God , mankind may look around itself 
and see that "this God musnt have created everything purposeless, everything 
comes and goes without tasting the life enough. However Gods attributes that 
we can easily understand from the nature, say us that He is merciful, Just, 
powerful . The Power with which The God created this universe can easily crate 
another one after all living beings died. the Mercy with which God gives every 
living being a life and its requirements from nothing, must give them an eternal 
hapiness and life as well. The just wit wich  God gives to everything a suitable 
position in this universe, he gave a soul suitable for lion and gave a body 
suitable for plants. He must punish theevil people who may killed lots of 
people and do many evil things to innocent livingbeings. His just requires the 
punishment and reward as well. So we can understand from the universe 
around us that tghere must be an afterlife 
757. Religious scriptures implying an afterlife are usually prior to scientific 
breakthroughs that would suggest otherwise, such as evolution contradicting 
the design argument 
Appendix 3 – Study 1: Free-Text Responses      312 
758. evidence 
759. Prove to me it doesnt 
760. Consciousness is little understood 
761. I have never seen any scientific evidence that supports the notion of an 
afterlife. 
762. I can't understand how we can exist without our bodies and brain 
763. All that I am is absorbed by the universe 
764. gives hope for something after death 
765. Ockam's razor principle: maybe some "extraordinary" experience looks 
so because we just don't have an alternative simpler, "ordinary" explanation 
766. Just another phenomenon used by religion to convert and manipulate 
people 
767. There have been many anecdotal pieces of evidence e.g. near death 
experiences etc, which suggests that something is going on that many people 
have experienced, but whether or not this is evidence of afterlife is difficult to 
prove. 
768. Theres more to life than what we only see 
769. The is some very tentative evidence from NDEs, mediumship, children 
who remember past lives, and apparition research that suggests that there may 
be something to it. However this evidence is not conclusive, but nor is is 
conclusively dismissed either. I prefer to keep an open mind, but not so much 
my brains fall out. I have also had experiences that on a personal level are 
suggestive of this interpretation when all else is considered. 
770. I don't see how it could exist 
771. on the other hand, not convinced such a place truly exists so only rated 
a 5 
772. "I do not believe there is an after life, if I'm wrong, GOD help me ! 
773. I'm 81 years old, if I am wrong in my disbelief; I'll come back and let you 
know. :^D" 
774. there is a very small chance science might discover it's true. 
775. People hate to appreciate the reality of things, they like to kid 
themselves that everything is meaningful, that there is some grand scheme, that 
something is directing everything, that there is a point. NO there ISNT! And 
that in itself is freeing. It allows you to actually enjoy that you are HERE... not 
to live by evil archaic bigoted religious commandments, but to form your own 
morals, to be yourself, to be proud of that, to do the right thing because  you 
think it is the right thing, to study, to understand as much as possible, and to 
appreciate every second because when the light goes off it all stops. 
776. Its a bit scary actually - to be captive somewhere forever- being tortured 
or spending eternity doing I don't know what. I take confort from the belief that 
I have not exsisted before and will simply not exist again 
777. My own scepticism has been challenged by real events 
778. You keep asking if I would change in mind in the face of strong 
evidence. You do know, of course, that it is very difficult to scientifically prove 
that afterlife does NOT exist. So I wonder how you can suggest that people who 
believe in it could be convince that it does not on the basis of impossible 
science. 
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779. Consciousness is clearly produced by physical activity, i.e. the brain.  
When the brain stops working, consciousness will stop. 
780. There is no evidence for it. 
781. Books by credible authors eg Moody, Ring, Sabom, Fenwick, Parnia.  
Acknowledging anecdotal nature of material. 
782. Not contradict the way that we can see the nature. 
783. no one has returned from the afterlife to report its existence 
784. Brains cease to function at death and all that we are exists within a 
functioning brain 
785. From what I know of science, there is no obvious way that an afterlife 
could exist. 
786. Religion - because it supports that idea to control and manipulate 
people with false threats and promises 
787. Impossible to prove 
788. it would be a very crowded  place! 
789. too many things have happened in my life to disbelieve 
790. The near-universality of such views. 
791. Culture 
792. The idea of an afterlife seems so very much like wishful thinking by 
humans. 
793. Extent of extra things that would be required for an Afterlife to exist (for 
example, a soul or similar), none of which hold evidence for their existence (i.e. 
an afterlife does not fit into current scientific principles). 
794. I believe it's a fictional concept to comfort people who are afraid of 
death 
795. Prefer it to not believeing there is anything at all! 
796. Never felt that I've been contacted by anyone in the afterlife. 
797. Multi personalities have been found in patients with mental diseases 
and post corpus callosum surgery. I wonder - which personality is the soul and 
so which will go to 'heaven'- 
798. the should might be something that never dies, it only changes 
799. It makes as much sense as not believing in it 
800. Its absense is strongly insinuated by current scientific evidence 
801. every prophets said the same thing. they showed people miracles to 
make them accept easily. And this invitation has lots of reasonable aspects as 
well. If somebody who had never tell a lie, comes to you and claim smthing you 
tend to believe in his ideas even if you dont know ecxactly. BUt this messengers 
are abundent in number and each and every of them said the same thing, all of 
them recognised in their community as the truthfull and perfect individuals, all 
of them supported their claims with miracles, so its not feasable after seeing this 
and not believing in afterlife. Furthermore its a kind of arrogance and ignorance 
802. I think humans are egocentric as a species and such is a strong 
motivator for implementing the idea of an afterlife, through sheer want for an 
afterlife is a poor basis for proof 
803. Id like to think that my energy or personality extends itself after my 
body dies in some form 
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804. I am a materialist. I believe that when the body dies there is no essence 
that can live on in any coherent form. 
805. I believe ancestral memories are accessible during critical life 
developments 
806. more meaning to life 
807. Strong doubt about the existence of life after death (that doesn't mean 
I'm not hoping that there would be something else after death...) 
808. It's a nice thought though... 
809. Even if it were not true that there was an afterlife, it is often helpful for 
us to believe in it, as it helps give people hope/motivation etc. 
Appendix 4 – Study 3: Questionnaire      315 
Appendix 4 – Study 3: Questionnaire 
Briefing and Instructions 
 
We all have our personal beliefs about a wide variety of topics.  But, why do people hold their 
particular beliefs?  This study is looking at some of the reasons people might hold their beliefs 
on a selection of common topics.  We will be collecting data on beliefs at a number of points in 
the first term. 
You’ll be asked to answer some short general questions before being asked to rate your belief 
in a number of topics, as well as rating the reasons why you believe or disbelieve.  The topics 
are: creationism, evolution, extrasensory perception (ESP), ‘opposites attract’, and the 
existence of an afterlife.   The questions on each topic span two pages – please be sure to 
answer the questions on both pages for each topic. 
Please read the clarifying definition for each topic.  Circle one number only on each scale to 
indicate your views on each topic. 
Taking part in this study is optional and you can quit the study at any time even if you’ve 
already started filling in the questionnaire.   If you’re not comfortable answering questions on 
a particular topic then please feel free to skip that topic or any individual question on that 
topic, although your responses are much more useful to us if you do answer all the questions. 
All data will be treated with full confidentiality and, if published, it will not be identifiable as 
yours. 
This data is being collected by Duncan Colvin (d.colvin@gold.ac.uk) as part of his postgraduate 
research at Goldsmiths under the supervision of Prof Chris French (c.french@gold.ac.uk). If you 
have any queries about the research, feel free to contact either of them. 
If you are willing to take part in this study, please sign below and provide us with some basic 
background information: 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
I understand what is involved in this study and I am willing to take part. 
Signed:      Date: 
Name: 
Goldsmiths email address (needed so that we can award you your credits): 
Age:         years         months  Gender (M/F): 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! 
If you require any further clarification, please feel free to ask by raising your hand
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To begin with we’d like to ask you five very short general problem solving questions: 
 
 
3) A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total.  The bat costs £1 more than the ball. How many 





4) The City Council of Padua has asked for volunteers to take care of visiting English 
schoolchildren.  Volunteers have to fill in a card.  Mr Rossi and Mrs Bianchi are about 
to sort the cards.  Mrs Bianchi argues that only women will volunteer.  Mr Rossi says 
she is wrong, and states that men will volunteer as well.  Mrs Bianchi counters that if 
that is the case, then the men will be married.  
 
Cards filled in by the volunteers show gender on one side and marital status on the 
other.  Given the four cards below, circle the two cards that you must turn over to 









5) If it takes five machines, five minutes to make five widgets, how many minutes would 





6) In a lake there is a patch of lily pads.  Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how many days would it take for the patch 





7) How many letter F’s are there in the following paragraph? 
FINISHED FILES ARE 
THE RESULT OF YEARS 
OF SCIENTIFIC STUDY 
COMBINED WITH 
MORE THAN A FEW 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 
 Answer: 
Male Female Unmarrie Married 
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Before we proceed to the specific questions about belief/disbelief, we’d also like you 
to answer a few very brief questions about your preferences.  Simply circle the 






8) Which would you prefer to receive? 
 
 
c) £100 now 
 






9) Which of the following would you prefer? 
 
 
a) £100 guaranteed 
 





10) Which would you prefer to receive? 
 
 
c) £3000 now 
 





11) Which of the following situations would you prefer? 
 
 
a) Definitely having to pay £100 
 
b) A 75% chance of having to pay £200 (note: this also means a 25% chance of not 
having to pay anything) 
Creationism – page 1 of 2 
Definition: 
For the purpose of this study Creationism is defined as the belief that the Bible gives a 
literally true account of the creation of the Earth and all life upon it. 
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To what extent do you believe in Creationism? 
completely disbelieve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely believe 
 
For each statement given below please circle a number from 1 to 9 to indicate how much it 
contributes to your particular view about Creationism: 
1) I hold my particular view about Creationism because my view makes me feel good or is 
comforting. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
2) I have arrived at my particular view about Creationism after careful evaluation of the 
objective evidence, both for and against my view. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
3) When it comes to issues like Creationism, I trust my 'heart', not my 'head' to tell me the 
truth. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
4) Personal experience or observation is the reason for my particular view about Creationism. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
5) Science is the reason that I hold my particular view about Creationism. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
6) I hold my particular view about Creationism because the arguments offered for other points 
of view are internally inconsistent – i.e. other points of view contain contradictions within 
themselves and so cannot be true. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
Creationism – page 2 of 2 
 
Now imagine that you were presented with strong evidence that contradicted your view 
about Creationism.  How likely would you be to change your mind on this topic? 
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not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely 
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Evolution – page 1 of 2 
Definition: 
For the purpose of this study Evolution is defined as the development of all the species of 
animals on earth from earlier forms (for example, land animals evolved from early forms of 
fish). 
To what extent do you believe in Evolution? 
completely disbelieve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely believe 
 
For each statement given below please circle a number from 1 to 9 to indicate how much it 
contributes to your particular view about Evolution: 
1) I hold my particular view about Evolution because my view makes me feel good or is 
comforting. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
2) I have arrived at my particular view about Evolution after careful evaluation of the objective 
evidence, both for and against my view. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
3) When it comes to issues like Evolution, I trust my 'heart', not my 'head' to tell me the truth. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
4) Personal experience or observation is the reason for my particular view about Evolution. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
5) Science is the reason that I hold my particular view about Evolution. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
6) I hold my particular view about Evolution because the arguments offered for other points of 
view are internally inconsistent – i.e. other points of view contain contradictions within 
themselves and so cannot be true. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
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Evolution – page 2 of 2 
 
Now imagine that you were presented with strong evidence that contradicted your view 
about Evolution.  How likely would you be to change your mind on this topic? 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely 
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Extrasensory Perception (ESP) – page 1 of 2 
Definition: 
For the purpose of this study Extrasensory Perception (ESP) is defined as the direct 
perception of information by the mind without using any normal way to find the information 
out. 
To what extent do you believe in ESP? 
completely disbelieve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely believe 
 
For each statement given below please circle a number from 1 to 9 to indicate how much it 
contributes to your particular view about ESP: 
1) I hold my particular view about ESP because my view makes me feel good or is comforting. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
2) I have arrived at my particular view about ESP after careful evaluation of the objective 
evidence, both for and against my view. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
3) When it comes to issues like ESP, I trust my 'heart', not my 'head' to tell me the truth. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
4) Personal experience or observation is the reason for my particular view about ESP. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
5) Science is the reason that I hold my particular view about ESP. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
6) I hold my particular view about ESP because the arguments offered for other points of view 
are internally inconsistent – i.e. other points of view contain contradictions within themselves 
and so cannot be true. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
Appendix 4 – Study 3: Questionnaire      323 
Extrasensory Perception (ESP) – page 2 of 2 
 
Now imagine that you were presented with strong evidence that contradicted your view 
about ESP.  How likely would you be to change your mind on this topic? 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely 
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Opposites Attract – page 1 of 2 
Definition: 
For the purpose of this study the idea that Opposites Attract is defined as people being 
attracted to partners who are the opposite of themselves in significant ways (such as in their 
personality or in the hobbies that they like, and so on). 
To what extent do you believe in the idea that Opposites Attract? 
completely disbelieve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely believe 
 
For each statement given below please circle a number from 1 to 9 to indicate how much it 
contributes to your particular view about Opposites Attracting: 
1) I hold my particular view about Opposites Attracting because my view makes me feel good 
or is comforting. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
2) I have arrived at my particular view about Opposites Attracting after careful evaluation of 
the objective evidence, both for and against my view. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
3) When it comes to issues like Opposites Attracting, I trust my 'heart', not my 'head' to tell me 
the truth. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
4) Personal experience or observation is the reason for my particular view about Opposites 
Attracting. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
5) Science is the reason that I hold my particular view about Opposites Attracting. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
6) I hold my particular view about Opposites Attracting because the arguments offered for 
other points of view are internally inconsistent – i.e. other points of view contain 
contradictions within themselves and so cannot be true. 
Appendix 4 – Study 3: Questionnaire      325 
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Opposites Attract – page 2 of 2 
 
Now imagine that you were presented with strong evidence that contradicted your view 
about Opposites Attracting.  How likely would you be to change your mind on this topic? 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely 
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Afterlife – page 1 of 2 
Definition: 
For the purpose of this study Afterlife is defined as a place, or state, in which people 
continue to exist after their mortal bodies have died. 
To what extent do you believe in the existence of an Afterlife? 
completely disbelieve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely believe 
 
For each statement given below please circle a number from 1 to 9 to indicate how much it 
contributes to your particular view about the existence of an Afterlife: 
1) I hold my particular view about the existence of an Afterlife because my view makes me feel 
good or is comforting. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
2) I have arrived at my particular view about the existence of an Afterlife after careful 
evaluation of the objective evidence, both for and against my view. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
3) When it comes to issues like the existence of an Afterlife, I trust my 'heart', not my 'head' to 
tell me the truth. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
4) Personal experience or observation is the reason for my particular view about the existence 
of an Afterlife. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
5) Science is the reason that I hold my particular view about the existence of an Afterlife. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
6) I hold my particular view about the existence of an Afterlife because the arguments offered 
for other points of view are internally inconsistent – i.e. other points of view contain 
contradictions within themselves and so cannot be true. 
not at all my reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely my reason 
Appendix 4 – Study 3: Questionnaire      328 
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Afterlife – page 2 of 2 
 
Now imagine that you were presented with strong evidence that contradicted your view 
about the existence of an Afterlife.  How likely would you be to change your mind on this 
topic? 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely 
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Debriefing 
One of the studies you took part in today asked you about various beliefs and reasons 
for belief.  The aim of the study was to replicate research (Griffin & Ohlsson, 2001) 
which found that people’s reasons for belief in various topics can be broadly 
categorised as intuitive/emotional or rational/knowledge based (heart versus head, so 
to speak).  In the previous research people were more likely to believe in creationism, 
ESP, afterlife, and opposites attract, for intuitive rather than rational reasons, whereas 
the opposite was true for evolution.  You were also asked about how likely you would 
be to change your belief if faced with strong contradictory evidence.  Previous research 
found that people who reported a greater rational component to their belief (or 
disbelief) also rated themselves as more likely to change their mind if faced with 
contradictory evidence. 
However, the previous research did not look at actual belief change.  The present study 
is therefore looking at real world belief change in relation to ESP, following the lecture 
on Anomalistic Psychology that you attended earlier in the term.  In addition to this, 
the study also aimed to control for people’s varying tendencies to inhibit their more 
intuitive responses to things – hence the additional questions at the beginning of the 
questionnaire you completed earlier in the year (e.g. reading is automatic and counting 
the F’s in a paragraph requires inhibiting default reading behaviour).  It is hoped that 
this research will shed light on why and when people change (or do not change) their 
beliefs, particularly with respect to belief in the paranormal. 
 
Once again, many thanks for your participation in this research study. 
       Duncan Colvin (d.colvin@gold.ac.uk) 
       PhD Supervisor: Chris French (c.french@gold.ac.uk) 
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Appendix 5 – Study 5: Briefing and Debriefing 
 
Study 5 used the same questionnaires as study 3, apart from exceptions specified in the Study 5 
Material section in the present thesis.  Only the briefing and debriefing are therefore provided 
here, due to differences required for the sample.  The briefing was on paper and the debriefing 
was sent by email due to some respondents completing an online equivalent for the second half. 
Briefing and Instructions 
 
We all have our personal beliefs about a wide variety of topics.  But, why do people hold their 
particular beliefs?  This study is looking at some of the reasons people might hold their beliefs 
on a selection of common topics.  The questionnaire will be run again at the end of term – 
completing both questionnaires will make you eligible for the £50 cash prize draw (see below 
for details). 
You’ll be asked to answer some short general questions before being asked to rate your belief 
in a number of topics, as well as rating the reasons why you believe or disbelieve.  The topics 
are: creationism, evolution, extrasensory perception (ESP), ‘opposites attract’, and the 
existence of an afterlife.   For clarity there is one topic per page.   
Please read the clarifying definition at the top of each page.  Circle one number only on each 
scale to indicate your views on each topic. 
Taking part in this study is optional and you can quit the study at any time even if you’ve 
already started filling in the questionnaire.   If you’re not comfortable answering questions on 
a particular topic then please feel free to skip that topic or any individual question on that 
topic, although your responses are much more useful to us if you do answer all the questions. 
All data will be treated with full confidentiality and, if published, it will not be identifiable as 
yours. 
This data is being collected by Duncan Colvin (d.colvin@gold.ac.uk) as part of his postgraduate 
research at Goldsmiths under the supervision of Prof Chris French (c.french@gold.ac.uk). If you 
have any queries about the research, feel free to contact either of them. 
If you are willing to take part in this study, please sign below and provide some basic 
demographic information: 
*   *   *   *   * 
I understand what is involved in this study and I am willing to take part. 
Signed:      Date: 
Age:                          Gender (M/F): 
 
THANKYOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! 
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Debriefing 
Hi Everybody, 
Some time ago, on the anomalistic psychology, course you all took part in a questionnaire 
(some of you did two of them) relating to beliefs and why people hold the views that they do.  
And now that data collection and analysis have been completed we can give you the full 
debrief. 
The study that you took part in was looking into factors that might be involved in belief 
maintenance and change.  Previous research suggests that people may have different reasons 
for holding the beliefs that they do.  Some beliefs are held for knowledge-based reasons; that is, 
the person professing the belief believes that it is supported by the available empirical evidence. 
Some beliefs are held for intuitive or emotional reasons; that is, the beliefs in question simply 
make us feel good or we are relying upon subjective personal experience, and so on. Previous 
research by Griffin and Ohlsson (2001) showed that people who said they held their beliefs for 
knowledge-based reasons reported that they would be willing to modify their beliefs if 
presented with evidence that appeared to undermine them. Those who held their beliefs for 
emotional/intuitive reasons reported that they would not be willing to modify their beliefs 
under such circumstances. However, the study was entirely based upon self-report, i.e., what 
respondents thought they would do. 
The study that you took part in attempts to test what respondents actually do. Thus the 
hypothesis we’re testing in this study is that those of you who said you believed in ESP for 
knowledge-based reasons (i.e., you thought that scientific evidence supported such a belief) 
may well have reduced your level of belief but that those of you who said you believed in ESP 
largely for emotional reasons will not have done so.  The results at this stage of the research 
indicate that belief in ESP did reduce after Prof. Chris French's course on anomalistic 
psychology, but this wasn’t related to why people said they held their views on ESP.  Our next 
step then will be to look at this discrepancy between what people say they would do and what 
they actually do. 
As you can see your participation has be genuinely helpful in advancing our knowledge in this 
area and suggesting new avenues of research, so once again, thanks to all of you for taking part! 
  
Finally, you may remember that taking part in the questionnaires entered you into a prize draw 
for a £50 cash prize.  So, congratulations to our winner Phoebe Mansfield!  Just in time for the 
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Appendix 6 – Study 6: Experimental Material 
 
This material was presented online.  ‘System 1’ refers to material designed to appeal to intuitive 
thinking and ‘System 2’ refers to material to appeal to rational thinking.  The material below is 
not in the actual presentation order (see Study 6 chapter for this).  Participants would not see 
all material as they were assigned randomly to different conditions.  The briefing and debriefing 
are at the end of this appendix.  Finally, CRT related items are listed near the end of this 
appendix, as well. 
 
Intro 
The following is taken from the introduction to a news piece looking into claims about 
a new phenomenon known as DVP (Delayed Voice Projection).  Names have been 
changed to preserve anonymity – any similarity to real persons is unintended. 
 
In a new phenomenon that’s being dubbed Delayed Voice 
Projection, or DVP, it’s being claimed that when an audio 
recording device, such as a digital voice recorder, or even a 
mobile phone, is left to record in a quiet room, it can record 
extremely faint traces of things people said the day before, and 
perhaps even further back than that.  If these claims about DVP 
are true then the applications for law-enforcement could be far-
reaching.  While it wouldn’t allow police officers to see into the 
future, like in films such as Minority Report, it could perhaps 
help them solve crimes by hearing into the past.  Could DVP be 
the next big break-through in policing?  We sent our reporter, 
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Belief formation 
System 1 version 
The following is taken from the same news piece on DVP. 
 
Reporter: I spoke to some people who’ve had a go at DVP 
themselves, to see what they think of it.   
Interviewee: We did like they said and we put my friend’s 
mobile phone in the living room to record.  And then we went 
out to the kitchen for half an hour while we cooked dinner.  We 
weren’t really expecting much to be honest, it was just a laugh.  
But, when we went back and listened to it we could hear this 
really faint recording of some of the things we remembered 
saying the day before.  It was really spooky. 
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System 2 version 
The following is taken from the same news piece on DVP. 
 
Reporter: I spoke to one of the people who claims to have 
demonstrated DVP and asked him what he thinks is behind it. 
Interviewee: We all know that sound waves are basically a 
vibration that travels through the air.  But, actually all things 
vibrate in response to sound waves.  There’s already a good 
example from law enforcement, where they can focus a laser 
beam through a window onto an object in a room to hear what 
the people inside are saying.  They do that by the laser beam 
detecting the vibrations that the sound waves are causing in the 
object.  And then, of course, sound waves bounce around, from 
surface to surface in a room, they don’t just stop.  The waves get 
smaller over time, of course, like ripples on the surface of a 
pond, but it takes a while for them to die out.  If you combine 
the fact that the sound waves bounce around and that it’s not 
just the air that vibrates due to sound waves, then I think what 
we have with DVP is we’re recording extremely faint sound 
waves that are still bouncing around or being emitted by objects 
in the room, long after the original sounds occurred. 
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Belief change 
System 1 version 
The following is taken from the same news piece on DVP.  Names have been changed 
to preserve anonymity – any similarity to real persons is unintended. 
 
Reporter: Some of the people I spoke to, who’ve had a go at 
DVP themselves, had a different story to tell, however. 
Interviewee: We did everything you’re supposed to do.  The 
audio recorder in a quiet room with no one there.  All that stuff, 
we were really careful.  We recorded for about an hour and it 
was pretty exciting to hit play and see what there was.  I 
listened to it first and I could hear some really, really faint 
words in it, like really faint.  But then Gemma listened to it and 
she heard something totally different.  Josey did too – and she 
heard something else.  We all heard different things and none 
of it was anything we had said in that room before either, not 
ever.  So I think it’s just a trick of the mind or something.  You 
just hear what you want to hear. 
 
System 2 version 
The following is taken from the same news piece on DVP.  Names have been changed 
to preserve anonymity – any similarity to real persons is unintended. 
 
Reporter: Some of the other people I spoke to had a different 
explanation for DVP, however. 
Interviewee: The short story is that it’s not physically possible 
for the sound waves to stay around for long enough to be 
recorded the next day.  The energy of the sound waves isn’t 
that great and it gets absorbed by the surroundings, especially 
by soft things like carpets and clothes.  They just absorb it and 
the sound wave energy is reduced.  Pretty soon all the energy is 
used up and the sound waves have disappeared.  The sound 
waves won’t be around for longer than a few seconds at most, 
let alone hours or days.  What’s happening in DVP is that the 
recording devices are recording white noise, random 
background static, and people are just listening to the white 
noise and hearing what that they expect to hear.  It’s like seeing 
patterns in clouds.  The human brain is very good at finding 
patterns in things even where there isn’t really anything there 
and that’s what’s happening here. 
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EVP Control Question 
 
Finally, have you ever heard of a phenomenon called EVP (electronic voice projection), 
which claims that messages from deceased people, or spirits, can be recorded on an 
audio tape or digital audio recorder? 
YES       /       NO 
Physics Control Question 
 
What is your highest level science qualification? 
Do you have an interest in acoustics or physics? 
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Belief rating 













































Please answer the following short questions as best you can: 
 
 
12) A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total.  The bat costs £1 more than the ball. How many 





13) The City Council of Padua has asked for volunteers to take care of visiting English 
schoolchildren.  Volunteers have to fill in a card.  Mr Rossi and Mrs Bianchi are about 
to sort the cards.  Mrs Bianchi argues that only women will volunteer.  Mr Rossi says 
she is wrong, and states that men will volunteer as well.  Mrs Bianchi counters that if 
that is the case, then the men will be married.  
 
Cards filled in by the volunteers show gender on one side and marital status on the 
other.  Given the four cards below, circle the two cards that you must turn over to 









14) If it takes five machines, five minutes to make five widgets, how many minutes would 
it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? 
 
Answer: 
Male Female Unmarrie Married 
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15) In a lake there is a patch of lily pads.  Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how many days would it take for the patch 
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16) How many letter F’s are there in the following paragraph? 
FINISHED FILES ARE 
THE RESULT OF YEARS 
OF SCIENTIFIC STUDY 
COMBINED WITH 
MORE THAN A FEW 
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Next, please answer the 4 very brief questions below.  Simply circle the answer that 





17) Which would you prefer to receive? 
 
 
e) £100 now 
 






18) Which of the following would you prefer? 
 
 
c) £100 guaranteed 
 





19) Which would you prefer to receive? 
 
 
e) £3000 now 
 





20) Which of the following situations would you prefer? 
 
 
c) Definitely having to pay £100 
 
d) A 75% chance of having to pay £200 (note: this also means a 25% chance of not 
having to pay anything) 
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Briefing and Instructions 
 
You will be asked to read some excerpts from a news piece on a new phenomenon that 
some people claim is real and others claim is not real.  First you will read an 
introductory description of the phenomenon and then you will hear comments from 
both sides of the debate.  In between this there will also be a brief filler task so that 
some time has elapsed between you hearing each side of the argument. 
Taking part in this study is optional and you can quit the study at any time.  All data 
will be treated with full confidentiality and, if published, it will not be identifiable as 
yours. 
This data is being collected by Duncan Colvin (d.colvin@gold.ac.uk) as part of his 
postgraduate research at Goldsmiths under the supervision of Prof Chris French 
(c.french@gold.ac.uk). If you have any queries about the research, feel free to contact 
either of them. 
You must be over 16 years of age to take part in this research study.  If you are over 16 
years old and you are willing to take part in this study, please sign below and provide 
some basic demographic information: 
 
 
*   *   *   *   *    *    *  
 
 
I understand what is involved in this study and I am willing to take 
part 
Age:                          Gender (M/F): 
Signed:      Date: 
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Debrief 
Thank you for taking part in this study.  Research like this would not be possible 
without volunteers like yourself. 
In this study, we were looking at how people’s beliefs are influenced by different types 
of material.  In particular, we were interested in the effects of ‘sciencey’ material versus 
personal material, such as people’s personal experiences.  Depending upon the study 
condition you took part in you may have seen some types of material, but not others 
(e.g. you might have seen all ‘sciencey’ material and no personal experiences). 
Another important question is whether the type of material we encounter first changes 
how other material influences us later on.  For example, if someone believes DVP is 
real because of hearing about personal experiences of DVP working, will they be 
convinced to change their mind later on if they encounter scientific counter-
arguments?  Or would they be more likely to change their mind if they heard about 
personal experiences of DVP not working? 
Finally, we have to confess that DVP doesn’t really exist – we made DVP up for the 
purposes of the study!  We did this because we wanted to look at people’s evaluation 
of new phenomena.  So we needed something that people would not already have 
heard of.  As far as we know, no one has claimed that a phenomenon matching the 
description of DVP exists.  However, it does have similarities with EVP (electronic 
voice projection), which claims that messages from deceased people or spirits can be 
recorded. 
Once again, thank you very much for taking part in this research study. 
 
